

科技部人文社會科學研究中心
學術研究群成果報告

產業與貿易理論 5
學術研究群

學術研究群編號：MOST107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10909
MOST 110-2420-H-002-003-MY3-SG11002
學術研究群執行期間：109 年 7 月 1 日至 110 年 6 月 30 日
學術研究群召集人：黃鴻
執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學經濟系

中 華 民 國 110 年 7 月 23 日

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

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計畫召集人：黃鴻

計畫成員：王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩

兼任助理：Dong Van Chung、呂文智、陳彥勳

研讀書籍：(研究群可不必填寫)

中 華 民 國 110 年 7 月

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中文摘要

國際貿易研究和產業組織，向來是經濟學的重要研究領域。產業與貿易理論不僅是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程，也是國內許多學者投身研究的重點領域。臺大國際貿易研究群成立迄今邁入第二十六個年頭，目前參與研究群人數近十五人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且成員半數以上非台大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次（包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會）高達五十場。本研究群近九年來之研究成果斐然，成員所發表之科技部（國科會）經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊多達六十篇。

承蒙科技部人文社會科學研究中心補助學術研究群計劃、國科會拋光計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費及黃鴻教授國家講座經費之補助，本研究群每年均邀請多位國際貿易領域之海外知名學者至研究群與成員一同學術交流。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，進一步加深相關學術社群間之關係，確實促使台灣學術研究圈與國際學術界接軌。

除了每週集會外，另一特色在於不論報告或討論，全程使用英語。本研究群為國內少數常態性的全英語研究群，且成效良好。在計畫執行期間，本研究群照例於每星期一上午十點二十分至中午十二點三十分，假臺灣大學社會科學院討論室舉行，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或研究群成員論文。縱使 110 年 5 月中起疫情嚴峻，研究群成員仍透過 Webex 線上會議系統，於每星期一持續舉行研究群。希望藉由本計劃經費補助，幫助研究群成員鑽研國際貿易領域，繼續研究熱門前瞻議題，提升臺灣國際貿易學者的研究潛力，引導他們在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表學術論文。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty-six years. Workshop participants are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number of them is about fifteen now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over fifty and the number of papers discussed is more than a hundred each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

Keywords: international trade, workshop

主講題目與內容摘要

研討日期	2020 年 7 月 6 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, Odd Rune Straume
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Scand. J. of Economics</i> 113(2), 444–469, 2011
主講人	Bui Dang Long、梁文榮
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、梁文榮、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勳、賴宜君、林毓楸、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We analyze the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering the effect of both introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received body of theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

研討日期	2020 年 7 月 13 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	An Urban Conguration with Online Competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Fu-Chuan Lai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	賴孚權 (Fu-Chuan Lai)
參加人員	賴孚權、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、林晏如、呂得成、Bui Dang Long、Dong Van Chung、賴宜君、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、林號楸
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper introduces the impact of online competition to analysis of the urban congfiuration of a small open city which was first developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969) (AMM hereafter). In comparison to a revised AMM model in Lai and Tsai (2008) which assumed a monopoly vendor, the present paper's online entry brings competition, eventually causes price reduction, city expansion, and asymmetrically ascending land rent, and makes the incumbent vendor relocate to a more remote city boundary. When the disadvantage of online purchasing is not large, the urban configuration demonstrates that most residents purchase online, and only the residents living near the physical vendor make shopping trips. Finally, the benet of city expansion from online competition eventually goes to the absentee landowners by way of the raised land rents.

研討日期	2020 年 7 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER-FRIENDLY INITIATIVE
作者 Authors of the paper	Leonard F. S. Wang, Ya-Chin Wang, Lihong Zhao
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Bulletin of Economic Research 64:1, 2012, 0307-3378
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、賴宜君、林毓楙、周宗翰、洪珮瑜、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、陳彥勳、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer-friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer-friendly or non-profit-based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer-friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer-friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a 'Win-Win-Win' solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.

研討日期	2020 年 7 月 27 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Welfare Effect of Vertical Licensing in the Presence of Complementary Inputs
作者 Authors of the paper	Lin Yen Ju
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、王光正、王羿傑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、Bui Dang Long、賴宜君、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、林毓楸、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper focuses on how the final goods are produced by two complementary inputs influence s the incentives of a vertically integrated firm that licenses the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into an input supplier. We find that the licensor strategically faces a higher wholesale price through vertical licensing than with in house production so as to lower the price of complementary input when the products are differentiated. We also show that the vertical licensing always occurs even when the licensor offers the agreement for free. Moreover, when the final goods are transformed by multiple complementary inputs the wholesale price is set above the upstream marginal cost is more likely occurs.</p> <p>From the view of welfare, this causes double marginalization and welfare reduction even industry profit in the downstream market increased, which is a conflict of the interest between the licensor and the society's desire.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 8 月 3 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Leverage Effect of Bundling on Monopoly Power and Product Quality
作者 Authors of the paper	Hui-Ling Chung, Jin-Li Hu, Yan-Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	鍾暉陵
參加人員	鍾暉陵、王光正、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、林毓楙、周宗翰、陳彥勳、Bui Dang Long、Dong Van Chung、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper analyzes effects of bundling on the competitor's profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when the bundler is a high- or low-quality firm, facing a single product competitor. When the bundling firm produces the high-(low-) quality competing product, bundling is (is not) a preferred strategy. However, when bundling enables the bundler to reverse its quality, bundling becomes a preferred strategy. Independent of the bundler's quality of competing good, bundling reinforces the monopolist's market power toward the monopoly good, which is reverse from the traditional leverage effect where bundling extends its monopoly power from the monopoly good market to the competing good market. When the bundling firm is the high-quality firm, bundling always reduces the consumer surplus and increases the competitor's profit and social welfare. On the other hand, when the bundler is the low-quality firm, bundling enables the bundler to revert its quality level. If the quality difference in competing goods is sufficiently small (large), then bundling increases (reduces) the competitor's profit and social welfare while decreases (increases) the consumer surplus.

研討日期	2020 年 8 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Mixed market structure, concentration and welfare
作者 Authors of the paper	吳世傑
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	吳世傑
參加人員	吳世傑、王光正、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾晔陵、賴宜君、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、周宗翰、Dong Van Chung、陳彥勳、許至乙、林毓楨
摘要 Abstract of the paper	no

研討日期	2020 年 8 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Pricing Internal Trade, Licensing External Rivals, and Market Performance
作者 Authors of the paper	Chih-Min She, Shih-Jye Wu, and Ya-Po Yang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	楊雅博
參加人員	楊雅博、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、彭正浩、周宗翰、林虢楸、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、Lusangu Mkandawire、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、陳彥勳、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper analyzes how a decentralized firm, facing the competition with a centralized firm in the downstream market, can manipulate both of an internal transfer price and an external license contract to achieve its preferred objective. We found that the transfer pricing as well as the technology licensing can be judiciously used by the decentralized firm as complementary tools to practice full collusion with its rival, which may be detrimental to consumer and social welfare. This novel finding is qualitatively robust under various directions of extension: heterogeneous products, alternative time structure, and bargaining power in signing a licensing contract.

研討日期	2020 年 8 月 31 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Non-Discriminatory Pricing, Partial Backward Ownership, and Entry Deterrence
作者 Authors of the paper	Matthias Hunold
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 70 (2020) 102615
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	王佳琪、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、林毓楙、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、周宗翰、陳彥勳、Bui Dang Long、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.

研討日期	2020 年 9 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	External Reference Pricing and Foreign Price Control: Lowest-Price Approach and Average-Price Approach (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Van-Chung Dong, Yan-Shu Lin, and Pei-Cyuan Shih
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Dong Van Chung、施佩全
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、施佩全、王羿傑、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、Bui Dang Long、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Admittedly, there are two popular approaches of imposing an external reference pricing (ERP), i.e. lowest-price approach or average-price approach. This paper sets out a simple three-country model to examine how home government makes a decision of ERP approach in context of international trade. It shows that the optimal policy choice significantly relies on the relative market size between home and referencing countries. Without foreign price control, the average price can be better only if the home market size is relatively similar to the foreign countries; otherwise, the lowest-price approach is more socially desirable. With a foreign price control, the average-price approach has higher possibility to be chosen by the home government if the home market size is relatively large; if not, it hinges on the relative market sizes.

研討日期	2020 年 9 月 14 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Value of Consumer Information in a Vertical Differentiated Market
作者 Authors of the paper	Wei Wei Lee, Wen Feng Tsai and Yan Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	李媿瑋
參加人員	李媿瑋、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、許雅媚、林毓楙、洪珮瑜、呂文智、蔡文鋒、Dong Van Chung、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、Lusangu Mkandawire、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>Conclusion and Discussions</p> <p>The first best is to provide the information to L exclusively but it never emerges in equilibrium.</p> <p>IP will mostly choose to sell to both unless the market is fairly competitive.</p> <p>Policy implication: promoting competition regulating IP to “exclusive sale”</p>

研討日期	2020 年 9 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Comparing welfare and profit in quantity and price competition within Stackelberg mixed duopolies
作者 Authors of the paper	Kosuke Hirose, Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics</i> (2019) 126:75–93
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、王光正、王羿傑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、丁虹仁、呂文智、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、林號楸、陳彥勳、蔡文鋒、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We compare welfare and profits under price and quantity competition in Stackelberg mixed duopolies. Under public leadership, price competition always yields greater profits and welfare than quantity competition. By contrast, under private leadership, the result depends on the nationality of the private firm. When the private firm is domestic (foreign), welfare is greater under quantity (price) competition. However, private firms always earn more under price competition. Introducing the nonnegative profit constraint affects welfare ranking but not profit ranking. These results indicate that profit ranking is fairly robust to the time structure in Stackelberg mixed duopolies, but welfare ranking is not.

研討日期	2020 年 9 月 28 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Effects of Parallel Trade in Two-sided Markets
作者 Authors of the paper	Kuo-Feng Kao and Hiroshi Mukunoki
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、呂文智、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、林號楸、陳彥勳、Damiana Simanjuntak、許至乙、賴宜君、周宗翰、Bui Dang Long、蔡文鋒
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This study investigates the effects of parallel imports in two-sided markets, which increase profits for manufacturers when products have the nature of two-sided markets. Additionally, parallel imports increase consumer surplus and social welfare in all countries, if network externalities from both sides are large enough. However, if one of the externalities is small while the other is large, parallel imports can hurt consumers and welfare of all countries.

研討日期	2020 年 10 月 5 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Price competition or price leadership (I)
作者 Authors of the paper	Makoto Yano, Takashi Komatsubara
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Econ Theory</i> (2018) 66:1023–1057
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、王光正、王羿傑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、洪珮瑜、劉洋、Bui Dang Long、許雅媚、呂文智、陳彥勳、林毓楙、蔡文鋒
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Every now and then, we observe a fierce price war in a real world market, through which competing firms, selling a homogenous product, end up with Bertrand like price competition. Despite this, not much has been known in the existing literature as to why a price competition market is formed. We address this question in the context of a choice between engaging in price competition and holding a price leader. Focusing on a duopoly market, we demonstrate that if the market is tight (or if the relative size of demand to supply exceeds a threshold value) and if the cost differential between firms is reasonably large, duopoly firms choose to engage in price competition. Otherwise, one firm becomes a price leader while the other firm a price follower

研討日期	2020 年 10 月 12 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	International Licensing under Endogenous Tariff in Vertically Related Markets (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang, Dang-Long Bui, Yi-Jie Wang, and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Bui Dang Long、王羿傑
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、丁虹仁、洪珮瑜、許雅媚、劉洋、呂文智、蔡文鋒、陳彥勳、Damiana Simanjuntak、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We construct a trading framework involving vertically related markets to examine the optimal international licensing under endogenous tariff, in which a foreign vertically integrated firm has a cost-reducing technology of the downstream product competing against domestic upstream and downstream firms in domestic markets. We obtain the following results. First, the foreign licensor will choose royalty licensing with the royalty rate equaling two times of the innovation size if the innovation size is low, while choosing mixed licensing otherwise. Second, the fixed-fee licensing can never occur. Third, licensing will always lower the welfare of the domestic country. Fourth, the equilibrium tariff rate will be first increasing, then decreasing, and then increasing, when the innovation size becomes higher. Lastly, the optimal royalty rate will be increasing, then remain increasing but the optimal royalty rate drops to a lower level, and then decreasing in the innovation size.

研討日期	2020 年 10 月 19 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Profit-Sharing Licensing (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Shuai Niu
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>J Econ</i> (2017) 121:267–278
主講人	陳彥勳、林燕淑
參加人員	陳彥勳、林燕淑、王光正、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、洪珮瑜、劉洋、許雅媚、林號楸、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、呂文智、蔡文鋒、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Profit-sharing licensing is quite a common business practice. In a Cournot duopoly model, we showed that if not subject to any restrictions this kind of technology for equity deal would lead to a decline in industry output and hurt consumers. To avoid the industry output contraction and protect the interests of consumers, the government can intervene in licensing by requiring that the profit-sharing rate specified by a licensing contract should not exceed the percentage difference of involved firms' equilibrium outputs before licensing.

研討日期	2020 年 10 月 26 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Technology licensing under successive monopoly
作者 Authors of the paper	Pei-Cyuan Shih, Tsung-Han Chou, Hong Hwang, and Yan-Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、蔡文鋒、Damiana Simanjuntak、許雅媚、劉洋、洪珮瑜、林虢楸、呂文智、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Assume there is an outside innovator who owns a cost-reducing technology, which can be applied to one of the production stages of the product in question. The market structure of the industry is that of an $n+1$ -stage successive monopoly. We shall examine the optimal licensing contract and the production stage the licensing to occur. It is found that the optimal licensing policy is that of a two-part tariff when the licensing occurs at a middle production stage. A pure fixed-fee is called for if the licensing occurs at the upmost production stage. Moreover, if the production technology exhibits a unitary input coefficient (i.e., one input to produce one unit of the output), the licensor's profit and social welfare are both maximized when the licensing occurs at the upmost production stage. However, this result may be overturned if the input coefficient of the production technology is non-unitary. Furthermore, if the technology can be applied to all the production stages, the licensor's optimal licensing contract is to charge a negative sum of royalty rates together with positive fixed-fees.

研討日期	2020 年 11 月 09 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	EXCLUSIVE DEALING: INVESTMENT PROMOTION MAY FACILITATE INEFFICIENT FORECLOSURE (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	CHIARA FUMAGALLI, MASSIMO MOTTA, THOMAS RØNDE
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS</i> Volume LX, No. 4
主講人	Dang-Long Bui、梁文榮
參加人員	Dang-Long Bui、梁文榮、王光正、王羿傑、施姵全、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂文智、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.

研討日期	2020 年 11 月 16 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Minimum Quality Standards Under Cournot Competition
作者 Authors of the paper	TOMMASO M. VALLETTI
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Regulatory Economics</i> ; 18:3 235-245, 2000
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、丁虹仁、蔡文鋒、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dang-Long Bui、陳彥勳、許至乙、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	I study the consequences of imposing a minimum quality standard on an industry in which firms first incur fixed quality development costs and subsequently compete over quantity. I find that a mildly restrictive minimum quality standard unambiguously reduces total welfare, in contrast to previous findings derived in the literature where it is assumed that firms compete over prices.

研討日期	2020 年 11 月 23 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership
作者 Authors of the paper	Arghya Ghosh and Hodaka Morita
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2017 pp. 1044-1067
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、丁虹仁、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、劉洋、林號楸、陳彥勳、Damiana Simanjuntak、呂文智、Dang-Long Bui、蔡文鋒、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	An alliance often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO. PEO can increase the alliance partners' profitability by inducing knowledge transfer, but the PEO itself reduces their joint profit because it induces other firms to take more aggressive actions. This trade-off endogenously determines the level of PEO, which can benefit consumers and/or improve welfare. Given the growing antitrust interest in PEO, we explore the antitrust implications of our analysis

研討日期	2020 年 12 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	A Proposal for Exclusive Contracts with Asymmetric Demands (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Damiana Simanjuntak
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Damiana Simanjuntak、梁文榮
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、梁文榮、高國峯、丁虹仁、呂文智、Bui Dang Long、蔡文鋒、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、劉洋、林號楸、陳彥勳、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>Introduction</p> <p>Motivation: should exclusive dealing be banned?</p> <p>Chicago School: the presence of efficient potential entrant supplier prevents supplier-retailer exclusive contract.</p> <p>This study: the Chicago School argument may not hold when we consider competition between retailers under different market sizes.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 12 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	平行輸入與售後服務市場
作者 Authors of the paper	高國峯
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、王光正、梁文榮、澎正浩、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、劉洋、林號楸、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>我們利用一兩期模型來討論平行輸入與售後服務市場之關聯性，以汽車為例，假定汽車可以使用兩期，如購買原廠汽車，則消費者在第一期可以享有原廠之維修保固服務，但在第二期則需要自行付費來進行維修保養，惟在第二期消費者可以自行選擇於原廠或外場維修，另外，如消費者購買外匯車，則其於第一期即須選擇於原廠或外場維修，同時，第二期亦面對相同之選擇，我們假定原廠提供較高之品質服務而外場之服務品質較低，在此一設定之下，我們發現購買外匯車之消費者不會選擇至原廠進行維修保養。給定製造商選定一零售代理商於外國進行銷售與維修保養，我們發現平行輸入的存在有可能使得製造商之利潤上升，主要原因在於開放平行輸入後，本國市場競爭會變得更激烈，此一結果將降低製造商之銷售利潤，但是另一方面，當外匯車增加，其於外場維修之需求增加，此一效果將使得外場維修商提高外場維修服務的價格，故於原廠維修之效費者將增加，因維修市場為價格競爭，消費者亦願意付出更高的價格至原廠為商品進行維修保養，故原廠在維修市場之獲利將大幅地上升，當此一效果夠大時，則開放平行輸入將增加製造商之利潤。</p>

研討日期	2020 年 12 月 28 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Adriana Gama, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Ana Elisa Pereira
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Economic Theory</i> (2020) 70:1139–1164
主講人	許至乙、林燕淑
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、王光正、施姍全、梁文榮、澎正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、陳彥勳、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、林競楸、劉洋、蔡文鋒、周宗翰、呂文智
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper investigates the effects of exogenous entry on market performance, and the profitability and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in symmetric Cournot oligopolies with firm-specific network effects. With strategic substitutes in the Cournot part of the model, per-firm output is declining in the number of firms, but industry output, price, per-firm profit, consumer surplus and social welfare may go either way in response to entry. We identify respective sufficient conditions for each possibility. The counter-intuitive conclusions tend to require strong network effects. We study the scope for profitability of mergers and the associated welfare effects. In a general analysis, we provide a sufficient condition on inverse demand for a merger to be profitable, which amounts to requiring strong network effects. Under the condition that leads to higher industry output with entry, mergers are always social welfare-enhancing.

研討日期	2021 年 1 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Shin Kishimoto
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics</i> (2020) 129:173–193
主講人	陳彥勳、林燕淑
參加人員	陳彥勳、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、林毓楸、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This study considers licensing of a cost-reducing technology through bargaining between a technology-holding firm and its rival firm in a Cournot duopoly market. To consider the relative bargaining power of both firms, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is applied as our solution. Then, we specify the combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty that are realized through bargaining, and examine the effect on social welfare of the technology-holding firm's bargaining power. The principal findings are as follows. Regardless of the technology-holding firm's bargaining power, pure royalty licensing is carried out, and social welfare is non-increasing in its bargaining power. In our model, licensing through a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is often assumed in the literature, is regarded as the case in which the technology-holding firm has full bargaining power. Thus, the result on social welfare implies that the take-it-or-leave-it offer licensing mechanism leads to the socially worst outcome.</p>

研討日期	2021 年 1 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Yongmin Chen and David E. M. Sappington
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> 3 (May 2011): 194–220
主講人	Bui Dang Long、梁文榮
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、梁文榮、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、Damiana Simanjuntak、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce welfare if the incumbent's R&D ability is sufficiently limited, but can increase welfare if patent protection and the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced.

研討日期	2021 年 1 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	A theoretical and empirical study on factors affecting dietary behaviors of the Taiwanese elderly
作者 Authors of the paper	Hong Yi-Chen
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	洪乙禎
參加人員	洪乙禎、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、林號楸、賴宜君、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational level is helpful for the eating habits of various food, and economic status contribute to fruit and vegetable intake. • Educational level and economic status have positive effects for the dietary behaviors of the elderly. • Also, age and marital status are influential factors on dietary behaviors.

研討日期	2021 年 2 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Quality Choice under Demand Uncertainty
作者 Authors of the paper	Piin-hueih Chiang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	江品慧
參加人員	江品慧、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、林競楸、周宗翰、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper studies the quality decision of a monopolist under demand uncertainty. High quality is expensive and consumers' taste for quality is uncertain when the monopolist is deciding its quality. The consumers have heterogeneous preference over quality. After entry, it observes the consumers' taste for quality and then decides its price. For a fixed variance of consumers' taste, the monopolist chooses higher quality and the market will be covered in both states when the probability of high state increases. For a fixed expected taste, the firm's optimal quality will only start to increase when the volatility of uncertainty exceeds a threshold. Moreover, as the volatility increases, the monopolist chooses a higher quality such that the market will be covered in high state, but only partially covered in the low state.</p>

研討日期	2021 年 2 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Renegotiation Breakdown
作者 Authors of the paper	Dongyeol Lee
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Review of Industrial Organization</i> (2015) 47:25–50
主講人	Damiana Simanjuntak
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、梁文榮、張瑞雲、Bui Dang Long、賴宜君、林毓 懃、呂文智、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper analyzes the seller's incentive to write exclusive contracts with buyers ("exclusive dealing") and the welfare implications of such contracts in the presence of renegotiation breakdown whereby exclusive dealing is able to affect both the incumbent seller's investment and a rival's entry. The analysis shows that the probability of renegotiation breakdown plays a central role in determining the competitive effect of exclusive dealing. Exclusivity is likely to be anticompetitive for intermediate levels of renegotiation breakdown risk, while it is likely to be procompetitive for a very low breakdown risk under linear pricing (and for a very high breakdown risk under two-part tariffs). The result suggests that the competitive effect of exclusive dealing is decided by the interaction between investment promotion and foreclosure, which in turn depends on the probability of renegotiation breakdown and the pricing scheme that sellers can choose.

研討日期	2021 年 2 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 605 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	WHY DO MANDATED INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES STILL EXIST? (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	DAPENG CAI and YUKIO KARASAWA-OHTASHIRO
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Contemporary Economic Policy</i> (ISSN 1465-7287) Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2021, 236–247
主講人	許至乙、林燕淑
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、王光正、施姍全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、林毓楨、周宗翰、Dong Van Chung、Damiana Simanjuntak、Suwannaja Sultiwan、陳彥勳、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	It is widely believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be eliminated altogether. However, local equity requirements (LERs) that effectively mandate multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through international joint ventures (IJVs) are still common and are seemingly persistent. We seek to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt LERs. We demonstrate that LERs can in fact be host governments' optimal choices when regulating the entry of MNEs into domestic markets formerly dominated by public firms.

研討日期	2021 年 3 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 605 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Differentiation and pricing strategies for hotels in sun and beach destinations
作者 Authors of the paper	Juan Pedro Aznar
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i> 2020;1-5.
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、黃鴻、丁虹仁、Dong Van Chung、Damiana Simanjuntak、Suwannaja Sultiwan、周宗翰、賴宜君、許至乙、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper develops a theoretical model for oligopolistic competition in the hotel industry for sun and beach destinations. The aim of the model is to identify in which cases the market structure is biased towards luxury hotels with high-quality investment levels or towards medium and low-quality hotels with cheaper prices. The willingness to pay and the number of customers in each income-level segment and hotels' location are the most relevant factors in understanding the market structure. These determinants of market structure are relevant not only for market participants but also for policymakers with responsibilities in designing tourism policies.

研討日期	2021 年 3 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 605 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	From Segmented Markets to Integrated Markets: an Analysis of Economic Integration and Antidumping Legislation
作者 Authors of the paper	Jota Ishikawa
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 12(4), 706–722, 2004
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、丁虹仁、林毓楸、Suwannaja Sultiwan、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、賴宜君、周宗翰、許至乙、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The paper examines how a movement from segmented markets to integrated markets affects the volume of trade, consumer prices, profits and welfare in a monopoly model. The monopolist can initially discriminate consumer prices among markets with trade costs but has to take arbitrage into account as economic integration proceeds. The analysis provides interesting insights into economic integration and antidumping law. It is shown that the extent of arbitrage and the shape of the marginal cost curve play crucial roles. Surprisingly, it is possible that neither consumers nor the monopolist gains from economic integration, and that antidumping legislation benefits consumers at the expense of producers.

研討日期	2021 年 3 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 605 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	External Reference Pricing and Foreign Price Control: Lowest-Price Approach and Average-Price Approach (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Van-Chung Dong, Yan-Shu Lin, and Pei-Cyuan Shih
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Van-Chung Dong、黃鴻
參加人員	Van-Chung Don、黃鴻、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、高國峯、Bui Dang Long、Damiana Simanjuntak、周宗翰、Suwannaja Sultiwan、賴宜君、陳彥勳、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Admittedly, there are two popular approaches of imposing external reference pricing (ERP), i.e. lowest-price approach or average-price approach. This paper sets out a simple three-country model to examine how home government makes a decision of ERP approach in context of international trade. It shows that optimal policy choice significantly relies on the relative market size between home and referencing countries. Without foreign price control, the average-price approach results in a higher (lower) level of profit (consumer surplus) relative to the lowest-price approach. From home government's perspective, the average-price approach is chosen only if home market size is relatively large; while, the lowest-price approach is more socially desirable if it is middle among three countries. With foreign price control, the average-price approach generates a lower aggregate profit than the lowest-price approach does; but it is ambiguous in terms of consumer surplus. Comparably, price control enhances the possibility of adopting the average-price approach if home market size is large enough, otherwise ambiguous.

研討日期	2021 年 3 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Incentives for input foreclosure (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Roman Inderst and Tommaso Valletti
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>European Economic Review</i> , 55 (2011) 820–831
主講人	Bui Dang Long、黃鴻
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、黃鴻、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、彭正浩、高國峯、丁虹仁、陳彥勳、林號楸、Suwannaja Sultiwan、Damiana Simanjuntak、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in a model of upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly sub-stitutable inputs. Our main motivation is a critical assessment of common assertions that draw inferences from pre-merger observable variables to post-merger incentives to foreclose. In particular, we find that, contrary to some commonly expressed views, high margins on the downstream and low margins on the upstream market are not good predictors for the incentives of a newly integrated firm to foreclose rivals. Besides this contribution to policy, our model also extends existing results in the literature on vertical foreclosure through allowing for the interaction of product differentiation on the upstream and on the downstream market.</p>

研討日期	2021 年 4 月 12 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Royalty Licensing, Tariff and Social Welfare (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	陳彥勳
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	陳彥勳、黃鴻
參加人員	陳彥勳、黃鴻、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、Suwannaja Sultiwan、林毓楙、Bui Dang Long、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	To study the effect of tariff policy on social welfare and technology transfer under a royalty licensing contract, we construct a duopolistic trade model. Besides, we also compare optimal tariff rate and social welfare under different licensing types. We show, by a royalty licensing contract, technology transfer will always occur and consumers' surplus will always decrease under any given tariff rate. Moreover, we find the optimal tariff rate under a royalty licensing contract is higher than that under a fixed-fee licensing contract. Besides, social welfare under a fixed-fee licensing contract is higher than that under a royalty licensing contract. Furthermore, a two-part licensing contract will be either a pure fixed-fee licensing contract or a pure royalty licensing contract.

研討日期	2021 年 4 月 19 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Spatial Price Discrimination, Online Competition, and Zoning under an Urban-Rural Framework
作者 Authors of the paper	Wen-Chung Guo and Fu-Chuan Lai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	郭文忠
參加人員	郭文忠、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、高國峯、賴宜君、Dong Van Chung (童文終)、Suwannaja Sultiwan、許至乙、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	To study the effect of tariff policy on social welfare and technology transfer under a royalty licensing contract, we construct a duopolistic trade model. Besides, we also compare optimal tariff rate and social welfare under different licensing types. We show, by a royalty licensing contract, technology transfer will always occur and consumers' surplus will always decrease under any given tariff rate. Moreover, we find the optimal tariff rate under a royalty licensing contract is higher than that under a fixed-fee licensing contract. Besides, social welfare under a fixed-fee licensing contract is higher than that under a royalty licensing contract. Furthermore, a two-part licensing contract will be either a pure fixed-fee licensing contract or a pure royalty licensing contract.

研討日期	2021 年 4 月 26 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Implicit protectionism via state enterprises and technology transfer from foreign enterprises (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Review of International Economics</i> . (2020) 28: 723–743.
主講人	許至乙、黃鴻
參加人員	許至乙、黃鴻、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、郭文忠、丁虹仁、林毓楨、賴宜君、Dong Van Chung、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We formulate a mixed triopoly in which one state enterprise competes with one domestic and one foreign private enterprise. The private enterprise can transfer its technology to the private rival, which reduces the rival's production cost. We show that if the privatization policy is endogenous, then the foreign firm voluntarily transfers its technology. We also show that the foreign enterprise may strategically raise its local ownership share. These results suggest that the existence of a state enterprise and its potential future privatization serve as an industrial policy that improves the domestic firm's competitive advantage relative to the foreign enterprise.

研討日期	2021 年 5 月 3 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Social efficiency of entry and the implications of two part tariff in a vertical structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Yen Ju Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、Suwannaja Sultiwan、陳彥勳、林毓楙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>We analyze a Cournot oligopoly downstream market that produces a homogeneous product and incorporates vertical relationships when outsourcing input production to an external supplier is a feasible option. We demonstrate that the free entry is socially excessive when there is in house input production providing a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. However, our finding yields an important policy implication, given that entry regulations have often been imposed on industries, such a justification is not necessarily valid when the outsourcing occurs We show that the incumbent can practice input outsourcing through the two part tariff as a tool to deter the entry of the entrants, leading socially insufficient as the external supplier is more efficient. Moreover, we also find that there is socially insufficient when the entry cost is sufficiently low Our result spotlights the two part tariff pricing can have crucial ramifications for the attainment of procompetitive welfare effect for free entry.</p>

研討日期	2021 年 5 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers (I) & (II)
作者 Authors of the paper	Satya P. Das and Sarbajit Sengupta
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy</i> , Volume 10, Number 4, Winter 2001, 565–590
主講人	Dong Van Chung、黃鴻
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、丁虹仁、Damiana Simanjuntak、林毓楸、Bui Dang Long、Beny T. Oktora、Suwannaja Sultiwan、陳彥勳、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The formation of international mergers is examined in the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information, one when a local firm has private information on market size and the other when a foreign firm has private information on its technology. In each situation, parametric configurations are identified under which a merger offer may or may not be made. It also examines the kind of offer and the probability of its acceptance. The likelihood of a merger being formed is also related to the basic market size, demand uncertainty, and cost uncertainty. Welfare effects of tax/subsidy policies by the host country are also analyzed.

研討日期	2021 年 5 月 17 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts
作者 Authors of the paper	Linda Gratz and Markus Reisinger
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 31 (2013) 429–437
主講人	Damiana Simanjuntak
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、張瑞雲、黃鴻、林燕淑、王羿傑、丁虹仁、施姍全、蘇婷、高國峯、Beny Trias Oktora、陳彥勳
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.

研討日期	2021 年 5 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Uğur Akgün and Ioana Chioveanu
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy</i> . 2019; 28: 510–519.
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	Beny Trias Oktorá、高國峯、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、彭正浩、黃鴻、林燕淑、丁虹仁、蘇婷、施佩全、許至乙、陳彥勳、張瑞雲、梁文榮、王羿傑
摘要 Abstract of the paper	In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers' incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.

研討日期	2021 年 5 月 31 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing, Tariffs, and Social Welfare
作者 Authors of the paper	陳彥勳
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	陳彥勳
參加人員	陳彥勳、Beny Trias Oktorá、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施姍全、張瑞雲、蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、賴宜君、王羿傑
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>We construct a duopolistic trade model and apply royalty licensing in the model to study the effect of a tariff policy on social welfare and international technology transfer. Besides, we also compare the optimal tariff rate and social welfare under different licensing types. We show, under royalty licensing, technology transfer always occurs, and consumer surplus decreases with the tariff rate. Moreover, it is found that the optimal tariff rate under royalty (fixed-fee) licensing is the highest (lowest), social welfare under fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is the highest (lowest), and two-part tariff licensing is in-between. Furthermore, we also consider a model with one private firm competing with a partially privatized public firm in a domestic market under fixed-fee licensing and find that the technology-transfer-inducing tariff rate decreases as the degree of privatization decreases. Additionally, the optimal tariff rate is prohibitive when the degree of privatization is significantly low.</p>

研討日期	2021 年 6 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance
作者 Authors of the paper	Giacomo Calzolari and Vincenzo Denicolò
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>American Economic Review</i> 2015, 105(11): 3321–3351
主講人	Damiana Simanjuntak
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、許至乙、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施佩全、蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、賴宜君、王羿傑、陳彥勳、楊雅棠、羅先佑
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.

研討日期	2021 年 6 月 28 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Trade Policies and FDI with an Endogenous Market Structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Chih-Yi Hsu, Hong Hwang, Yan-Shu Lin, and Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、施佩全、蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、賴宜君、王羿傑、陳彥勳、楊雅棠、羅先佑
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Reducing trade barriers, including tariffs and “nontariff barriers (NTBs),” is one of the primary goals for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and afterward the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many countries still determine trade protection policies to protect their domestic industries and consumer wealth. Especially, tariffs and quotas are the methods mainly adopted by various countries.

計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立滿 26 年。這 26 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近幾年中研院網路經濟學研討會、東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會、輔仁大學經濟學系研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行（自 2018 年九月起於每星期一上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行），即使在疫情嚴峻之時，研究群成員仍即刻改採線上會議，毫無中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾七年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。