

科技部人文社會科學研究中心  
學術研究群成果報告

產業與貿易理論 4  
學術研究群

學術研究群編號：MOST107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10808

學術研究群執行期間：108 年 7 月 1 日至 109 年 6 月 30 日

學術研究群召集人：黃鴻

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學經濟學系

中 華 民 國 109 年 7 月 7 日

# 補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

## 產業與貿易理論 4 學術研究群

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計畫召集人：黃鴻

計畫成員：王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩

兼任助理：吳家緻、周宗翰

研讀書籍：(研究群可不必填寫)

中 華 民 國 109 年 7 月

## 目錄

中文摘要.....	II
英文摘要.....	III
演講題目與內容摘要.....	1
計畫執行心得與收穫.....	49

## 中文摘要

國際貿易研究和產業組織，向來是經濟學的重要研究領域。產業與貿易理論不僅是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程，也是國內許多學者投身研究的重點領域。臺大國際貿易研究群成立迄今邁入第二十五個年頭，目前參與研討會人數近十五人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且成員半數以上非台大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次（包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會）高達五十場。本研究群近八年來之研究成果斐然，成員所發表之科技部（國科會）經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊多達六十篇。

承蒙科技部人文社會科學研究中心補助學術研究群計劃、國科會拋光計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費及黃鴻教授國家講座經費之補助，本研究群每年均邀請多位國際貿易領域之海外知名學者至研討會演講。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，進一步加深相關學術社群間之關係，確實促使台灣學術研究圈與國際學術界接軌。

除了每週集會外，另一特色在於不論報告或討論，全程使用英語。本研究群為國內少數常態性的全英語研究群，且成效良好。在計畫執行期間，本研究群照例於每星期一上午十點二十分至中午十二點三十分，假臺灣大學社會科學院討論室舉行，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或研究群成員論文。希望藉由本計劃經費補助，幫助研究群成員鑽研國際貿易領域，繼續研究熱門前瞻議題，提升臺灣國際貿易學者的研究潛力，引導他們在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表學術論文。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

## 英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty-five years. Workshop members are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number is about twenty now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over fifty and the number of papers discussed is more than a hundred each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

*Keywords: international trade, workshop*

## 演講題目與內容摘要

研討日期	2019 年 7 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Multi-input-multi-product Firm and Profitable Disadvantages
作者 Authors of the paper	Pei-Cyuan Shih, Yan-Shu Lin, and Yen-Ju Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、林晏如、周宗翰、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper studies profitable disadvantages with a multi-input-multi-product firm in which he produces two vertical differentiated products where the high quality product requires two complementary inputs, specific and common inputs, but the low quality product requires common input only. We show that when the cost of the specific input is large, an increase in the specific input's cost raises the profit of the multi-input-multi-product firm, called profitable disadvantage. This finding occurs in the bargaining power of the specific input supplier as well. Moreover, we find that the marginal product of common input plays an important role if the two vertical differentiated products are sold in one market, but not in selling in two separated markets.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 7 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Brick and mortar s innovation, entrant 's store type, and social welfare
作者 Authors of the paper	Ku Chu Tsao , Ping Chun Chung, Yan Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	曹古駒、林燕淑
參加人員	曹古駒、林燕淑、王昇傑、高國峯、梁文榮、張瑞雲、鍾睦陵、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This article uses a linear market model to explore the incumbent's R&D strategy and the new entrant's preference on competition mode BB competition (both incumbent and new entrant are physical stores) and BO competition (the incumbent is a physical store but the new entrant is an online store). Several results are obtained. First, if the hassle cost is small (large), the incumbent will invest less (more) R&D under BO competition. Second, when the hassle cost is sufficient large, the incumbent can inhibit the willingness of new entrant selects to open an online store via investing more R&D. Third, the new entrant will not establish dual sales channel (i.e. simultaneously open a physical store and an online store). Finally, when the hassle cost is small (large), the consumer surplus will prefer the new entrant open an online store (a physical store).

研討日期	2019 年 7 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Customer Privacy and Competition
作者 Authors of the paper	OZ SHY and RUNE STENBACKA
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. <i>Journal of Economics &amp; Management Strategy</i>
主講人	賴宜君、林燕淑
參加人員	賴宜君、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、曹古駒、王佳琪、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We analyze how different degrees of privacy protection affect industry profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare in a model with switching costs. Firms earn higher profits under weak privacy protection compared with strong or no privacy protection. The relationship between the degree of privacy protection and equilibrium profits is not monotonic. Consumer surplus and total welfare increase with the degree of privacy protection unless firms recognize consumer-specific switching costs. In that case, pricing conditional on switching costs has favorable implications for consumer surplus and total welfare.



研討日期	2019 年 7 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Product differentiation with multiple qualities
作者 Authors of the paper	Francesca Barigozzi and Ching-to Albert Ma
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 61 (2018) 380–412
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、梁文榮、鍾擘陵、王家琪、曹古駒、林晏如、周宗翰、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the classical quality- price, multistage game of vertical product differentiation. Each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities. Consumers' valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions. The unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities. We characterize equilibrium prices, and the effects of qualities on the rival's equilibrium price in the general model. Equilibrium qualities depend on what we call the Spence and price-reaction effects. For any equilibrium, we characterize conditions for quality differentiation.

研討日期	2019 年 7 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing and Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Multi Product Firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Lin Yen Ju
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、梁文榮、彭正浩、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of multi-product firm, in which one product is produced by an input as well as technology licensing from an outside patentee and the other is only produced by an input. We find that it is essential that the interaction between licensing mode of patentee and the behavior of upstream incumbent not be neglected when considering the possibility of anticompetitive exclusive dealing. When the patentee adopts a royalty licensing, the inefficient incumbent cannot deter socially efficient entry by multiple products, which stands for the Chicago School's argument. However, if patentee adopts a pure fixed fee licensing, which solves the double-marginalization problem. Compensating downstream firm profitably using its profits under exclusive dealing can be optimal for the incumbent. Therefore, a pure fixed fee licensing facilitates the anticompetitive exclusive dealing.</p>

<b>研討日期</b>	<b>2019 年 8 月 5 日上午 10:20~ 12:30</b>
<b>研討地點</b>	台大社會科學院 710 室
<b>主講題目</b> <b>Title of the paper</b>	Comparing welfare and profit in quantity and price competition within Stackelberg mixed duopolies
<b>作者</b> <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Kosuke Hirose and Toshihiro Matsumura
<b>文獻出處</b> <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	J Econ (2019) 126:75–93 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0603-7">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0603-7</a>
<b>主講人</b>	蔡明芳
<b>參加人員</b>	蔡明芳、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾睦陵、張瑞雲、曹古駒、賴宜君、周宗翰、許至乙
<b>摘要</b> <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We compare welfare and profits under price and quantity competition in Stackelberg mixed duopolies. Under public leadership, price competition always yields greater profits and welfare than quantity competition. By contrast, under private leadership, the result depends on the nationality of the private firm. When the private firm is domestic (foreign), welfare is greater under quantity (price) competition. However, private firms always earn more under price competition. Introducing the nonnegative profit constraint affects welfare ranking but not profit ranking. These results indicate that profit ranking is fairly robust to the time structure in Stackelberg mixed duopolies, but welfare ranking is not.

研討日期	2019 年 8 月 12 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	空間障礙與 Cournot 競爭下，存在網路與實體廠商之最適授權契約
作者 Authors of the paper	梁文榮、王羿傑
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、周宗翰、王佳琪、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>本文結合 Liang et al. (2006) 的鉅鈴模型與 Guo and Lai (2014, 2017) 網路廠商特性的設定，考慮市場大小對稱與空間障礙，在 Cournot 競爭下，探討存在網路與實體廠商時產業內授權廠商的最適授權契約，本文得到的主要結果為：第一、在獨家授權下，實體授權廠商的最適授權契約是固定權利金授權，並且若單位運輸費率相對於等待成本大（中段、小），實體授權廠商是授權給對手網路廠商（實體廠商）。第二、在 <math>k</math> 非劇烈創新的條件成立下，實體授權廠商同時授權給對手實體廠商和網路廠商相同的單位權利金授權契約不一定會優於實體授權廠商獨家授權固定權利金授權契約。第三、實體授權廠商的最適授權契約是授權給對手實體廠商單位權利金授權契約，並且在單位運輸費率相對於等待成本大（中段、小）時，同時授權給對手網路廠商固定權利金授權契約（混合授權契約、單位權利金授權契約）。</p>

研討日期	2019 年 8 月 19 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming?
作者 Authors of the paper	Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 64 (2019) 1–26
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、曹古駒、周宗翰、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming (i.e., some users joining both platforms). If initially both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true, as the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 8 月 26 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Jin-Hyuk Kim, Liad Wagman, Abraham L. Wickelgren
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>J Econ Manage Strat.</i> 2019;28:373–391
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	王佳琪、王光正、施姍全、彭正浩、黃鴻、張瑞雲、周宗翰、吳家緻、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We examine the influence of firms' ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two-to-one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three-to-two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.

研討日期	2019 年 9 月 9 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 814 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Technology Licensing in a Network Product Market: Fixed-Fee versus Royalty Licensing
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	HUAI GE ZHANG and XUEJUN WANG, XIANPEI HONG, QIANG (STEVEN) LU
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>ECONOMIC RECORD</i> , VOL. 94, NO. 305, JUNE, 2018, 168–185
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、賴宜君、許至乙、Dong Van Chung
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	This study investigates pricing and technology licensing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with one upstream firm that provides a key input to two downstream firms. We assume that one of the downstream firms owns a licensable innovation that exhibits network effects and that the other can either accept the licence from the innovator or develop a substitutable innovation. We analyse the effects of the producer-innovator's two alternative licensing strategies (i.e. fixed-fee and royalty licensing) on the members of the supply chain and the supply chain's efficiency. We find that royalty licensing is optimal with low network effects. For high network effects, the innovating firm's optimal licensing strategy depends on the market size and the potential licensee's cost of developing a substitutable innovation. We also find that royalty licensing can achieve better coordination of the supply chain than fixed-fee licensing.

研討日期	2019 年 9 月 16 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Trade Policies and FDI with an Endogenous Market Structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Chih-Yi Hsu, Hong Hwang, Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	許至乙、彭正浩
參加人員	許至乙、彭正浩、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、周宗翰、吳家緻、Dong Van Chung、BUI DANG LONG、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper examines the effects of trade policies (i.e., a tariff, a quota or a price control policy) on foreign firms' FDI incentives when the market structure is endogenously determined. It is found that the foreign firms have a higher incentive to undertake FDI under a tariff than the volume-equivalent quota or the price-equivalent price control policy. Nevertheless, the protection effects under the three policies are identical. This result is very different from that in Ishikawa and Miyagiwa (2008) in which the number of the foreign firms is restricted to two. Furthermore, with the potential entrants, the tariff policy is superior to the the price control policy in terms of domestic welfare. The tariff policy is superior (inferior) to the quota policy if the tariff revenue is larger (smaller) than the quota rent. However, the tariff policy, comparing to the quota or the price control policy, is welfare-deteriorating in terms of world welfare.



研討日期	2019 年 9 月 23 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Foreign direct investment as a signal
作者 Authors of the paper	Onur A. Koska, Ngo Van Long, Frank Stähler
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Review of International Economics</i> . 2018; 26:60–83.
主講人	Dong Van Chung、林燕淑
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、林燕淑、王光正、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、BUI DANG LONG、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper models oligopolistic competition among potential multinational firms in an environment of firm heterogeneity, incomplete information on costs, and strategic interactions. We show that foreign direct investment is more likely if it can serve as a signal of productivity in an environment of incomplete information as firms would like to avoid sending a low productivity signal. Our model shows that this effect is strong enough such that foreign direct investment can be an optimal foreign entry mode even if trade costs are zero.

研討日期	2019 年 10 月 07 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing Under Network Externalities
作者 Authors of the paper	KUANG-CHENG ANDY WANG, WEN-JUNG LIANG, CHUN-HUNG A. LIN
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>THE ECONOMIC RECORD</i> , VOL. 88, NO. 283, DECEMBER, 2012, 585–593
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾嘒陵、BUI DANG LONG、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper develops a duopoly model to explore licensing behaviour in the presence of network externalities. Under the assumption that the licensor and the licensee compete in a duopolistic market, we obtain the following results. First, the larger the network-externality effect, the more likely it is that the licensor will prefer fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing. Second, the larger the network-externality effect, the more likely it is that the optimal royalty rate will be smaller than the reduction in marginal costs from innovation under a royalty licensing arrangement.

研討日期	2019 年 10 月 14 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	When is upstream collusion profitable?
作者 Authors of the paper	Dingwei Gu, Zhiyong Yao, Wen Zhou, Rangrang Bai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , Vol. 50, No. 2, Summer 2019, pp. 326–341
主講人	周宗翰、林燕淑
參加人員	周宗翰、林燕淑、王羿傑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、BUI DANG LONG、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long-term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.

研討日期	2019 年 10 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Location, Price, and Welfare in the Presence of An On-line Firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Wen-Jung Liang and Yi-Jie Wang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、BUI DANG LONG、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We utilize a barbell model, in which both the brick-and-mortar firms' costs and markets are asymmetric, to examine the effects of increasing the number of firms by adding an online firm on brick-and-mortar firms' location choices, outputs, price, and welfare under Cournot competition. We obtain the following results. First, it may induce the two brick-and-mortar firms to switch their optimal locations either from agglomeration at the urban market to separate or from separation to agglomerate at the urban market. Second, the total sales may decline and the price level may rise in the urban market. Lastly, the welfare level may worsen.

研討日期	2019 年 10 月 28 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous
作者 Authors of the paper	DAINIS Z EGNERS, TOBIAS KRETSCHMER
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics &amp; Management Strategy</i> , Volume 26, Number 1, Spring 2017, 96–122
主講人	許至乙、彭正浩
參加人員	許至乙、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、BUI DANG LONG、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below-cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition-softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.

研討日期	2019 年 11 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Parallel Imports with Multiple Manufacturers
作者 Authors of the paper	Pei-Cyuan Shih, Hong Hwang, and Kuo-Feng Kao
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	working paper
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper uses a two-country model to investigate the effect of parallel imports when there are multiple manufacturers and retailers. We find that all manufacturers will subsidize their retailer to acquire a higher market share when parallel imports are prohibited. On the other hand, if parallel imports are allowed, then the manufacturers may charge a higher wholesale price. Moreover, this higher wholesale price under parallel imports softens the competition in foreign country, leading the profit of the manufacturers to increase. Finally, the welfare effect of parallel imports on the social welfare of country H and global welfare is also investigated in this paper.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 11 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	VERTICAL BARGAINING AND RETAIL COMPETITION: WHAT DRIVES COUNTERVAILING POWER?
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Germain Gaudin
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>The Economic Journal</i> , 128 (September), 2380–2413.
主講人	賴宜君、張瑞雲
參加人員	賴宜君、王光正、王羿傑、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、BUI DANG LONG、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	This article investigates the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a supply chain. Results are derived from a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether countervailing buyer power arises, in the form of lower input prices following greater concentration downstream, depends on the pass-through rate of input prices to retail prices. Countervailing buyer power generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level.

研討日期	2019 年 11 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Whistleblower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence
作者 Authors of the paper	Lydia Mechtenberg, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	This paper is a substantial revision of a previous version, which was circulated as CEPR DP No. 11898, CESifo WP No. 6394, and IZA DP No. 10607.
主講人	Gerd Muehlheusser
參加人員	Gerd Muehlheusser、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Whistleblowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Recent laws and global policy recommendations aim at facilitating whistleblower protection to enhance the willingness to report and to increase deterrence. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Whistleblower protection indeed leads to more reporting of misbehavior. However, our experimental findings suggest that non-meritorious claims are an issue, as they reduce prosecutors' incentive to investigate, which hampers the intended improvement of deterrence.



研討日期	2019 年 11 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Whistleblower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence
作者 Authors of the paper	Lydia Mechtenberg, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	This paper is a substantial revision of a previous version, which was circulated as CEPR DP No. 11898, CESifo WP No. 6394, and IZA DP No. 10607.
主講人	Gerd Muehlheusser
參加人員	Gerd Muehlheusser、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Whistleblowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Recent laws and global policy recommendations aim at facilitating whistleblower protection to enhance the willingness to report and to increase deterrence. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Whistleblower protection indeed leads to more reporting of misbehavior. However, our experimental findings suggest that non-meritorious claims are an issue, as they reduce prosecutors' incentive to investigate, which hampers the intended improvement of deterrence.

研討日期	2019 年 11 月 30 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Antidumping Filings and Product Quality: Evidence from China
作者 Authors of the paper	Xiaohua Bao, Xinyue Gao, and Lex Zhao
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Lex Zhao
參加人員	Lex Zhao、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、BUI DANG LONG、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>What we do in this paper</p> <p>Investigate: why there are so many AD filings against China</p> <p>Our findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Product quality can be an important reason for AD filings, especially against China;</li> <li>• We use product-level, micro data;</li> <li>• Specifically: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If the marginal cost to raise quality is high, low quality products will get more AD;</li> <li>If the product's quality reputation is low, low quality products will get more AD.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

研討日期	2019 年 12 月 09 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Optimality of Emission Pricing Policies Based on Emission Intensity Targets under Imperfect Competition
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Hiroaki Ino, Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	Working paper
主講人	Toshihiro Matsumura
參加人員	Toshihiro Matsumura、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、BUI DANG LONG、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙、周宗翰、賴宜君
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	<p>This study shows the first-best optimality of an emission tax based on emission intensity targets. Emissions are taxed when a firm's emission intensity exceeds the targeted level. The literature on environmental tax shows that Pigovian tax, which internalizes negative externality, yields the first-best optimum under perfect competition, whereas the same is not true under imperfect competition. We show that even under imperfect competition, the combination of uniform emission tax and non-uniform emission intensity targets leads to the first best. The first-best uniform tax rate is always equal to the Pigovian tax. This principle can also apply to the policy combination of tradable emission permits and emission intensity targets.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 12 月 23 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Failure of ad valorem and specific tax equivalence under uncertainty
作者 Authors of the paper	Laszlo Goerke, Frederik Herzberg, and Thorsten Upmann
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 10(4), 387-402
主講人	周冰瑤、王光正
參加人員	周冰瑤、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、BUI DANG LONG
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are “almost never” equivalent in the presence of uncertainty if we require equivalence to hold pathwise. Since we obtain this result under perfect competition, our analysis also provides a further rationale for why the equivalence must fail under imperfect competition.

研討日期	2019 年 12 月 30 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Upstream horizontal mergers involving a vertically integrated firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics</i> (2019) <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00677-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00677-5</a>
主講人	BUI DANG LONG
參加人員	BUI DANG LONG、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study upstream horizontal mergers when one of the merging parties is vertically integrated. Under observable contracting in the pre-merger case, we show that such type of mergers always harm consumers. However, under unobservable contracting in the pre-merger case, the input price may decrease and consumer surplus may increase as a result of the merger even in the absence of exogenous cost-synergies between merging firms. A necessary condition for this finding is that the unintegrated downstream firm is more cost-efficient than the downstream division of the integrated firm.

研討日期	2020 年 1 月 6 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in complementary markets with cost savings
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Christine Halmenschlager and Andrea Mantovani
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>Information Economics and Policy</i> , 39 (2017) 45–59
主講人	鍾暉陵
參加人員	鍾暉陵、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We study the private and the social desirability of mixed bundling that generates cost savings in markets for complementary products. Firms always want to adopt such a strategy, and we find that the prices of stand-alone products may decrease when cost savings are important. We also identify an intriguing case where mixed bundling is beneficial for firms, as it depends on the interplay between product sub-stitutability and cost savings in a non-monotonic way. Finally, we highlight situations where private and social interests coincide, and those where they collide.

研討日期	2020 年 1 月 13 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Comparing Specific and Ad Valorem Pigouvian Taxes and Output Quotas
作者 Authors of the paper	MARK DICKIE and GREGORY A. TRANDEL
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Southern Economic Journal</i> , Vol. 63, No. 2 (Oct., 1996), pp. 388-405
主講人	周冰瑤、林燕淑
參加人員	周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰、BUI DANG LONG、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper has shown that a Pigouvian commodity tax imposed in specific form generally leads to a different market outcome than does a tax imposed in ad valorem form, even in a competitive market. Two important exceptions to this conclusion hold when demand uncertainty is paired with constant marginal production costs or when market conditions are fully certain. When market conditions are uncertain, the two taxes also produce different outcomes than does an output quota.

研討日期	2020 年 1 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Welfare enhancing exclusive dealing Licensing and Multi-input-multi-product firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Lin Yen-Ju
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、曹古駒、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰、呂文智、BUI DANG LONG、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing with the presence of the multiple products firm, in which one product is produced by an input as well as license from an outside licensor and the other is only produced by an input. The paper shows that the licensing mode can have crucial ramifications for considering the possibility of anticompetitive exclusive dealing For the royalty licensing, the less the product differentiation or the similar the market size of the two products is, the less possibility of anticompetitive exclusive dealing. However, for the fixed fee licensing, it is more likely to facilitate the anticompetitive exclusive dealing. Assuming the government to maximize the consumer's welfare there are novel implications for antitrust agencies, where the optimal licensing mode may be irreconcilable between the licensor and the social's desire. Moreover, the anticompetitive dealing may not be harmful to the consumers' welfare.</p>



研討日期	2020 年 2 月 3 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Cooperative R&D with durable goods
作者 Authors of the paper	Amagoia Sagasta
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics</i> (2019) 128:239–258
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	蔡明芳、林燕淑、BUI DANG LONG、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙、賴宜君、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper analyzes the effect of the durability of the good produced by a duopolistic industry on research and development investment in the presence of spillovers. We show that the critical spillover level from which cooperation in R&D increases the level of investment is higher when firms produce durable goods and sell at least some units of their output than when firms produce non-durable goods. Moreover, with R&D cooperation investment is highest with renting firms and lowest with renting–selling firms. These findings indicate that R&D cooperation is more difficult to justify when firms produce durable goods in the presence of intertemporal inconsistency problems.

研討日期	2020 年 2 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Market Entry Strategy of a Multiple-product Firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Chia-Chi Wang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	王佳琪、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂文智、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>In this highly competitive environment, the multi-product firms are common in many industries. The purpose of this paper is to consider the entry decisions: no entry, FDI and M&amp;A of a multi-product firm when it attempts to enter the new market.</p> <p>This paper finds some interesting results. First, the multi-product firm can reduce the input price by strategically entering the new market. Second, given the marginal cost of new product is higher than the original one, the higher the degree of competition in the new market, the higher the profit of multi-product firm. In addition, if the market size of the new product is sufficiently high, then entering the new market may not be profitable for the multi-product firm. Lastly, if the new market is less competitive, then the multi-product firm prefers to adopt FDI to enter the new market. On the contrary, the optimal entry mode is M&amp;A.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 2 月 17 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation
作者 Authors of the paper	KURT R. BREKKE, ROBERT NUSCHELER, and ODD RUNE STRAUME
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Economics &amp; Management Strategy</i> , 15(1), 207-227
主講人	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、梁文榮
參加人員	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、黃鴻、賴宜君、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、呂文智
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price prior to the choice of locations, the optimal (second - best) price causes overinvestment in quality and an insufficient degree of horizontal differentiation (compared with the first-best solution) if the transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high. Under partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit prior to location choices, the optimal price induces first - best quality, but horizontal differentiation is inefficiently high.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 2 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Two-part tariff competition between two-sided platforms
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Markus Reisinger
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>European Economic Review</i> , 68(2014), 168–180
主講人	施姍全
參加人員	施姍全、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、呂文智、Dong Van Chung、BUI DANG LONG
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	Two-sided market models in which platforms compete in two-part tariffs, i.e., a subscription and a per-transaction fee, are often plagued by a continuum of equilibria. This paper incorporates heterogeneous trading behavior of agents into the existing framework. We show that this natural and realistic extension yields a unique equilibrium that has several reasonable properties. The equilibrium stays unique as the heterogeneity vanishes, thereby selecting a unique equilibrium from the continuum that exists under homogeneous trading behavior. We show that this equilibrium differs from equilibria obtained through other selection criteria. The analysis also provides novel empirical predictions.

研討日期	2020 年 3 月 2 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Strategic corporate social responsibility by a multinational firm
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Constantine Manasakis, Evangelos Mitrokostas, Emmanuel Petrakis
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	Review of International Economics. 2018, 26: 709–720
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、吳家緻、周宗翰、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙、Dong Van Chung
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	This paper investigates the determinants of a responsible multinational firm's decision to enter in a foreign country either through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as the relevant market and societal outcomes. We find that corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments are higher under FDI than under exports. The multinational firm's incentives to serve the foreign country through FDI are increasing in the average consumer's valuation for CSR and in the intensity of the foreign country's market competition, but only if the average consumer's valuation for CSR in this country is sufficiently high. These incentives are mitigated by the multinational firm's liability in this country under exports. We also find that there is misalignment of preferences between the stakeholders of the two countries over the multinational firm's mode of entry in the foreign country.

研討日期	2020 年 3 月 9 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Jose Miguel Abito, Julian Wright
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 26 (2008) 227–246
主講人	BUI DANG LONG
參加人員	BUI DANG LONG、梁文榮、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、Dong Van Chung、葛士剛、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The existing literature on exclusive dealing is extended to take into account that buyers signing exclusive deals are typically competing firms that are differentiated from the perspective of their customers. We show, provided such downstream firms are not too differentiated or provided upstream firms can compete in two-part tariffs, exclusive dealing forecloses entry to a more efficient rival. An established upstream firm and competing downstream firms raise their joint profit by signing exclusive deals to protect the industry from upstream competition. Naked exclusion arises despite the Chicago School logic that buyers only sign contracts that make themselves (jointly) better off.

研討日期	2020 年 3 月 16 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	External Referencing and Pharmaceutical Price Negotiation
作者 Authors of the paper	BEGON~A GARCIA MARIN~OSO, IZABELA JELOVAC, and PAU OLIVELLA
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>HEALTH ECONOMICS</i> , 20: 737–756 (2011)
主講人	Dong Van Chung
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、BUI DANG LONG、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country ( $F$ ) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm, whereas a home country ( $H$ ) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER, based on the foreign price. We show that country $H$ prefers ER if copayments in $H$ are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when $H$ 's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country $H$ harms country $F$ . Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost-containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.

研討日期	2020 年 3 月 23 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Does technology licensing matter for privatization?
作者 Authors of the paper	Leonard F. S. Wang, Arijit Mukherjee, Chenhang Zeng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12431">https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12431</a>
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost-efficient firm to a cost-inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.



研討日期	2020 年 4 月 6 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Non-linear pricing and conscious consumption
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Nadia Burani, Andrea Mantovani
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 68 (2020) 102549
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、 DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、Dong Van Chung、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We consider a duopolistic market in which a green firm competes with a brown rival and each firm sells two quality-differentiated products. We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by the two firms when consumers: (i) Are privately informed about their willingness to pay for quality, and (ii) differ in their environmental consciousness. We characterize how consumers with different valuations for quality self-select into firms and show that the ranking of qualities, relative prices and profits all depend on the interplay between consumers' valuations and firms' cost heterogeneity. Interestingly, when consumers' valuations for quality are relatively low, the brown firm does not offer a low-quality variety. This contrasts with the situation of full information, in which both firms commercialize a high- and a low-quality variety. Hence, the lack of information about consumers' valuations may not only favor the green firm in terms of higher prices and profits, but also reduce the product range offered by the brown rival.

研討日期	2020 年 4 月 13 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Regulated Price, Quality R&D, and Location Choice in the Oligopoly with an Online Firm
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	Working paper
主講人	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
參加人員	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、Dong Van Chung、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We examine the influences of introducing an online firm into a market with two physical firms on equilibrium levels of quality R&D, optimal regulated prices, physical firms' location choices, and welfare under regulated prices. By introducing an online firm such that competition in the market becomes more severe, we derive the following interesting results. First, we show that intensifying competition will lower the equilibrium level of quality R&D comparing with the case under the absence of online firm. This result is in support of Schumpeter (1943) argument. Second, the optimal regulated price for the physical firm in the former will become lower, and meanwhile it equals the optimal regulated price for the online firm plus the marginal cost of the physical firm. Third, physical firms' optimal locations will change from agglomeration at the center of the line segment to separation. Lastly, the welfare in a market becomes higher.

研討日期	2020 年 4 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Rod Falvey, Sarut Wittayarungruangsri
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> 22 (2006) 771– 786
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、黃鴻、BUI DANG LONG、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、許至乙
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	We consider the incentives that the existence of an Antidumping Law provides for strategic behavior on the part of duopolistic firms selling in each other's segmented markets. Firms have identical costs, but are located in countries with different market sizes (maximum willingness to pay). In free trade the firm from the larger market dumps in the other market, providing incentives for both firms to manipulate their sales in the two markets to influence any future antidumping duty. We show that for small (large) differences in market size, the dumping (other) firm's strategic actions dominate, and the dumping margin is reduced (increased) relative to free trade. We also consider a price undertaking as an alternative to the duty, and show that the outcome depends on which firms have input into the policy choice.

研討日期	2020 年 4 月 27 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Patrick DeGraba
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 31 (2013) 516–526
主講人	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、Dong Van Chung、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.

研討日期	2020 年 5 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	International Technology Licensing with Differential Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Dang-Long Bui and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	Working paper
主講人	BUI DANG LONG
參加人員	BUI DANG LONG、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	<p>We construct a model of vertically related markets to examine the optimal international licensing with differential tariffs where a foreign vertically integrated firm owns a cost-reducing technology of the downstream product competing against one domestic downstream firm and one domestic upstream firm in domestic markets. We show that, first, when the downstream tariff is relatively low, medium, and high, the optimal licensing is royalty licensing with the royalty rate equaling two times of the innovation size, mixed, and fixed-fee licensing, respectively. Second, given exogenous tariffs, the welfare post licensing can be lower than under no licensing. Third, the optimal downstream tariff is higher than the upstream tariff under both the absence and presence of licensing. Fourth, a fixed-fee licensing can never occur, when tariffs are endogenously determined. Lastly, we depict the areas of combinations of upstream and downstream marginal costs corresponding to the optimal licensing contracts under endogenous tariffs.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 5 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Corporate social responsibility, vertical product differentiation and international competition
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Jie Li, Xingtang Wang, Baomin Dong, Eden S. H. Yu
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>Rev Int Econ.</i> 2019 (27) 1108–1125.
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	Would a foreign firm's consumer-oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country's voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import-competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit-driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer-oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm's profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm's profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U-shaped. When firms' decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.

研討日期	2020 年 5 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Optimal price regulations in international pharmaceutical markets with generic competition
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Difei Geng, Kamal Saggi
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>Journal of Health Economics</i> Volume 71, May 2020, 102315
主講人	Dong Van Chung
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、許至乙、BUI DANG LONG、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	In a two-country (home and foreign) model in which the home producer of a branded pharmaceutical product faces generic competition in each market, we analyze home's optimal policy choices regarding two major types of price regulations: external reference pricing (ERP) and direct price controls. Home's nationally optimal ERP policy lowers domestic price while maintaining the firm's export incentive. This ERP policy results in a negative international price spillover that the foreign country can (partly) offset via a local price control. Generic competition in either market reduces home's welfare gain from instituting an ERP policy. Weaker competition abroad or a greater weight on firm profits relative to consumer surplus in home's welfare function makes it more likely that home prefers an ERP policy to a price control. While international integration of national generic markets can improve welfare, such is not the case if it causes home to relax its ERP policy.

研討日期	2020 年 5 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 <b>Title of the paper</b>	Market structure and quality determination for complementary products: Alliances and service quality in the airline industry
作者 <b>Authors of the paper</b>	Jan K. Brueckner, Ricardo Flores-Fillol
文獻出處 <b>Journal, vol.(issue), pp</b>	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 68 (2020) 102557
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE
摘要 <b>Abstract of the paper</b>	This paper explores the effect of market structure on quality determination for complementary products. The focus is on the airline industry and the effect of airline alliances on flight frequency, an important element of service quality. With zero layover cost, the choice of flight frequencies has the same double-marginalization structure as in the usual alliance model, leading to a higher frequency in the alliance case as double marginalization is eliminated, along with a lower full trip price and higher traffic. The surprising result of the paper emerges with high-cost layover time, where double marginalization in frequencies is absent and where an alliance reduces service quality via a lower frequency, with the full price potentially rising (in which case traffic falls).



研討日期	2020 年 6 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 609 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	On the First-mover Advantage in a Bargaining Vertically Related Market
作者 Authors of the paper	Yi-Chun Lai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	賴宜君
參加人員	賴宜君、林燕淑、施姵全、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>The downstream firms prefer to bargain through decentralized rather than centralized bargaining process. In contrast, the profits of the upstream firm and the firm not engaged in bargaining are higher respectively under centralized bargaining.</p> <p>When all downstream firms act as Stackelberg, social welfare is higher under decentralized bargaining, however, when downstream firms compete in Cournot fashion, social welfare would be higher under centralized bargaining than decentralized bargaining, if the product substitutability is sufficient high.</p>

研討日期	2020 年 6 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	EXCLUSIVE DEALING: INVESTMENT PROMOTION MAY FACILITATE INEFFICIENT FORECLOSURE
作者 Authors of the paper	CHIARA FUMAGALLI, MASSIMO MOTTA, THOMAS RØNDE
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS</i> 0022-1821 Volume LX December 2012 No. 4
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.

研討日期	2020 年 6 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	QUALITY AND LOCATION CHOICES UNDER PRICE REGULATION WITH ASYMMETRIC DEMANDS
作者 Authors of the paper	LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE
參加人員	王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、 賴宜君、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>The purpose of this paper is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦First, to analyze firms' optimal quality and location choices under price regulation with asymmetric demand.</li> <li>◦Second, by intensifying competition through increasing number of firms, quality and location choices are determined.</li> <li>◦Finally, we establish how the competition intensity affects quality, output, and Social welfare.</li> </ul>

研討日期	2020年6月22日上午10:20~12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Two sided platform: per unit and ad valorem pricing
作者 Authors of the paper	林宣佑
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	施姍全
參加人員	施姍全、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>本文討論外送平台對上平台雙邊(消費者與餐廳)如何訂定最適的二部定價策略(固定進入費用與每次交易費用)。模型中將餐廳邊分為兩種不同交叉網路外部性餐廳，且交易費用為抽成(從價交易費用)；而消費者邊皆為同質具有相同交叉網路外部性，且交易費用為從量收費。主要結論發現，在平台為獨占時，我們以一般式的效用函數證得平台對雙邊定價策略符合Lerner Indices定價原則。消費者邊固定進入費用與每次交易費用為線性重合，但餐廳邊的兩部定價可得單一解，均衡的抽成原則為平台對兩種不同交叉網路外部性餐廳的邊際收益相同。當平台有競爭時，我們以Hotelling的線性空間模型得到消費者邊的二部定價為線性重合，雙占Single homing平台對餐廳邊均衡抽成為零，雙占Competitive bottleneck平台對餐廳邊均衡抽成為1/2。當政府管制平台定價時，其定價原則為價格等於邊際成本，在獨占平台與雙占Competitive bottleneck平台對餐廳邊最適抽成均為零，但在雙占Single homing平台時則為任意值。最後，本文討論平台因收集消費者資訊以後，可以對個別的消費者採個人化定價時的最適定價策略。</p>

研討日期	2020 年 6 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學 710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing, entry, and privatization
作者 Authors of the paper	Leonard F.S. Wang, Chenhang Zeng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 62 (2019) 230–239
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、賴宜君、許至乙、林毓楙、許雅媚、洪珮瑜、Bui Dang Long、Dong Van Chung、AMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper examines how technology licensing by a private innovator affects privatization with ex-ante cost asymmetry. In a mixed duopoly, we find that licensing to the public firm reduces the incentive for privatization compared to the situation without licensing. This result is robust in consideration of either a domestic or a foreign entry of a private firm. However, licensing to the entrant private firm increases the incentive for privatization. Furthermore, we show that the effects of entry on privatization critically depend on whether the new entrant is a domestic or foreign one. The entry of a domestic private firm facilitates privatization while that of a foreign private firm hinders privatization.

## 計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立滿 25 年。這 25 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近幾年中研院網路經濟學研討會、東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會、傳仁大學經濟學系研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行（自 2018 年九月起於每星期一上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行），鮮少中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾七年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨演講反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。在過去一年中，我們邀請了 Gerd Muehlheusser (University of Hamburg)、Yuka Ohno (Hokkaido University)、Lex Zhao (Kobe University)、Toshihiro Matsumura (The University of Tokyo) 等經濟學者蒞臨演講。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。