

科技部人文社會科學研究中心  
學術研究群成果報告

產業與貿易理論 3 學術研究群

學術研究群編號：MOST107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10709

學術研究群執行期間：107 年 7 月 1 日至 108 年 6 月 30 日

學術研究群召集人：黃鴻

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學經濟學系

中 華 民 國 108 年 6 月 30 日

# 補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

## 產業與貿易理論 3 學術研究群

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計畫召集人：黃鴻

計畫成員：王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩

兼任助理：吳家緻

研讀書籍：(研究群可不必填寫)

中 華 民 國 108 年 6 月

## 補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明）

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形(請於其他欄註明專利及技轉之證號、合約、申請及洽談等詳細資訊)

論文：已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專書：已出版 尚未出版 撰寫中 無

其他：

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）。

## 補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果彙整表

計畫主持人：黃 鴻		計畫編號：MOST 107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10709			
計畫名稱：產業與貿易理論 3					
		成果項目	量化	單位	質化 (說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文	12	篇	請附期刊資訊。
		研討會論文			
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。
		其他		篇	
國外	學術性論文	期刊論文		篇	請附期刊資訊。
		研討會論文			
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。
		其他		篇	
參與計畫人力	本國籍	教授		人次	
		副教授			
		助理教授			
		博士後研究員			
		專任助理			
	非本國籍	教授			
		副教授			
		助理教授			
		博士後研究員			
		專任助理			
		其他成果			
		(無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)	區域經濟研討會、中研院人社中心網路與貿易研討會、淡江大學城中校區研討會、台灣經濟學年會		

本研究群成員 2018 年以後發表之期刊論文：

- [1] **Wang, Kuang-Cheng A.** P.-Y. Chou, **W.-J. Liang\*** (2018), Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxes in the Presence of Cost and Quality Differences, *International Tax and Public Finance*, 25(5), 1197–1214. (SSCI)
- [2] **Y.-J. Wang, Kuang-Cheng A. Wang, W.-J. Liang\***, B.-Y. Lee (2018), Product and Process R&D under Asymmetric Demands, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 21, 1-21. (SSCI)
- [3] **Liang, W.-J., Kuang-Cheng, Andy Wang,** P.-Y. Chou (2018). The Superiority among Specific, Demand Ad Valorem and Cost Ad Valorem Subsidy Regimes. *Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 1-21. (SSCI).
- [4] Ray-Yun Chang, Jin-Li Hu, **Yan-Shu Lin** (2018). The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Outsourcing. *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (BEJTE)*, <https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0195> (SSCI)
- [5] Chih-Wei Chang, Dachrahn Wu, and **Yan-Shu Lin** (2018). Price Control and Privatization in a Mixed Duopoly with a Public Social Enterprise. *Journal of Economics*, 124(1), 57-73. (SSCI)
- [6] Ku-Chu Tsao, Shih-Jye Wu, Jin-Li Hu, **Yan-Shu Lin** (2019). Subcontracting Bargaining Power and the Trade Policy. *Journal of International Trade & Economic Development*, 28(1), 82–100. (SSCI)
- [7] Chih-Wei Chang, Chia-Chun Li, and **Yan-Shu Lin** (2019). The strategic incentive of corporate social responsibility in a vertically related market. *International Review of Economics and Finance*, 59, 88-97. (SSCI)
- [8] **Pei-Cyuan Shih, Hong Hwang, Cheng-Hau Peng** (2018). Parallel Trade with an Endogenous Market Structure. *The World Economy*, <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12727>.
- [9] **Kuo-Feng Kao** and Chin-Sheng Chen (2019). Foreign Direct Investment, Input Prices, and Host Country Welfare. *Review of International Economics*, 27, 36-60. (SSCI).
- [10] **Kuo-Feng Kao** and Chao-Cheng Mai (2018). The Chain Effect of an Antidumping Policy. *Southern Economic Journal*, 85(2), 424-440. (SSCI).
- [11] **Hong Hwang,** Yi-Shan Hsueh and **Cheng-Hau Peng** (2018). Trade Liberalization and Product R&D in a Differentiated Duopoly. *International Review of Economics and Finance*, 56, 34-38. (SSCI)
- [12] Chi-Yi Hsu, Ray-Yun Chang, **Cheng-Hau Peng** (2018). Quality Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly. *Taiwan Economic Review*, 46(2), 181-224. (TSSCI).

## 目錄

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## 中文摘要

國際貿易研究和產業組織，向來是經濟學的重要研究領域。它不僅是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程，也是國內許多學者投身研究的重點領域。台大國際貿易研究群成立迄今邁入第二十四個年頭，目前參與研討會人數近十五人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且成員半數以上非台大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次（包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會）高達五十場。本研究群近五、六年來之研究成果斐然，成員所發表之科技部（國科會）經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊達五十多篇。

承蒙科技部人社中心補助學術研究群計劃、國科會拋光計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費及黃鴻教授國家講座經費之補助，本研究群每年均邀請多位國際貿易領域之海外知名學者至研討會演講。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，進一步加深相關學術社群間之關係，促使台灣學術研究圈與國際學術界接軌。

除了每週集會外，另一特色在於不論報告或討論，全程使用英語。本研究群為國內少數常態性的全英語研究群，且成效良好。在計畫執行期間，本研究群照例於每星期一上午十點二十分至中午十二點二十分，假臺灣大學社會科學院討論室舉行，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或研究群成員論文。希望藉由本計劃經費補助，幫助研究群成員鑽研國際貿易領域，繼續研究熱門前瞻議題，提升臺灣國際貿易學者的研究潛力，引導他們在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表學術論文。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

## 英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty-four years. Workshop members are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number is about twenty now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over fifty and the number of papers discussed is more than a hundred each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

*Keywords: international trade, workshop*



## 演講題目與內容摘要

研討日期	2018 年 7 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing
作者	Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 170 (2018) 71–75
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、吳家緞、丁虹仁、林燕淑、周冰瑤、呂星樺、周宗翰、鄭依涵、楊東穎、呂銘耀、賴宜君、林晏禎
摘要	<p>We consider licensing of non-drastic innovations by a patent holder who interacts with a potential licensee in a downstream market. We compare two kinds of license contracts: per unit and ad valorem royalties, combined with fixed fees. Assuming that antitrust authorities apply the same principle to review ad valorem licensing which they apply to per unit licensing, we show that per unit licensing is more profitable if the licensor is more efficient in using the innovation, whereas ad valorem licensing is more profitable if the licensee is more efficient. This explains why and when these licensing schemes should be observed.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 7 月 7 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Endogenous timing with a socially responsible firm
作者	Arturo Garcia and Mariel Leal and Sang-Ho Lee
文獻出處	Munich Personal RePEc Archive
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	許至乙、吳家緻、丁虹仁、林燕淑、周冰瑤、呂星樺、周宗翰、鄭依涵、楊東穎、呂銘耀、賴宜君、林晏禎
摘要	This study considers a mixed duopoly in which a socially responsible firm competes with a private firm by incorporating environmental externality and clean technology. We analyze the endogenous market structure in which both firms strategically decides quantities sequentially or simultaneously, which also affects abatement activities. We show that depending on the relative concerns on environment and consumers surplus, the socially responsible firm can be less or more aggressive in the production and abatement. Thus, not only the significance of externality but also the instrumental conflict of social concerns are crucial factors in determining the equilibrium of endogenous

研討日期	2018 年 7 月 14 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly
作者	Simon P. Anderson, Andre´ de Palma, Brent Kreider
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Public Economics</i> 81 (2001) 173–192
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	施佩全、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、彭正浩、周宗翰、吳家緞、楊東穎、許至乙、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	<p>We analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms. Both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent, and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits (and hence the long run number of firms). We provide summary conditions for these effects to arise. The conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form. Surprisingly, the analysis largely corroborates Cournot results with homogeneous demand.</p>

研討日期	2018年7月14日上午10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	The licensing of eco-technology under emission taxation: Fixed fee vs. auction
作者	Seung-Leul Kim, Sang-Ho Lee
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 45 (2016) 343–357
主講人	施佩全
參加人員	施佩全、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、彭正浩、周宗翰、吳家緞、楊東穎、許至乙、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	This paper investigates the effect of emission taxation on outside innovator's licensing strategies for eco-technology and its welfare consequences when duopolistic polluting firms have different production costs and purchase licenses for pollution abatement goods. In the presence of an emission tax, we compare the two types of licensing contract, fixed fee and auction, and show that the preference on licensing strategy depends not only upon the level of the emission tax but also on the production cost gap. Specifically, non-exclusive licensing is preferred to exclusive licensing when the emission tax or cost gap is small, while exclusive auction (fixed fee) licensing is preferred when the cost gap is intermediate (large). We also analyze some important welfare issues and discuss public policies on emission taxation and licensing regulation.

研討日期	2018 年 7 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
作者	Chih-Chen Liu, Leonard F.S. Wang, Sang-Ho Lee
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 129 (2015) 108–111
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、丁虹仁、王光正、梁文榮、陳金盛、楊東穎、周宗翰、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要	This paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms' incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certified by a Non-Governmental Organization. We show that, to induce firms to adopt certified ECSR, the certifier will set a standard lower than the optimal one, and the standard in Cournot competition is higher than that in Bertrand competition. Finally, we show that firms and consumers benefit from firms' certified ECSR.

研討日期	2018 年 7 月 21 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The Strategic Effect of a Licensing Option Agreement in Vertically Related Markets
作者	高國峯
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、丁虹仁、王光正、梁文榮、陳金盛、楊東穎、周宗翰、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要	<p>We employ a simple successive monopoly model to investigate the effect of a licensing option agreement in vertically-related markets. Both a pre-determined and a re-negotiable licensing option will be considered. By providing a pre-determined (re-negotiable) licensing options to the licensee, the innovator can resolve the hold-up problem in vertically-related markets by making the input monopolist aware that its pricing will affect the downstream firm's (the innovator's) incentive on exercising the licensing option (determining the re-negotiable licensing contract). The input monopolist can thus encourage technology licensing to happen by determining a low input price. At equilibrium, both the innovator's profit and the social welfare with the licensing option are higher than that without.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 4 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Mergers, investments and demand expansion
作者	Marc Bourreau and Bruno Jullien
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 167 (2018) 136–141
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	林晏如、許至乙、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、楊東穎、周宗翰、吳家緻、賴宜君
摘要	In this paper, we study the impact of a merger to monopoly on prices and investments. Two single-product firms compete in prices and coverage for a new technology. In equilibrium, one firm covers a larger territory than its competitor with the new technology, leading to single-product and multi-product zones, and sets a higher uniform price. If the firms merge, the merged entity can set different prices and coverage for the two products. We find that the merger raises prices and total coverage, but reduces the coverage of the multi-product zone. We also show that the merger can increase total welfare and consumer welfare.

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
作者	Hiroshi Kitamura、Noriaki Matsushima、Misato Sato
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 56 (2018) 145–167
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、許至乙、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、楊東穎、周宗翰、吳家緻、賴宜君
摘要	This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market benefits not only the downstream firm, but also the complementary input suppliers, by raising complementary input prices. Thus, the downstream firm is unable to earn higher profits, even when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent supplier can deter socially efficient entry by using exclusive contracts, even in the absence of scale economies, downstream competition, and relationship-specific investment.



研討日期	2018 年 8 月 11 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition
作者	Michael Keen and Jenny E. Ligthart
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 13(2), 385–390, 2005
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	吳家緻、周冰瑤、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、呂星樺、賴宜君
摘要	A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point-for-point increases in destination-based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
作者	Rabah Amir · Giuseppe De Feo
文獻出處	<i>Int J Game Theory</i> (2014) 43:629–658
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、周冰瑤、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、呂星樺、賴宜君
摘要	<p>This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private—domestic or foreign—firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. A central goal of the paper is to present a unified and general treatment of the basic question of what constitutes the appropriate solution concept—Cournot or Stackelberg—in such duopolies. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We demonstrate that this result is due to the objective function of the public firm being increasing in the rival’s output (instead of decreasing for a private firm). We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. We make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of super modular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Managing process innovation, input price discrimination and social welfare
作者	陳金盛
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	陳金盛、張瑞雲、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、楊東穎、周宗翰、吳家緞、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要	<p>The paper examines a technology leader firm's management strategy for a process innovation in the presence of an input monopolist.</p> <p>In the model, the input monopolist sells an input to a downstream duopoly market, where the technology leader firm competes with a technology laggard firm.</p> <p>We assume that the input monopolist can charge the input prices by either discriminatory pricing or uniform pricing.</p> <p>The leader firm decides the amount of the innovation to be kept secret to reduce the possible spillover benefits receiving the laggard firm.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 18 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Price versus Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly: A General Analysis
作者	Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	陳金盛、張瑞雲、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、楊東穎、周宗翰、吳家緻、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If the two firms take the same competition mode, i.e., Cournot or Bertrand competition, and the degree of the product differentiation is high, the welfare is higher under quantity competition than under price competition.</li> <li>• If the two firms can take different competition modes and the degree of privatization is at the middle range, social welfare is the highest if the state-own firm chooses the price contract and the private firm chooses the quantity contract.</li> <li>• If the degree of privatization is at the middle range, the two firms will choose different competition strategies. Specifically, the price (quantity) contract is the dominant strategy for the state-own firm whereas the quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for the private firm if the degree of privatization is low (high).</li> </ul>

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 25 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical separation with location-price competition
作者	Youping Li, Jie Shuai
文獻出處	<i>J Econ</i> DOI 10.1007/s00712-017-0533-9
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、王佳琪、楊東穎、周宗翰、鄭依涵、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要	While the literature has generally found that vertical separation helps buffer competition and harm consumers in a duopolistic market, we find the exact opposite. To induce the retailers to locate closer to consumers and earn a larger market share, the manufacturers set wholesale prices below marginal cost. This market share effect dominates the previously focused coordination effect under which a higher wholesale price helps coordinate the retailers' pricing decisions. For each manufacturer, vertical separation is a dominant strategy so the endogenous determination of vertical separation versus vertical integration is a prisoner's dilemma game.

研討日期	2018 年 8 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Technology spillovers, intellectual property rights, and export-platform FDI
作者	Arghya Ghosh, Hodaka Morita, Xuan Nguyen
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> 151 (2018) 171–190
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、王佳琪、楊東穎、周宗翰、鄭依涵、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要	<p>How do trade liberalization and changes in market size affect the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in Southern countries? We explore this question in an international oligopoly model in which a Northern firm has the option of export-platform FDI (EPF): that is, to set up an export platform in the South to serve not only the Southern market but also other export markets. EPF allows the Northern firm to take advantage of low tariffs that often exist between the South and other export markets. However, with imperfect protection of IPR in the South, the Northern firm's technological advantage is reduced under EPF as technology spills over, at least partially, to Southern firms. We show that when trade between the South and the export market becomes more liberalized, South government weakens its optimal IPR policy to improve welfare. The opposite is true when trade is liberalized between the North and the South, or between the North and the export market. The effect of an increase in the size of the Southern market critically depends on whether the Northern firm chooses EPF over home production to increase its profit in the Southern market or in the export market. The robustness of our findings is explored in a variety of extensions including multiple export platforms, multilateral trade liberalization, and EPF by multiple Northern firms. Explicitly incorporating export markets and the possibility of EPF, this paper sheds new light on our understanding of the North–South conflict regarding IPR protection, a highly debated issue among member countries of the WTO.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 9 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	1. Tariff policy and exhaustion of intellectual property rights in the presence of parallel imports 2. Optimal Tariff Policy, Market Demands and Parallel Imports with Endogenous Market Structure
作者	1. Jung Hur and Yohanes E. Riyanto 2. Lin Horn-Chern
文獻出處	1. <i>Oxford Economic Papers</i> 58 (2006), 549–568 2. working paper
主講人	Lin Horn-Chern
參加人員	Lin Horn-Chern、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tao Zeng、周宗翰、許至乙、賴宜君、吳家緻
摘要	<p>This paper examines an interplay between tariff policy and parallel-import policy. From a welfare point of view, a host government would prefer allowing parallel imports to prohibiting them.</p> <p>However, if a tariff is not at the government's disposal, there will be no parallel imports in equilibrium because a foreign manufacturer would prefer adopting a uniform pricing policy to a discriminatory pricing policy, which will prevent parallel imports from occurring. If a tariff is at the government's disposal, it can be set optimally to induce the foreign manufacturer to impose a price discrimination policy. Such a policy will facilitate entry by a parallel importer provided that parallel imports are feasible.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 9 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 609 討論室
主講題目	A Welfare Analysis of Two-Tier International Technology Licensing
作者	Ku-Chu Tsao, Jin-Li Hu, Yan-Shu Lin, Hong Hwang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要	<p>This paper analyzes the impact of two-tier international technology licensing on the home country's industry profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We examine four international technology licensing regimes - upstream licensing only (UL), downstream licensing only (DL), both upstream and downstream licensing (UDL), and laissez-faire licensing (LFL). The results show that both consumer surplus and industry profits are higher under UL regime than that under DL regime. The consumer surplus is higher (lower) under UL regime than that under UDL regime when innovation size is small (large). The LFL regime has the highest social welfare, UL regime has the higher social welfare than UDL regime. Under vertically related markets, the domestic welfare is not always higher when the home country receives more international licensing. Moreover, the above results still hold in the leader-follower competition under the UDL regime and even for the case where the new technology comes from the home country.</p>



研討日期	2018 年 9 月 17 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 609 室
主講題目	Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives
作者	Michael Kopel, Björn Brand
文獻出處	<i>Economic Modelling</i> 29 (2012) 982–989
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、吳家緞、許至乙
摘要	<p>In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 9 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Patent pools, litigation, and innovation
作者	Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach
文獻出處	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 46, No. 3, Fall 2015 pp. 499–523
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、林晏如、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、張瑞雲、陳金盛
摘要	<p>This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation. If patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 9 月 22 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
作者	Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 151 (2017) 1–3
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	周宗翰、林晏如、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、張瑞雲、 陳金盛
摘要	Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.

研討日期	2018 年 10 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 609 室
主講題目	Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition
作者	Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 60 (2018) 32–53
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、曹古駒、吳家敏
摘要	<p>We reconsider the optimal technology licensing by an incumbent firm facing multiple competitors. First, we cover the case of one license and show that competition has a drastic effect on optimal two-part tariffs. We also consider license auctions and design a more profitable dynamic mechanism. Next, we allow the licensor to award multiple licenses and design a dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry profit. It awards licenses to all firms, prescribes maximum permitted royalty rates and positive fixed fees, and is more profitable than other dynamic mechanisms. Finally we show that a slight modification of that mechanism is also optimal for outside patent holders.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 10 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note
作者	Ming Hsin Lin, Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	MPRA Paper No. 77285, posted 4 March 2017 14:22 UTC
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、Dong Van Chung、許至乙
摘要	The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax-subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.

研討日期	2018 年 10 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Parallel Imports with Multiple Manufacturers
作者	Hong Hwang, Kuo-Feng Kao, Pei-Cyuan Shih
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、鍾曁陵、Dong Van Chung、吳家緻、許至乙
摘要	<p>This paper uses a two-country model to investigate the effect of parallel imports when there are multiple manufacturers and retailers. We find that all manufacturers will subsidize their retailer to acquire a higher market share when parallel imports are prohibited. On the other hand, if parallel imports are allowed, then the manufacturers may charge a higher wholesale price. Moreover, the higher wholesale price under parallel imports softens the competition in foreign country, leading the profit of the manufacturers increases. Finally, when the market size of foreign country is extremely large, parallel imports necessarily decrease the global welfare.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 10 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Competition and Innovation
作者	Ku-Chu Tsao
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、 Dong Van Chung、吳家緞、許至乙
摘要	We investigate that the effects of competition on a firm's R&D investment depends on the number of innovating firms or non-innovating firms and the type of R&D investment. We show that without R&D tournament, higher the number of innovating firms reduces R&D investment; higher the number of non-innovating firms reduces (increases) R&D investment for sufficiently costly (not very costly). Under R&D tournament, the tournament effect may harm the incentive for R&D investment if the number of innovating firms increases. However, the tournament effect benefits the incentive for R&D investment if the number of non-innovating firms increases.

研討日期	2018 年 10 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Welfare decreasing endogenous mergers between producers of complementary goods
作者	Pedro Pita Barros, Duarte Brito, Helder Vasconcelos
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 60 (2018) 54–95
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、鍾曠陵、曹古駒、Dong Van Chung、吳家緻
摘要	This paper investigates the competitive effects of mergers involving producers of complementary goods, which are usually considered to be welfare increasing, in a setting where: ( i ) consumers need to purchase two components to make up a system; and ( ii ) there is competition between two vertically differentiated producers of one of the components whereas the second (must-have) component is monopolized. We find that the (privately profitable) merger involving the low quality producer of one component and the monopolist producer of the other component may decrease both consumers' surplus and social welfare for parameter values such that this merger can endogenously occur.



研討日期	2018 年 11 月 5 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Human Judgment and AI Pricing
作者	Ajay Agrawal, Joshua S. Gans, and Avi Goldfarb
文獻出處	<i>AEA Papers and Proceedings</i> 2018, 108: 58–63
主講人	Dong Van Chung
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、吳家緻
摘要	<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is undergoing a renaissance. Thanks to developments in machine learning—particularly, deep learning and reinforcement learning—there has been an explosion in the applications of AI in many settings. In actuality, however, far from providing new forms of machine intelligence in a general fashion, what AI has been able to do has been to reduce the cost of higher quality predictions in a drastic way (Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb forthcoming(a)). As deep learning pioneer Geoffrey Hinton put it, “Take any old problem where you have to predict something and you have a lot of data, and deep learning is probably going to make it work better than the existing techniques” (Creative Destruction Lab 2016). Thus, when they are able to utilize AI, decision makers know more about their environment, including about future states of the world. These developments have brought about discussions as to the role of humans in that decision making process. The view we take here (see also Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb forthcoming (b)) is that humans still play a critical role in determining the reward functions in decisions. That is, if the decision can be formulated as a problem of choosing an action (<math>x</math>), in the face of uncertainty about the state of the world (<math>\theta</math>) with probability distribution function <math>F(\theta)</math>, in an ideal setting, AI can transform that problem from <math>\max_x \int u(x, \theta) dF(\theta)</math> into <math>\max_x u(x, \theta)</math> with actions being made in a state contingent manner. However, this transformation relies on someone knowing the utility function, <math>u(x, \theta)</math>. We claim that, at present, only a human can develop this knowledge. That said, the value to understanding the utility function in all of its nuance is enhanced when the decision maker knows that they will have accurate predictions of the state of the world. This is especially true when it comes to states that are unlikely to arise or as applied to decision making in complex environments. Here we develop a model of utility function discovery in the presence of AI. In so doing, we choose to emphasize experiences as the means by which decision makers come to know that function. Our goal here is to understand what this implies for the demand for AI and, in particular, how suppliers of AI services should go about pricing their services. We show that learning leads to some interesting dilemmas in setting AI pricing. In particular, learning may lead decision makers to discover they have dominant actions and so do not need AI for prediction at all. This presents challenges for the long-term pricing of AI services. The mechanism driving this result is related to the price discrimination literature on the strategic effects of firms gaining information about consumers (e.g., Villas-Boas 2004; Acquisti and Varian 2005).</p>

研討日期	2018 年 11 月 12 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm
作者	Oscar Amerighi and Giuseppe De Feo
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> . 2017;19: 811–826.
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung
摘要	We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare-maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare-maximizing location. An efficiency-enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.

研討日期	2018 年 11 月 19 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	The Strategic Interplay Between Bundling and Merging in Complementary Markets
作者	Andrea Mantovani and Jan Vandekerckhove
文獻出處	<i>MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS</i> Manage. Decis. Econ. 37: 19–36 (2016)
主講人	鍾曄陵
參加人員	鍾曄陵、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、曹古駒、Dong Van Chung、許至乙
摘要	In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the competitive pressure in the market, either the firms within both pairs merge, with or without bundling, or only one pair merges and bundles, whereas the other one remains independent. The latter case can be harmful for consumers as overall prices surge. We also consider the case where a pair moves before the other. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where the first movers merge, but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.

研討日期	2018 年 11 月 26 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Showrooming and Webrooming: Information Externalities Between Online and Offline Sellers
作者	Bing Jing
文獻出處	MARKETING SCIENCE Articles in Advance, pp. 1–15
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要	<p>In a product market where consumers are open to uninformed purchases, we study competition between a traditional and an online retailer in the presence of showrooming. Several results are obtained. First, showrooming intensifies competition and lowers both firms' profits, thus supporting traditional and online retailers' recent strategy of carrying more exclusive varieties. Second, lowering consumer search costs may aggravate showrooming and decrease the traditional retailer's profits for intermediate search costs. Third, opening an online store expands the demand of the traditional retailer but intensifies competition, thus lowering its profits under certain conditions. Fourth, a return policy by the online retailer alleviates showrooming and relaxes competition but weakly reduces its demand, increasing its profits only for intermediate search costs. The return policy (weakly) increases the traditional retailer's profits. Fifth, when search cost is not high enough, price matching by the traditional retailer may also intensify competition and hurt its profits. We then examine how webrooming interacts with showrooming. When webrooming resolves partial match uncertainty, it may increase both firms' profits by inducing more consumers to participate.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 12 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 713 室
主講題目	An Advantage of Emission Intensity Regulation for Emission Cap Regulation in a Near-Zero Emission Industry
作者	Kosuke Hirose and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	Online at <a href="https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90134/">https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90134/</a> MPRA Paper No. 90134, posted 21 November 2018 06:09 UTC
主講人	Toshihiro Matsumura
參加人員	Toshihiro Matsumura、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂銘耀、Dong Van Chung、吳芸甄、許至乙
摘要	<p>We revisit command-and-control regulations and compare their efficiencies, in particular, an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per unit of output under emission equivalence.</p> <p>We find that in both the most stringent target case, when the target emission level is close to zero, and the weakest target case, when the target emission level is close to business as usual, emission intensity yields greater welfare, although the same may not be true in moderate target cases.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 12 月 08 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Academic Paper Toolkit (economics)
作者	Yuka Ohno & Kaede Tominaga
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Yuka Ohno
參加人員	Yuka Ohno、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、黃鴻、張瑞雲、林晏如、Dong Van Chung、吳芸甄、吳家緞、周宗翰、許至乙、呂銘耀
摘要	<p>When we read journal articles we focus on contents, and not on how papers are written.</p> <p>Young researchers often have difficulties writing journal articles, since there are many ways to write them.</p> <p>What if we put together a toolkit as a starting point? Will that help?</p> <p>Start writing early</p> <p>Organizing thinking/information</p>

研討日期	2018 年 12 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目	Trade, Risk Taking and Firm Volatility
作者	Yongjin Wang & Laixun Zhao
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Laixun Zhao
參加人員	Laixun Zhao、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、林晏如、Dong Van Chung、呂銘耀、吳家緻、吳芸甄、許至乙
摘要	<p>How trade affects macroeconomic volatility is an important topic in international economics.</p> <p>Traditional view: openness to trade leads to higher income volatility, since it tends to increase a country's exposure to shocks specific to the sector in which the country specializes (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984).</p> <p>Evidence, however, does not support this view: country-specific shocks are at least as important as sector-specific shocks in shaping countries' volatility patterns (e.g. Stockman, 1988, Costello, 1993, Koren and Tenreyro, 2007)</p>

研討日期	2019 年 1 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	International effects of national regulations: External reference pricing and price controls
作者 Authors of the paper	Difei Geng and Kamal Saggi
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of International Economics 109 (2017) 68–84
主講人	Dong Van Chung、林燕淑
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、張瑞雲、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Under external reference pricing (ERP) the price that a government permits a firm to charge in its market depends upon the firm's prices in other countries. In a two-country (home and foreign) model where demand is asymmetric across countries, we show that home's unilaterally optimal ERP policy permits the home firm to engage in a threshold level of international price discrimination above which it is (just) willing to export. If the firm faces a price control broad or bargains over price with the foreign government, an ERP policy can even yield higher home welfare than a direct price control.



研討日期	2019 年 1 月 14 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	A note on how to sell a network good
作者 Authors of the paper	André Veiga
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , Volume 59, July 2018, Pages 114-126
主講人	許至乙、彭正浩
參加人員	許至乙、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、張瑞雲
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This work considers a monopolist in an industry with positive network externalities. The firm can screen heterogeneous consumers by offering multiple products. Screening captures a greater share of consumer surplus but also segregates consumers into multiple products, thereby lowering the total network surplus. Thus, screening is socially inefficient. The author shows screening is never profit maximizing: the monopolist offers a single product, but at an excessive price. Thus, excessive consumer segregation is unlikely to occur in industries such as online multiplayer games, financial exchanges and messaging software.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 1 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	<b>Comparing Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes under Price-inelastic Demand with Quality Differentiation</b>
作者 Authors of the paper	Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang, Ping-Yao Chou, and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working Paper
主講人	王光正
參加人員	王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、張瑞雲、林晏如、吳家緻、許至乙、周宗翰、賴宜君、李家君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We examine the superiority of a specific tax and an ad valorem tax in a fully covered model with vertical differentiation, in which the demand elasticities of the products are inelastic. By focusing on the influences of vertical differentiation and inelastic demand, we show that a specific tax is superior to an ad valorem tax in the short run, when the marginal cost of the high-quality product is relatively low or is relatively high but the ad valorem tax rate is high. We also show that a specific tax may not only be welfare superior to, but may also Pareto dominate an ad valorem tax in the long run, when the ad valorem tax rate is high. These two results imply that the government should impose a specific tax on products with price-inelastic demand if the tax revenue requirement is high.

研討日期	2019 年 1 月 28 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing Essential Patents: The Non-Discriminatory Commitment and Hold-Up
作者 Authors of the paper	Youping Li Jie Shuai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of Industrial Economics, Forthcoming</i>
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、許至 乙、周宗翰、李家君、賴宜君、呂呈祥
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard-conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non-discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold-up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.

研討日期	2019 年 2 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Trade Policies, FDI and Endogenous Market Structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Chih-Yi Hsu Hong Hwang Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	許至乙、彭正浩
參加人員	許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、彭正浩、黃鴻、吳家緻、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper examines the effects of non-tariff barriers on foreign firms' FDI with free entry. We consider a model a la Ishikawa and Miyagiwa(2008) with domestic new entrants in the home market. Comparing to a tariff policy, it is found that the foreign firms have less incentive to undertake FDI under an equivalent quota or an equivalent price control policy. However, the protection effects under the three policies are identical. This result is very different from that in Ishikawa and Miyagiwa (2008). Furthermore, with new entrants, the import tariff policy is superior (inferior) to the equivalent quota and a equivalent price control policy in terms of domestic (world) welfare.</p>

研討日期	2019年2月18日上午10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院609室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Airport congestion and capacity when carriers are asymmetric
作者 Authors of the paper	Ming Hsin Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 62 (2019) 273–290
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This study investigates pricing and capacity investment for a congested airport served by multiple carriers. Removing the symmetric carrier assumption, when airlines' market shares are potentially asymmetric, the socially non-discriminatory optimal charge rule should include an additional term that corrects the distortion caused by pricing itself. The first-best outcome cannot be achieved, and the airport overinvests under the non-discriminatory optimal charge. However, if the airport levies discriminatory charges respective to carriers, the first-best outcome can be achieved and capacity investment is socially efficient under discriminatory optimal charges. In addition, the discriminatory optimal charges levied on a carrier with a larger (smaller) market share are lower (higher).</p>

研討日期	2019 年 2 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 609 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Pollution Enhancing Social Welfare in the Presence of Licensing
作者 Authors of the paper	Pei-Cyuan Shih, Tsung-Han Chou, Yan-Shu Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	施姍全
參加人員	施姍全、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、吳家緻
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>This paper sets up a duopoly model in which there is one domestic firm and one foreign firm with advanced environmental and process technology to analyze the optimal technology licensing strategies and government's environmental regulations. We compare three types of licensing strategies, process technology, environmental technology and package licensing, and show that the preference on licensing strategy depends on the level of environmental damage. Specifically, process technology licensing only is preferred when the marginal environmental damage is small, while package licensing is preferred when the environmental damage is large. This result is of interest as it goes against the conventional wisdom that package technology transfers can be more beneficial to the licensor. It is also found with surprise that if the environmental damage is high, the package technology licensing occurs, leading to a higher social welfare level.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 3 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 609 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	How mergers affect innovation: Theory and evidence
作者 Authors of the paper	Justus Haucap, Alexander Rasch, Joel Stiebale
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 63 (2019) 283–325
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、施姵全、高國峯、黃鴻、周宗翰、Dong Van Chung、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This article analyses how horizontal mergers affect innovation of the merged entity and its non-merging competitors. Using data on horizontal mergers among pharmaceutical firms in Europe and applying propensity score matching estimators, we find that average patenting and R&D of the merged entity and its rivals declines substantially in post-merger periods. We show that this result is consistent with the predictions from an oligopoly model with heterogeneous firms, as well as a patent race model, when pre-merger R&D intensity is sufficiently high. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find that negative effects of mergers on innovation are concentrated in markets with high R&D intensity and in technology classes with overlap in pre-merger innovation activities of merging and rival firms.

研討日期	2019 年 3 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade
作者 Authors of the paper	Keith E. Maskus, Frank Stähler
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>European Economic Review</i> 70(2014) 186–196
主講人	Dong Van Chung、林燕淑
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、林燕淑、王光正、王羿傑、施嫻全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、吳家緻、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The volume of retail-level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences. We offer an agency-based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer. The model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market. The manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer. If parallel trade is permitted, this offer will fall if there is incomplete information, resulting in a small, or zero, volume of parallel trade. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off, while offering little benefit to home consumers, compared to the case where such trade is banned.



研討日期	2019 年 3 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Is Price Undertaking a More Friendly Protection Policy than Anti-dumping Duty?
作者 Authors of the paper	<i>Kuo-Feng Kao and Hong Hwang</i>
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	It is generally believed that price undertaking is a more friendly protection policy for a foreign dumping firm than anti-dumping duty as price undertaking allows the foreign dumping firm to keep the anti-dumping duty rents. However, this result contradicts the empirical finding in Zanardi (2006). It is found that only 41% of anti-dumping measures in EEC ends up with price undertaking in 1981-2001, even though firms can commit to a minimum price instead of being imposed an anti-dumping duty. In this paper, we shall show that the competition mode plays an important role in determining which anti-dumping measure is friendlier to dumping firms.

研討日期	2019 年 3 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Antidumping duties and price undertakings: A welfare analysis
作者 Authors of the paper	Shih-Jye Wu, Yang-Ming Chang, Hung-Yi Chen
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 29 (2014) 97–107
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、王光正、王昇傑、施姵全、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、吳家緻、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>In this paper we examine differences in welfare implications between two trade protection measures: antidumping (AD) duties and price undertakings. Based on a stylized model of duopolistic competition under an effective AD law, we first analyze the case where a foreign firm convicted of dumping is required to pay an AD duty. We then examine the case in which a convicted foreign firm has the option of (i) paying an AD duty or (ii) accepting an undertaking by raising product price to its “normal value.” Taking into account the GATT/WTO policy that an AD duty rate must not exceed the margin of dumping, we show conditions under which a foreign firm chooses to evade its AD fine by a price undertaking. We find that the welfare-maximizing AD duty rate for a dumped product depends crucially on its normal value. If the foreign product's normal value is “critically high,” the optimal AD rate is set to fully reflect the dumping margin. Otherwise, the optimal AD rate is set lower than the dumping margin. From the perspective of social welfare, these findings help to identify the economic conditions under which one policy instrument is chosen over the other against foreign dumping.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 4 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Smart Products: Liability, Timing of Market Introduction, and Investments in Product Safety
作者 Authors of the paper	Herbert Dawid and Gerd Muehlheusser
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Gerd Muehlheusser
參加人員	Gerd Muehlheusser、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、吳家緞、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>Smart products such as autonomous vehicles (AVs) are considered ripe for market introduction within the next decade, and they are presumed to fundamentally change mobility in modern societies. While considered safer than conventional cars in the long-run, AVs still will cause accidents, and car manufacturers and computer and software producers are expected to face stiffer liability than they currently do with conventional cars. This might impede innovative activities, thereby delaying the market introduction and market penetration of AVs. We develop a dynamic model framework to investigate these claims. In each period, a potential (monopolistic) innovator decides on investing in a safety stock of AVs, market introduction and output, and we analyze the impact of the liability regime on these intertemporal decisions. Calibrating the model to the U.S. automobile market, our analysis reveals the pro and cons of a more stringent liability for producers of AVs: While this does increase the safety of AVs in the long run, the safety stock is accumulated more slowly, which delays the market introduction of AVs, and reduces the safety level of early AV generations on the market. Moreover, the innovator might forgo the development of AVs altogether. Our analysis also suggests that direct safety regulation might be a better policy than the use of the liability system.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 4 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Outsourcing induced by strategic competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Yutian Chen, Pradeep Dubey, Debapriya Sen
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 29 (2011) 484–492
主講人	陳琦、黃鴻
參加人員	陳琦、黃鴻、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、周宗翰、吳家緻、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.

研討日期	2019 年 4 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Choices and impacts of cross-licensing contracts
作者 Authors of the paper	Dan Zhao
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 48 (2017) 389–405
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、陳琦、Dong Van Chung、許至乙、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>By relaxing the common assumption of a perfectly monopolized technology market, this article analyses strategic behaviors of incumbents upon technology licensing who hold cost-reducing/ quality-improving technology, and examines some hot issues related to the implications on antitrust and welfare, the role of bargain in cross-licensing, the significance of both cost reducing/quality-improving technology in competition. The findings show that: I) cross-licensing cannot necessarily enhance the degree of collusion, and further harms the consumer surplus and social welfare under quantity competition; II) when the rivals have the participated motivation to license, the outcomes of licensing games depend on the magnitude of innovation, the degree of differentiation on production cost and quality between the enterprises. With a small non-drastic innovation, only cost-reducing/quality-improving licensing occurs if there is a small/large cost difference and small quality difference. However, cross-licensing upon quality-cost does occur if small cost difference and large quality difference. Once with a major non-drastic or drastic innovation, only quality-improving licensing occurs regardless of production cost or product quality difference; III) in contrast that quality-improving technology could help increase the willing-to-pay by consumers with no drop on population, the enterprise that holds cost-reducing technology with drastic innovation could make zero production of the rival or expel it before/ after licensing contract; IV) the cross-licensing parties with incomplete bargaining power happen to have the consistent aims to increase industry profit, which promotes the industry a virtuous cycle; V) government would rather support the post-outcome of cross-licensing than courage the ex-ante formation of R &amp; D cooperation.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 4 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN MIXED DUOPOLIES WITH EXTERNALITY
作者 Authors of the paper	TOSHIHIRO MATSUMURA, AKIRA OGAWA
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Australian Economic Papers</i> , Volume56, Issue4, December 2017, Pages 304-327
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、賴宜君、Dong Van Chung、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.

研討日期	2019 年 5 月 6 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	A note on how to sell a network good
作者 Authors of the paper	André Veiga
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 59 (2018) 114–126
主講人	陳琦、黃鴻
參加人員	陳琦、黃鴻、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、周宗翰、吳家緻、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	I consider a monopolist in an industry with positive network externalities. The firm can screen heterogeneous consumers by offering multiple products. Screening captures a greater share of consumer surplus but also segregates consumers into multiple products, thereby lowering the total network surplus. Thus, screening is socially inefficient. I show screening is never profit maximizing: the monopolist offers a single product, but at an excessive price. Thus, excessive consumer segregation is unlikely to occur in industries such as online multiplayer games, financial exchanges and messaging software.

研討日期	2019 年 5 月 13 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Antidumping Policy and Commodity Taxes
作者 Authors of the paper	Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang and Ping-Yao Chou
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、賴宜君、陳琦、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>In this paper we discuss the superiority of the AD duty policy and price undertaking policy.</p> <p>Regarding to the superiority between AD duty policy and price undertaking policy, it is usually obtained in the extant literature that the AD duty policy is superior to the price undertaking policy.</p> <p>By introducing the commodity tax and the domestic firm may be more efficiency than foreign firm, we receive the results different from the extant literature.</p>



研討日期	2019 年 5 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding
作者 Authors of the paper	Matthew Ellman, Sjaak Hurkens
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Economics Letters</i> 181 (2019) 11–16
主講人	許至乙、彭正浩
參加人員	許至乙、彭正浩、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、黃鴻、周宗翰、賴宜君、吳家緻、陳琦
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher profits and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome.

研討日期	2019 年 5 月 27 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Choosing the Partners in the Licensing Alliance
作者 Authors of the paper	Soo Jeoung Sohn
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS</i> Manage. Decis. Econ. 27: 251–260 (2006)
主講人	王昇傑
參加人員	王昇傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant.

研討日期	2019 年 6 月 3 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: WEIGHTED WELFARE AND PRICE COMPETITION
作者 Authors of the paper	JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ and MÁXIMO SEDANO
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>The Japanese Economic Review</i> Vol. 62, No. 4, December 2011
主講人	吳家緻
參加人員	吳家緻、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、黃鴻、曹古駒、許至乙、陳琦、賴宜君、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (weighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weight given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also analyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.

研討日期	2019 年 6 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Product and process productivity: Implications for quality choice and conditional exporter premia
作者 Authors of the paper	Juan Carlos Hallak, Jagadeesh Sivadasan
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Journal of International Economics</i> 91 (2013) 53–67
主講人	林燕淑、周宗翰
參加人員	林燕淑、周宗翰、王光正、王羿傑、梁文榮、黃鴻、曹古駒、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要 Abstract of the paper	<p>We develop a model of international trade with two dimensions of firm heterogeneity. The first dimension is “process productivity”, which is how we denote the standard concept of productivity as modeled in the literature. The second one is “product productivity”, defined as firms' ability to develop high-quality products spending small fixed outlays. The distinction between these two sources of productivity, together with the assumption that iceberg trade costs decrease with quality, delivers various conditional exporter premia as theoretical predictions. Conditional on size, exporters sell higher quality products, charge higher prices, pay higher input prices and higher wages, and use capital more intensively. Some of these predictions had already been documented in the empirical literature but lacked a theoretical framework for properly interpreting them. We conduct systematic tests of these predictions using manufacturing establishment data for India, the U.S., Chile, and Colombia, and find strong support for the model.</p>

研討日期	2019 年 6 月 17 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Parallel Imports: The Competition between Authorized and Unauthorized Retailers
作者 Authors of the paper	Kao, Kuo-Feng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
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摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper investigates some phenomenon of parallel imports in real world by considering the competition between authorized and un authorized retailers. Different from Maskus and Chen (2004, 2005), it shows that the optimal wholesale price is no less than the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. Moreover, the authorized retailer itself has the incentive to decrease the volume of parallel trade to against the competition from the unauthorized retailers.

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研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Indirect taxation and undesirable competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Leonard F.S. Wang, Chenhang Zeng, Qidi Zhang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	<i>Economics Letters</i> 181 (2019) 104–106
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、黃鴻、曹古駒、張瑞雲、周宗翰、許至乙、賴宜君
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies undesirable competition in an asymmetric oligopoly under ad valorem taxation. We show that when the cost advantage of efficient firms is large, both the entry of and the cost reduction in efficient firms raise social welfare, but unexpectedly hurt consumers. Moreover, we find that unit taxation yields higher consumer surplus in equilibrium, and it could also be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation under certain conditions.

## 計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立滿 24 年。這 24 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近幾年網路與貿易研討會和東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行（自 2018 年九月起於每星期一上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行），鮮少中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾六年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨演講反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。在過去一年中，我們邀請了 Horn-Chern Lin (Ontario Ministry of Finance)、Tao Zeng (Wilfrid Laurier University)、Toshihiro Matsumura (The University of Tokyo)、Yuka Ohno (Hokkaido University)、Lex Zhao (Kobe University)、Gerd Muehlheusser (University of Hamburg) 等經濟學者蒞臨演講。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。