

科技部人文社會科學研究中心  
補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

產業與貿易理論 6

學術研究群

計畫編號：MOST 110-2420-H-002-003-MY3-GB11003

執行期間：110 年 7 月 1 日至 111 年 6 月 30 日

計畫召集人：黃 鴻

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學社會科學院經濟學系

中 華 民 國 111 年 6 月 28 日

科技部人文社會科學研究中心  
補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

產業與貿易理論 6

類別：學術研究群 經典研讀班

計畫編號：MOST 110-2420-H-002-003-MY3-GB11003

執行期間：110 年 7 月 1 日至 111 年 6 月 30 日

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學社會科學院經濟學系

計畫召集人：黃鴻

計畫成員：王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、  
黃鴻

兼任助理：陳彥勳

中華民國 111 年 6 月 28 日

## 補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

### 1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

本案申請規劃辦理 47 場會議，實際辦理 45 場會議

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明）

說明：

### 2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形（請於其他欄註明專利及技轉之證號、合約、申請及洽談等詳細資訊）

論文： 已發表  尚未發表之文稿  撰寫中  無

專書： 已出版  尚未出版之書稿  撰寫中  無

其他：

### 3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）。

說明：

此次學術研究群補助計畫，讓成員可以每週相聚聆聽各位講者演講，發表其研究成果又或者是分享最新穎的研究議題及經典的期刊文章，並且透過每次問答討論，重新檢視成員的研究方向。此外，邀請講者前來研究群演講，更能促使成員及參與學者/學生迸發新的研究火花，產生新的想法，甚至是研究合作機會。研究群補助計畫不僅對於成員，對於講者以及參與者的學術研究均助益甚大。

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果彙整表

|                    |       |  |    |  |
|--------------------|-------|--|----|--|
| 計畫召集人：黃 鴻          |       | 計畫編號：MOST 110-2420-H-002-003-MY3-GB11003 |    |  |
| 中心專案計畫名稱：產業與貿易理論 6 |       |  |    |  |
| 成果項目               |       | 量化                                       | 單位 | 質化<br>(說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)  |
| 國內                 | 學術性論文 | 期刊論文                                     | 1  | 篇<br>請附期刊資訊。<br><b>Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang, Cheng-Hau Peng</b> (2022). Competition, Partial Privatization, and Welfare: A General Analysis. <i>Taiwan Economic Review</i> , <a href="#">forthcoming</a> .  |
|                    |       | 研討會論文                                    |    |  |
|                    |       | 專書                                       |    | 本<br>請附專書資訊。   |
|                    |       | 專書論文                                     |    | 章<br>請附專書論文資訊。   |
|                    |       | 其他                                       |    | 篇  |
| 國外                 | 學術性論文 | 期刊論文                                     | 5  | 篇<br>請附期刊資訊。<br>[1] <b>Wang, Kuang-Cheng A., P.-Y. Chou, W.-J. Liang</b> (2022). Commodity Taxes and Rent Extraction. <i>Journal of Economics</i> , 135, 285–297. (SSCI).<br>[2] Hui-Ling Chung, Hung-Yi Chen, <b>Yan-Shu Lin</b> (2021). Strategic Decisions of a Multi-product Firm under Bertrand Competition. <i>Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting &amp; Economics</i> .<br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2021.1910049">https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2021.1910049</a> . (SSCI)<br>[3] Yen-Ju Lin, <b>Yan-Shu Lin</b> , and <b>Pei-Cyuan Shih</b> (2022). Welfare Reducing Vertical Licensing in the Presence of Complementary Inputs. <i>Journal of Economics</i> .<br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00782-y">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00782-y</a> . (SSCI).<br>[4] <b>Kuo-Feng Kao</b> and Hiroshi Mukunoki (2021). The effects of parallel trade in two-sided markets. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 199, 109721. (SSCI)<br>[5] Horn-In Kuo, <b>Cheng-Hau Peng</b> and K.L. Glen Ueng (2021). On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 23(5), 1012-1021. (SSCI) |

|  |      |                 |   |    |           |
|--|------|-----------------|---|----|-----------|
|  |      | 研討會論文           |   |    |           |
|  |      | 專書              |   | 本  | 請附專書資訊。   |
|  |      | 專書論文            |   | 章  | 請附專書論文資訊。 |
|  |      | 其他              |   | 篇  |           |
| 參與計畫人力   | 本國籍  | 教授              | 6 | 人次 |           |
|  |      | 副教授             | 1 |    |           |
|  |      | 助理教授            | 1 |    |           |
|  |      | 博士後研究員          |   |    |           |
|  |      | 專任助理            |   |    |           |
|  | 非本國籍 | 教授              |   |    |           |
|  |      | 副教授             |   |    |           |
|  |      | 助理教授            |   |    |           |
|  |      | 博士後研究員          |   |    |           |
|  |      | 專任助理            |   |    |           |
| 其他成果   |      |                 |   |    |           |
| (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。) |      | 台灣經濟學會年會、中研院研討會 |   |    |           |

科技部人文社會科學研究中心

## 中文摘要

國際貿易研究和產業組織，向來是經濟學的重要研究領域。尤其是產業與貿易理論，不僅是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程，亦是國內許多學者投身研究的重點領域。臺大國際貿易研究群成立迄今，邁入第二十七個年頭，目前定期出席參與研討會的人數近十五人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且成員半數以上非臺大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次（包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會）高達五十場。本研究群近十年來研究成果斐然，成員所發表之 SSCI 和科技部（國科會）經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊多達七十三篇。承蒙科技部人文社會科學研究中心補助學術研究群計劃、國科會拋光計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費，以及黃鴻教授國家講座經費之補助，本研究群歷年來邀請多位國際貿易領域之海外知名學者至研討會演講。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，進一步加深相關學術社群間之關係，確實促使台灣學術研究圈與國際學術界接軌。2020、2021 接連兩年疫情期間，雖無法邀請國外學者，本研究群仍維持每週集會（線上與實體），並且力邀國內學者前來分享其研究成果，持續提供成員與其他研究者間交流之機會。除了每週集會外，另一特色在於不論報告或討論，全程使用英語。本研究群為國內少數常態性的全英語研究群，且成效良好。在計畫執行期間，本研究群照例於每星期一上午十點三十分至中午十二點三十分，假臺灣大學社會科學院討論室舉行，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或研究群成員論文。希望藉由本計畫經費補助，幫助研究群成員鑽研國際貿易領域，繼續研究熱門前瞻議題，提升臺灣國際貿易學者的研究潛力，引導他們在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表學術論文。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

## 英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty-seven years. Workshop participants are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number of them is about fifteen now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over seventy and the number of papers discussed is more than fifty each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

*Keywords: international trade, workshop*

## 目錄

|                |    |
|----------------|----|
| 題目及內容摘要.....   | 1  |
| 計畫執行心得與收穫..... | 46 |

科技部人文社會科學研究中心

## 題目及內容摘要

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 7 月 5 日上午 10:30~ 12:20  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Licensing a Quality-Enhancing Innovation to an Upstream Firm   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Xiaoli Tian  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economic Modelling</i> 53 (2016) 509–514  |
| 主講人                                 | 陳彥勳  |
| 參加人員                                | 陳彥勳、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、高國峯、施姍全、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、賴宜君、張瑞雲、羅先佑、楊雅棠、王羿傑、許至乙  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>This paper examines the case where a patent holder who is not a producer licenses its quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm, which sells its product through a downstream monopoly. It is found that the patent holder prefers a two-part tariff contract, which includes both a fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty. However, the royalty included in the licensing contract makes each firm price at a markup over marginal cost and therefore makes both consumers and the society worse off, if the innovation is small and the supplier is weak. From a welfare perspective, licensing by means of an ad valorem tax is more efficient, as it allows the upstream firm to be less aggressive when trading with the downstream firm.</p> |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| 研討日期                                    | 2021 年 7 月 12 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                    | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br><b>Title of the paper</b>       | Export Cartel and Consumer Welfare   |
| 作者<br><b>Authors of the paper</b>       | Arijit Mukherjee and Uday Bhanu Sinha  |
| 文獻出處<br><b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b> | <i>Review of International Economics</i> (2018) 1–15   |
| 主講人                                     | 王羿傑  |
| 參加人員                                    | 王羿傑、Beny Trias Oktorá、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、高國峯、施姍全、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、張瑞雲、吳世傑、羅先佑、許至乙、陳彥勳  |
| 摘要<br><b>Abstract of the paper</b>      | The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using a strategic trade policy model, we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, product-market cooperation benefits consumers by affecting the trade policies. We further show that consumers in the importing countries are affected adversely if cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, instead of the exporting firms. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 7 月 19 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Kangsik Choi, Ki-Dong Lee, Seonyoung Lim   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics</i> . 2020; 20190029  |
| 主講人                                 | 施姵全  |
| 參加人員                                | 施姵全、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、丁虹仁、Suttiwan 蘇婷、林燕淑、賴宜君、張瑞雲、吳世傑、楊雅棠、羅先佑、陳彥勳   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers, assuming that the manufacturer sets the input price after observing the terms of the incentive contracts offered to management in the downstream market. Thus, we compare the two models: (1) decentralized bargaining between manufacturers and retailers including two-part tariff contract (2) linear input pricing without bargaining. Contrast to previous studies, we find that in equilibrium, the owners of retailers offer delegation contracts to managers for output restriction regardless of competition modes when offering linear input pricing, which implies that owners do not face a prisoners' dilemma situation and Pareto superior profit is obtained for retailer. Thus, managerial delegation of retailer is not socially desirable due to the output restriction. Furthermore, decentralized bargaining allows to equalize all the equilibrium outcomes in the different delegation structure under both Bertrand and Cournot competition and leads no delegation for the endogenous delegation problem.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 7 月 26 日上午 10:30~ 12:20  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | External Reference Pricing under Incomplete Information   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Dong Van Chung  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | Dong Van Chung  |
| 參加人員                                | Dong Van Chung、陳彥勳、Damiana Simanjuntak、施姵全、黃鴻、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、Beny Trias Oktora、Bui Dang-Long、許至乙、彭正浩、丁虹仁、王羿傑、吳世傑   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | Our key finding is that the social welfare is always better-off in favor of the full information relative to the incomplete information, no matter informed or uninformed manufacturer and irrespective of the mode of ERP policy. For the case of the uninformed government, when the difference between two types of foreign market demand is large enough, the separating policy is always preferred to the pooling policy. When the difference between two types of foreign market demand becomes smaller, the pooling policy is more desirable than the separating policy if two market sizes are similar; otherwise, if the separating policy is more preferred to the pooling policy if the home market is completely big. For the case of uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer, the pooling policy is more desirable than the separating policy only if two countries are comparatively similar in size and the probability of high type is small enough, otherwise the separating policy is called-for. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 8 月 2 日上午 10:30~ 12:20  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Content Provision and Compatibility in a Platform Market   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Alexander Rasch and Tobias Wenzel  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> 124 (2014) 478–481  |
| 主講人                                 | Beny Trias Oktor   |
| 參加人員                                | Beny Trias Oktor、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施姍全、Suttiwan 蘇婷、林燕淑、賴宜君、許至乙、陳彥勳   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This paper studies the ambiguous welfare effects of compatibility in a platform market with endogenous content provision. Compatibility can be particularly harmful if it leads to reduced content but can be beneficial if content is sufficiently increased. |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 8 月 9 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Trade Policies and FDI with an Endogenous Market Structure  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chih-Yi Hsu, Hong Hwang, Yan-Shu Lin, and Cheng-Hau Peng  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | 許至乙   |
| 參加人員                                | 許至乙、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、黃鴻、施佩全、張瑞雲、Suttiwan 蘇婷、郭文忠、梁文榮、林燕淑、楊雅棠、羅先佑、陳彥勳  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | Under an endogenous market structure, this study investigates the effects of tariff and equivalent quota policies on foreign firms' FDI decisions with a general demand. Results show that the equilibrium price is equal to the average cost of the new entrants. In addition, the entry modes of the foreign firms will only affect their own output and the number of new entrants, but have no effect on the equilibrium price and other firms' outputs. We also find that FDI is more likely to occur under a tariff policy than the equivalent quota policy, but the world welfare under a tariff policy is lower than that under the equivalent quota policy. Finally, the cost-efficient firm is more likely to engage in FDI under the tariff and the quota regimes. These results complement the existing trade literature. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 8 月 16 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Vertical Integration without Intrafirm Trade   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chrysovalantou Milliou   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> 192 (2020) 109180   |
| 主講人                                 | 林晏如  |
| 參加人員                                | 林晏如、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、王佳琪、Damiana Simanjuntak、<br>Bui Dang-Long、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施姵全、Suttiwan<br>蘇婷、林燕淑、吳世傑、許至乙、郭文忠、陳彥勳   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This paper shows that a vertically integrated firm has incentives to outsource input production to an equally efficient nonintegrated upstream firm that serves its downstream rival. By outsourcing, it raises both its own and its rivals' cost and generates softer price competition in the final product market. Both the positive implications of vertical integration on the integrated firm's profits and its negative implications on consumers and welfare are stronger with outsourcing than with the commonly presumed insourcing. |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 8 月 23 日上午 10:30~ 12:20  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Can Firms Benefit From Competition?   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi, Ignatius Horstmann, Frank Mathewson  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 76 (2021) 102740  |
| 主講人                                 | 王佳琪   |
| 參加人員                                | 王佳琪、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、Bui Dang-Long、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施佩全、周冰瑤、張瑞雲、林晏如、Suttiwan 蘇婷、周宗翰、梁文榮、林燕淑、吳世傑、郭文忠、楊雅棠、王羿傑、羅先佑、許至乙、陳彥勳   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We typically assume that exit of competitors from an industry benefits those that remain. We show here that, when one accounts for the supply chain effects of exit, this need not be the case. Specifically, when exit downstream induces exit of upstream producers, input prices rise to the detriment of downstream firms. If mark-ups on inputs are large while downstream mark-ups are small, then exit of downstream competitors reduces the profits of non-exiting firms. We show that this result is quite general and argue that it has application beyond competition policy, being especially apt in the area of industry dynamics. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 8 月 30 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Antidumping Regulations: Anti-Competitive and Anti-Export  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | David R. Collie and Vo Phuong Mai Le   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Review of International Economics</i> , 18(5), 796–806, 2010  |
| 主講人                                 | 周冰瑤  |
| 參加人員                                | 周冰瑤、Beny Trias Oktorá、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、施姵全、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、張瑞雲、郭文忠、楊雅棠、羅先佑、許至乙、陳彥勳  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 9 月 6 日上午 10:30~ 12:20  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Free Entry Under Common Ownership  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Susumu Sato, Toshihiro Matsumura   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> 195 (2020) 109489   |
| 主講人                                 | 陳彥勳  |
| 參加人員                                | 陳彥勳、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、郭文忠、Dong Van Chung、林晏如、Beny Trias Oktora、許至乙  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This study investigates the equilibrium and welfare properties of free entry under common ownership. We formulate a model in which incumbents under common ownership choose whether to enter a new market. Using a circular-market model, we find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which may or may not improve welfare. Welfare has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the degree of common ownership, which implies that there is a strictly positive optimal degree of common ownership. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 9 月 13 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Andrei Hagiu, Hanna Halaburda  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 34 (2014) 25–35  |
| 主講人                                 | Suwannajoi Suttiwan  |
| 參加人員                                | 王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、郭文忠、Dong Van Chung、Beny Trias Oktora、Ayu Sasni、陳彥勳、許至乙、蘇承叡  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., facing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.</p> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 9 月 27 日上午 10:30~ 12:20   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chrysostomos Tabakis, Maurizio Zanardi   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Journal of International Economics</i> 121 (2019) 103246  |
| 主講人                                 | 許至乙  |
| 參加人員                                | 許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、郭文忠、Suttiwan、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Ayu Sasni   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the effects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e., the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against non-members as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD activity since the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block effect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.</p> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 10 月 04 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | External Reference Pricing under Incomplete Information  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Van-Chung Dong, Yan-Shu Lin, and Pei-Cyuan Shih  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Van-Chung Dong   |
| 參加人員                                | Van-Chung Dong、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家勸、鍾擘陵、郭文忠  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>External reference pricing (ERP) is common tool practiced by governments to on purpose of lowering domestic price which the price is determined by a basket of foreign prices. The paper aims to explore the interaction between the home government, exporting firm and foreign retailer under a world of incomplete information. Our key findings are that the social welfare under uninformed government and informed manufacturer is always worse-off than one under full information. However, the social welfare under uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer might be better-off if the foreign market is low. Next, given uninformed government, the social welfare under uninformed manufacturer is no worse-off than one under informed manufacturer. For the case of uninformed government and informed manufacturer, the pooling and the separating policy result in the same social welfare. For the case of uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer, the pooling policy is more desirable only if two types of foreign market are comparatively large and the probability of high type is low enough, otherwise the separating policy is called-for.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 10 月 18 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Frenemies in Platform Markets: Heterogeneous Profit Foci as Drivers of Compatibility Decisions  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ron Adner, Jianqing Chen, Feng Zhu  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>MANAGEMENT SCIENCE</i><br>Vol. 66, No. 6, June 2020, pp. 2432–2451   |
| 主講人                                 | Suttiwan Suwannajoi   |
| 參加人員                                | Suttiwan Suwannajoi、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、蘇家勸、鍾曄陵、郭文忠、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 10 月 25 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | 1. Licensing to a durable-good monopoly<br>2. Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | 1. Changying Li and Xiaoyan Geng<br>2. Minggao Xue and Lili Su  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | 1. <i>Economic Modelling</i> 25 (2008) 876–884<br>2. <i>Economic Modelling</i> 28 (2011) 1186–1194  |
| 主講人                                 | 蘇家勸   |
| 參加人員                                | 蘇家勸、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Damiana Simanjuntak、鍾曄陵、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>1. This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, charging a royalty is optimal. For large cost reducing or quality-improving innovations, licensing by means of a fee and a royalty is superior to using either alone. However, for the case of horizontal product innovations, using a fee contract is optimal.</p> <p>2. Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally, we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 11 月 01 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | On the welfare effects of vertical integration: Opportunism vs. double marginalization  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ioannis N. Pinopoulos   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> 174(2019) 169–172  |
| 主講人                                 | Ayu Sasni Munte   |
| 參加人員                                | Ayu Sasni Munte、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、鍾暉陵、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration by an upstream supplier dealing with two downstream firms through secret linear tariffs. We show that whether vertical integration is anti- or procompetitive depends on the distribution of the bargaining power between firms in the pre-integration case. In particular, when the supplier has all, or at least, higher bargaining power than downstream firms, vertical integration is socially desirable. On the contrary, when downstream firms have all, or at least, higher bargaining power than the supplier, integration is detrimental to society. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 11 月 08 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Exclusive Dealing Competition in the Presence of a Dominant Input Supplier and Horizontal Differentiation  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Damiana Simanjutak and Wen-Jung Liang  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Damiana Simanjutak   |
| 參加人員                                | Damiana Simanjutak、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We remove the assumption in Degraha (2013) that the dominant input supplier can charge the monopoly input price at the large market while offering exclusive dealing (ED) contract to manufacturer B at the small market and introduce horizontal differentiation to analyze ED competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival. We obtain the following interesting results. First, given no ED competition from the small rival, manufacturer B will never accept an ED contract provided by the dominant input supplier. Second, given no ED competition from the dominant input supplier, ED contract offered to manufacturer B by the small rival always accomplishes. Third, the small rival always wins ED competition. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 11 月 15 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Trade liberalization and incentives to implement antidumping protection  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Hiroshi Mukunoki   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 72 (2021) 422–437   |
| 主講人                                 | 周冰瑤  |
| 參加人員                                | 周冰瑤、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Damiana Simanjutak、許至乙、蘇家勸、鍾曄陵、郭文忠、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | Reducing trade costs by reducing tariffs can be overturned if the tariff reductions induce governments to implement antidumping (AD) measures. Some empirical studies show that a commitment to reduce tariffs leads to more frequent use of AD protection. Other studies show that we rarely observe this substitution effect between tariffs and AD actions. This study theoretically explores the conditions under which a lower import tariff promotes AD actions. Results suggest that a lower tariff encourages AD actions in countries with a small market size. However, it can either encourage or discourage AD actions of countries with a large market size. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 11 月 22 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | 1. Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market<br>2. Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | 1. Maria Alipranti, Chrysovalantou Milliou, and Emmanuel Petrakis<br>2. Debasmita Basak and Leonard F.S. Wang  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | 1. <i>Economics Letters</i> 124 (2014) 122–126<br>2. <i>Economics Letters</i> 138 (2016) 53–56   |
| 主講人                                 | 丁虹仁  |
| 參加人員                                | 丁虹仁、王光正、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjutak、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | 1. This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition.<br>2. We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot). |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 11 月 29 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Optimal intellectual property rights policy by an importing country   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Takeshi Ikeda, Tadanobu Tanno, and Yoshihito Yasaki   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> 209 (2021) 110113  |
| 主講人                                 | 王羿傑   |
| 參加人員                                | 王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Damiana Simanjutak、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We study the optimal intellectual property rights policies of an importing country with a large market in which producers are not based. We show that the government should ban imitation if the cost of innovation is low, and should not allow free imitation regardless of the cost of innovation. Moreover, social welfare under a monopoly can exceed that under Cournot duopoly, given relatively low-cost innovation. Thus, when the cost of innovation is low, entry restriction can raise social welfare, even when innovators are based in other countries. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 12 月 06 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Upstream horizontal mergers involving a vertically integrated firm   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ioannis N. Pinopoulos  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Journal of Economics</i> (2020) 130:67–83   |
| 主講人                                 | Ayu Sasni Munte  |
| 參加人員                                | Ayu Sasni Munte、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家勸、鍾晔陵、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We study upstream horizontal mergers when one of the merging parties is vertically integrated. Under observable contracting in the pre-merger case, we show that such type of mergers always harm consumers. However, under unobservable contracting in the pre-merger case, the input price may decrease and consumer surplus may increase as a result of the merger even in the absence of exogenous cost-synergies between merging firms. A necessary condition for this finding is that the unintegrated downstream firm is more cost-efficient than the downstream division of the integrated firm. |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 12 月 20 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Information and Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Suwannajoi Suttiwan   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | Suttiwan Suwannajoi   |
| 參加人員                                | Suttiwan Suwannajoi、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、鍾暉陵、郭文忠、高國峯、高國峯   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | As traditional wisdom mentions a network regulation in a two-sided market is a better choice for the total surplus on a zero-fee agent. However, this decreases consumer surplus and the profits of the monopoly platform due to a pricing effect. In this paper, we consider the role of information on agents. This study re-examines the previous works of literature by combining two main ideas of network neutrality and the role of information. The finding shows the role of information has an influence on the monopoly's platform price mechanism through cross-group network externality parameters. The presence of uninformed users, we find that: First, the network neutrality regulation seems a credible threat for consumers when the absence fee is on the other side. Second, the neutrality effect dominates the information effect in our model, the policy planner may decide not to impose network neutrality regulation. Third, competing platforms might always prefer to join network neutrality regulations for better profits. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2021 年 12 月 27 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Noncooperative and Cooperative Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Kosuke Hirose, Sang-Ho Lee, and Toshihiro Matsumura  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i> 176, pp549–571<br>DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0035  |
| 主講人                                 | 許至乙  |
| 參加人員                                | 許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、蘇家勸、鍾曄陵、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 1 月 3 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | The Effect of Information on Tariff  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ayu Sasni Munte  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Ayu Sasni Munte  |
| 參加人員                                | Ayu Sasni Munte、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、蘇家勸、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>Introduction</p> <p>Background:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A tariff or duty (the words are used interchangeably) is a tax levied by governments on the imported products. Different tariffs apply on different products by different countries.</li> <li>• The home country government has policy to intervene the market.</li> </ul> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 1 月 10 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Exclusive Dealing Competition Between Dominant Supplier and Small Rival  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Damiana Simanjutak and Wen Jung Liang  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Damiana Simanjutak   |
| 參加人員                                | Damiana Simanjutak、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家勸、鍾擘陵、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Exclusive Dealing (is a contractual arrangement, the downstream manufacturer agrees to buy the input from only one of the suppliers</li> <li>-The antitrust concern associated with ED: it allows incumbent input supplier to deter a more efficient supplier from entering the market.</li> <li>-The Chicago School Argument entry of a more efficient supplier can decrease the input price a rational manufacturer will not pursue ED</li> <li>-Real life ED issue the antitrust lawsuit raised by AMD against Intel in the CPU chip market</li> <li>-In its complaint against Intel, the New York State Attorney General indicates that Intel offers Dell specific discounts when Dell faces competition from AMD based manufacturers DeGraba 2013</li> <li>-DeGraba 2013 studies ED competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival to reflect the antitrust lawsuit raised by AMD against Intel in the CPU chip market</li> <li>-DeGraba 2013 suppliers compete in the small market <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The D supplier can charge a monopoly input price at the L market</li> <li>-Demands in the L and S markets are constant</li> </ul> </li> <li>-This paper introduces horizontal differentiation to analyze ED competition between a D supplier and a S rival supplier in the large and small market</li> <li>-We introduce a Barbell Model ala Liang et al. (2006).</li> </ul> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 1 月 17 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Humanities and Social Perspectives in Academic Journals Since the COVID-19 Pandemic  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Fu-Chuan Lai, Wei-Cheng Chen, Chia-Wen Chen, and Ming-Hung Tsay  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | 賴孚權  |
| 參加人員                                | 賴孚權、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家叡、鍾暉陵、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>本文回顧 Covid-19 大流行以來，主流學術期刊隨著疫情的進展所論及之人文與社會觀點，包括早期當醫療資源（口罩、呼吸機、酒精、檢測試劑、氧氣及瑞德西韋 (Remdesivir)）不足時的應急分配，到後來新冠肺炎疫苗研發成功但供應不足的情況下，富國與窮國、都市與鄉村、老年人與年輕人、有錢有權之人與弱勢族群之間的優先分配順序，以及政府從事疫調所引發的隱私疑慮。另外，我們也探討了不同群體的經濟活動受到疫情不同程度的影響。最後，我們也討論居家工作與居家學習的影響。我們試圖彙總這些人文社會觀點，特別是公平與福利的面向，並提出我們的觀點與建議。</p> |

|                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                             | 2022 年 1 月 24 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                             | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper       | An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper       | Sang-Ho Lee, Toshihiro Matsumura, Susumu Sato   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal, vol.(issue), pp | <i>Journal of Economics</i> (2018) 123:71–88<br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0559-z">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0559-z</a>   |
| 主講人                              | 陳彥勳   |
| 參加人員                             | 陳彥勳、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家勸、郭文忠   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper      | This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign). |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 2 月 7 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | How Opening the Aftermarkets Affects the Original Manufacturers?  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chih-Yi Hsu, Yan-Shu Lin and Cheng-Hau Peng   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | 許至乙   |
| 參加人員                                | 許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>According to copyright and design law (e.g. Directive 98/71/EC), manufacturers monopolize their ancillary goods market (e.g. electronic or automotive devices). Many cases are showing that enterprises prevent competition in the aftermarket through law or compatibility. The right to repair and repair clause has been gained attention on the United States and within the European Union. The right to repair refers to proposed government legislation that would allow consumers the ability to repair and modify their own consumer product, where otherwise the manufacturer of such products requires the consumer to use only their offered services by restricting access to tools and components, or software barriers put in place to hinder independent repair or modification. This working paper focuses on whether firms have incentives to support the right to repair voluntarily.</p> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 2 月 14 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Input Price Discrimination and Upstream R&D Investments  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ioannis N. Pinopoulos  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Review of Industrial Organization</i> , volume 57, pages85–106 (2020)   |
| 主講人                                 | Suttiwan Suwannajoi  |
| 參加人員                                | Suttiwan Suwannajoi、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、蘇家勸、鍾晳陵、郭文忠、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We study the welfare effects of input price discrimination when an upstream firm that supplies two cost-asymmetric downstream firms undertakes R&D investments. With observable two-part tariffs, banning discrimination always decreases R&D levels and long-run welfare. Under unobservable two-part tariffs, banning discrimination may increase or decrease R&D levels—depending on the degree of downstream cost-asymmetry; but it always decreases long-run welfare. Thus, with unobservable two-part tariffs, a ban on input price discrimination is detrimental to welfare even when its effect on upstream R&D investments is positive. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 2 月 21 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Price Discrimination under Online-Offline Competition  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Wen-Chung Guo and Fu-Chuan Lai   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | 郭文忠  |
| 參加人員                                | 郭文忠、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、蘇家勸、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | An online firm competes with two local offline firms when market sizes in term of demand intercepts are different, and online transaction suffers a distaste cost but benefits from a lower unit cost. Third-degree online price discrimination is shown to be welfare-improving when the scale of the cross demand parameter is large, even though the total quantities of either online or offline products are unchanged. However, if the online firm competes with a chain-store firm who sets uniform prices in all local markets, allowing online price discrimination is always welfare-worsen. Extensive discussions on the case of different slopes and multiple local markets are also provided. |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 3 月 7 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 606 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Host market competition, foreign FDI and domestic welfare   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Yingyi Tsai, Arijit Mukherjee, Jong-Rong Chen   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>International Review of Economics &amp; Finance</i><br>Volume 42, March 2016, Pages 13-22  |
| 主講人                                 | 王羿傑   |
| 參加人員                                | 王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Don Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家叡、高國峯、丁虹仁、Bui Dang Long  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This paper studies the impact on domestic welfare and a foreign firm's entry mode of a greater host market competition. We find that a stronger domestic competition may attract or deter FDI. We also show that higher domestic competition can raise domestic welfare either when it attracts FDI or when it does not affect the foreign firm's entry mode choice. Nonetheless, higher domestic competition may reduce domestic welfare if FDI is deterred. Our finding suggests that competition policy in the host country ought to be complemented by its foreign investment policy when foreign firm makes its FDI/export decision. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 3 月 14 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Silent financial interests and product innovation  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Anna Bayona, Ángel L. López  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i><br>Volume 170, September 2018, Pages 109-112  |
| 主講人                                 | 陳彥勳  |
| 參加人員                                | 陳彥勳、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Don Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁、Bui Dang Long   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We study quality-enhancing R&D, price competition, and welfare in markets with asymmetric passive partial ownership (PPO) holdings. The asymmetries in PPOs generate a positive re-allocation effect which, in some cases, can increase consumer and total surplus in markets with no spillovers |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 3 月 21 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Vertical relations, opportunism, and welfare  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Germain Gaudin  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 50, No. 2, Summer 2019, pp. 342–358   |
| 主講人                                 | Dong Van Chung  |
| 參加人員                                | Dong Van Chung、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家勸、郭文忠、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms' profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 3 月 28 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | International Tax Differences, Trade Costs, and the Multinational's Tax Avoidance  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Yi-Hui Chen, Yi-Jie Lee, Shih-Jye Wu   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | 吳世傑  |
| 參加人員                                | 吳世傑、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家勸、郭文忠、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three distinct effects — strategic, intra-firm profit shifting, and channel substitution influence the optimal level of the transfer prices and the corresponding MNE's location plan of its vertically related affiliates.</li> <li>• When the MNE is simultaneously the input supplier and output competitor for the downstream rival, its downstream affiliate's competitiveness will be dampen (resp. bolstered) when the locations of vertically related affiliates are separated (resp. co-located).</li> <li>• The fiercer the competitive in the local final-good market, the more likely the MNE will separate its vertically related affiliates.</li> <li>• Compared to the case with the absence of ALP, the MNE will be more likely to separate its vertically related affiliates across different countries when the ALP is executed.</li> </ul> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 4 月 11 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Optimum Discriminatory Tariffs: Benevolence, Domestic Ownership, and Opportunism  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Ayu Sasni Munte   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | Ayu Sasni Munte   |
| 參加人員                                | Ayu Sasni Munte、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家勸、郭文忠、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>We present a simple Cournot model for determining the optimal discriminatory tariff rates under the cases of benevolent government, domestic ownership, and opportunism. The main finding of this paper are as follows. First, under the benevolent government, the optimal tariff can be negative. The optimal tariff difference is half of the marginal cost difference if the consumer surplus oriented weight is not very large, and it is independent of the weight. Second, the domestic government may impose lower tariff to the more efficient firm when the domestic investor partially owns the more efficient firm. Third, under unobservable contract, the optimal tariffs are lower than those under observable contract, and the optimal tariff difference is two thirds of the marginal cost difference.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 4 月 18 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Timing of patent licensing and royalties  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chia-Hung Sun   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | 孫嘉宏   |
| 參加人員                                | 孫嘉宏、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>This research analyzes the incentives for a firm to license a cost-reducing technology and the determinant of royalties based on a dynamic insider licensing model with continuous time. We find when the product substitutability or the innovation size is relatively low that the licensor (innovator) sets a royalty that is a little bit high but not too high to induce the licensee to accept the licensing contract and to adopt the new technology. The equilibrium outcome is sequential adoption with the licensor as the leader and the licensee as the follower in adopting the new technology. It is better for both the licensor and the licensee to accept the licensing contract, which is a win-win situation, than for no licensing to occur even in the cases of fixed-fee licensing with differentiated products and unit-royalty licensing with homogenous products. For welfare analysis, we show that a licensor sets an excessively high royalty, and that the duopoly firms are both too late for adopting the new technology.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 4 月 25 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Aftermarket Service Strategies in a Product Duopoly   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Chih-Yi Hsu, Yan-Shu Lin and Cheng-Hau Peng   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | 彭正浩   |
| 參加人員                                | 彭正浩、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、郭文忠   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>The right to repairs and the repairs clause suggest that consumers should have the right to use spare parts or services provided by any firms to repair or modify their consumed products.</p> <p>In the absence of the repair clause the original product manufacturers can monopolize their aftermarket services by enforcing IPR. In other words, the consumer can only use the spare parts or services provided by the original manufacturers.</p> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 5 月 2 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學 713 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of R&D Investment   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Dang-Long Bui and Wen-Jung Liang  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper   |
| 主講人                                 | Bui Dang Long   |
| 參加人員                                | Bui Dang Long、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、高國峯   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>This paper aims to examine whether exclusive dealing (ED) can arise and the effects of it on the level of R&amp;D and welfare by introducing the R&amp;D investment, when the products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. By referring to the New York State Attorney General's complaint against Intel, we define the pricing policy in this paper as that the input supplier offers specific discounted input prices to help the downstream manufacturer win the competition in the downstream markets under exclusivity. We derive several interesting results as follows. First, exclusivity equilibrium arises if the transport rate is low, i.e., <math>0 &lt; t &lt; t_1</math>, while the reverse occurs if <math>t_1 &lt; t &lt; 1</math>. Second, the optimal R&amp;D level under ED is lower than under no ED if the R&amp;D cost parameter <math>\delta</math> and <math>t</math> are low such that <math>\delta + t &lt; 2</math>, while the reverse occurs if either <math>\delta</math> or <math>t</math> is high such that <math>\delta + t &gt; 2</math>. Third, exclusive dealing can improve social welfare if the transport rate is low and the R&amp;D cost parameter is high.</p> |

|                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                             | 2022 年 5 月 9 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                             | Webex online meeting (台大防疫規定所有活動與課程皆遠距舉行)  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper       | The relationship between privatization and corporate taxation policies   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper       | Yi Liu, Toshihiro Matsumura, and Chenhang Zeng   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal, vol.(issue), pp | <i>Journal of Economics</i> (2021) 133:85–101  |
| 主講人                              | 陳彥勳  |
| 參加人員                             | 陳彥勳、黃鴻、郭文忠、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、張瑞雲、林燕淑、許至乙、Ayu、彭正浩、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、施姍全、Dong Van Chung、丁虹仁、Bui Dang Long  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper      | We investigate how the corporate (profit) tax rate affects the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly with a minimal profit constraint for the private firm. We show that the profit tax rate directly affects the behavior of the partially privatized firm, and therefore affects the behavior of the private firm through strategic interactions. Regardless of whether the constraint is binding, the optimal degree of privatization increases with the corporate tax rate. The reason is that an increase of corporate tax rate reduces the profits flowing to foreign investors, which mitigates the welfare losses of privatization. Furthermore, the optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases) with the foreign ownership share in the private firm if the constraint is ineffective (effective). This result suggests that a minimal profit constraint can be crucial in the optimal privatization policy. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 5 月 16 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | Webex online meeting (台大防疫規定所有活動與課程皆遠距舉行)  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | External reference pricing and national healthcare policy  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Dong Van Chung   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Dong Van Chung   |
| 參加人員                                | Dong Van Chung、Damiana Simanjuntak、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、林燕淑、高國峯、陳彥勳、蘇家勸、Bui Dang Long、郭文忠、王羿傑、張瑞雲、許至乙、丁虹仁、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、彭正浩、施姍全、高國峯  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>The co-exist of external referencing pricing (ERP) and reimbursement policy is common in many countries. The purpose of the paper is to examine the presence of reimbursement policy whether the imposition of ERP is always socially desirable. Our key finding is that social welfare in the ERP-executed country can be worse-off if the copayment rate in that country is too high. Under an ERP system, an increase in the copayment rate creates both negative effects and positive effects on the social welfare of interested country, suggesting that the social welfare is a concave function of copayment rate. Under no ERP system, the copayment rate is independent of social welfare. Therefore, if the copayment rate is too large, the social welfare under ERP may be lower under the case of no ERP system. Our main insights are robust when we consider an indirect sale channel. Moreover, the pharmacy-purchasing-price (PPP) ERP system might result in a larger social welfare compared to the ex-factory-price (EPP) ERP system if the home copayment rate is high enough. Finally, the indirect sale channel can result in a higher profit of brand-name firm if the home copayment rate is high enough.</p> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 5 月 30 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | Webex online meeting (台大防疫規定所有活動與課程皆遠距舉行)  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | On the Licensing Game in a Durable-Good Market   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Jia-Rui Su   |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | 蘇家勸  |
| 參加人員                                | 蘇家勸、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Bui Dang Long、丁虹仁、施嫻全、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Dong Van Chung、郭文忠、林燕淑、陳彥勳、許至乙、高國峯、張瑞雲、黃鴻  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>Conclusion</p> <p>This study combines the stream of durable goods and the stream of inside patent holder licensing literature. We find that the optimal scheme of the licensing contract will be non-degenerated two-part tariff. Consumers are worse off than the non-licensing status. However, consumers may benefit from the licensing under the semi-drastic innovation size or under the perfect second-handed market structure which consumers can resale the goods in the perfectly competitive market.</p> |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 6 月 6 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | Webex online meeting (台大防疫規定所有活動與課程皆遠距舉行)  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Cost-reducing R&D Investment and Network Neutrality in two-sided market  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Suttiwan Suwannajoi  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Suttiwan Suwannajoi  |
| 參加人員                                | Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Ayu Sasni Munte、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Bui Dang Long、施姵全、Dong Van Chung、郭文忠、林燕淑、陳彥勳、丁虹仁、張瑞雲、許至乙、蘇家勸、黃鴻  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | <p>Conclusions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The literature on zero rating shows in contrast benefits between platforms, consumers and content providers, which lead to ambiguous total surplus.</li> <li>• We find that the platform's profit, the consumer surplus, content provider surplus and the total surplus may become higher after the platform engages in cost-reducing R&amp;D investment under no regulation rather than that with the regulation.</li> <li>• This result is of interest as it goes against the conventional wisdom from the content provider perspective for the favor to zero rating.</li> <li>• The result implies that the cost-reducing R&amp;D investment improves overall agents utilities and the total surplus. However, zero rating may not be social desirable when the monopoly platform and competing platforms engage in R&amp;D.</li> </ul> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 6 月 13 日上午 10:30~ 12:30  |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學社科院 713 討論室   |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | LOCATING OUTSIDE A LINEAR CITY CAN BENEFIT CONSUMERS  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Toshihiro Matsumura and Noriaki Matsushima  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE</i> , VOL. 00, NO. 0, 2011, pp. 1-13   |
| 主講人                                 | 丁虹仁   |
| 參加人員                                | 丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、彭正浩、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We investigate the effects of restricting the locations of firms in Hotelling duopoly models. In standard location-price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too great from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting the locations of firms and shortening the distance between them improves consumer welfare by reducing prices and transport costs. We introduce strategic reward contracts into location-price models and find that, in contrast to the above result, restrictions on the locations of firms reduce consumer welfare. These restrictions reduce transport costs but increase prices by changing the strategic commitments of the firms. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 6 月 20 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學社科院 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings   |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos, Emmanuel Petrakis, Panagiotis Skartados  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | <i>Economics Letters</i> , 177 (2019) 22–25  |
| 主講人                                 | 陳彥勳  |
| 參加人員                                | 陳彥勳、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、張瑞雲、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、蘇家勳、高國峯、丁虹仁  |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | We investigate the incentives of a high-quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard-quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings (PPOs). We identify the conditions under which there exists an ownership threshold to make such a free transfer profitable for the high-quality firm and show that these conditions are more stringent under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Finally, we show that technology transfer increases aggregate output, industry-wide profits, consumers surplus, and social welfare. |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 研討日期                                | 2022 年 6 月 27 日上午 10:30~ 12:30   |
| 研討地點                                | 國立臺灣大學社科院 710 討論室  |
| 主講題目<br>Title of the paper          | Exclusive Dealing Competition in Asymmetric Markets  |
| 作者<br>Authors of the paper          | Damiana Simanjutak and Wen-Jung Liang  |
| 文獻出處<br>Journal,<br>vol.(issue), pp | Working paper  |
| 主講人                                 | Damiana Simanjutak   |
| 參加人員                                | Damiana Simanjutak、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家勸、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁   |
| 摘要<br>Abstract of the paper         | This paper models an ED competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival in asymmetric markets and introduce horizontal differentiation using the barbell model. We derive the following results. First, manufacturers prefer ED from a monopoly supplier over different suppliers. Second, the dominant supplier wins in the large market by offering a compensation fee a bit higher than that offered by the small rival. Third, the small rival supplier wins in the small market by offering a compensation fee that is a bit higher than the dominant supplier's offer. Lastly, the dominant supplier wins in both markets when the large market is sufficiently larger in size and the difference between consumers' willingness to pay in the two markets is relatively low; otherwise, the small rival wins. |

## 計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立滿 27 年。這 27 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近幾年中研院網路經濟學研討會、東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會、輔仁大學經濟學系研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行（自 2018 年九月起於每星期一上午 10：30 至下午 12：30 間舉行），即使在疫情嚴峻之時，研究群成員仍即刻改採線上會議，毫無中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾九年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。