

科技部人文社會科學研究中心
學術研究群成果報告

產業與貿易理論 2 學術研究群

學術研究群編號：**MOST104-2420-H-002-016-MY3-SG10607**
MOST107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10702

學術研究群執行期間：106 年 7 月 1 日至 107 年 6 月 30 日

學術研究群召集人：黃鴻

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學經濟學系

中 華 民 國 107 年 7 月 2 日

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班結案報告

產業與貿易理論 2 學術研究群

計畫編號：MOST104-2420-H-002-016-MY3-SG10607

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計畫召集人：黃鴻

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兼任助理：

研讀書籍：(研究群可不必填寫)

中 華 民 國 107 年 7 月

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

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說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形(請於其他欄註明專利及技轉之證號、合約、申請及洽談等詳細資訊)

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專書： 已出版 尚未出版 撰寫中 無

其他：

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）。

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果彙整表

計畫主持人：黃鴻		計畫編號：MOST104-2420-H-002-016-MY3-SG10607 MOST107-2420-H-002-007-MY3-SG10702			
計畫名稱：產業與貿易理論 2 學術研究群					
成果項目		量化	單位	質化 (說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)	
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文	13	篇	請附期刊資訊。
		研討會論文			
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。
		其他		篇	
國外	學術性論文	期刊論文		篇	請附期刊資訊。
		研討會論文			
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。
		其他		篇	
參與計畫人力	本國籍	教授		人次	
		副教授			
		助理教授			
		博士後研究員			
		專任助理			
	非本國籍	教授			
		副教授			
		助理教授			
		博士後研究員			
		專任助理			
其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)		東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會、Joint Workshop between National Taiwan University and National University of Kaohsiung、中研院人社中心研討會、台灣經濟學會年會、區域經濟研討會、網路與貿易研討會			

本研究群成員 2017 年以後發表之 B 級以上期刊論文：

- [1] **Wang, Kuang-Cheng A., P.-Y. Chou, W.-J. Liang** (2018, Feb). Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxes in the Presence of Cost and Quality Differences. *International Tax and Public Finance*. (Accepted). (SSCI). MOST 103-2410-H-182-001.
- [2] **Liang, W.-J., Kuang-Cheng, Andy Wang, P.-Y. Chou** (2018, Jan). The Superiority among Specific, Demand Ad Valorem and Cost Ad Valorem Subsidy Regimes. *Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 1-21. (SSCI). MOST 103-2410-H-182-001.
- [3] **Wang, Kuang-Cheng A., Y.-J. Wang, W.-J. Liang***, C.-C. Mai (2017, Feb). Optimal Licensing with Equity. *Papers in Regional Science*, S(1), S207-S221. (SSCI).
- [4] Chih-Wei Chang, Dachrahn Wu, and **Yan-Shu Lin** (2017, Aug). Price Control and Privatization in a Mixed Duopoly with a Public Social Enterprise. *Journal of Economics*. (Accepted).
- [5] **Ray-Yun Chang, Jin-Li Hu, Yan-Shu Lin** (2017, Nov). The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Outsourcing. *The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics (BEJTE)* (Accepted)
- [6] **Kao, Kuo-Feng, Hong Hwang** (2017, Nov). Input Price Discrimination, Technology Licensing and Social Welfare. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 52, 446-456.
- [7] **Kao, Kuo-Feng, Cheng-Hau Peng** (2017, Nov). Trade Liberalization, Forward-looking Firms and Welfare. *Review of International Economics*, 25, 999-1016. (SSCI).
- [8] **Chang, Ray-Yun, Hong Hwang, and Cheng-Hau Peng** (2017, Feb). Competition, Product Innovation and Licensing. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy*, 17(1).
- [9] **Chen, Chin-Sheng** (2017, May). Price Discrimination in Input Markets and Quality Differentiation. *Review of Industrial Organization*, 50(3), 367-388. (SSCI).
- [10] **Chen, Chin-Sheng** (2017, Mar). Endogenous Market Structure and Technology Licensing. *The Japanese Economic Review*, 68(1), 115-130. (SSCI).
- [11] **Hong Hwang**, Yi-Shan Hsueh and **Cheng-Hau Peng** (2018, Feb). Trade Liberalization and Product R&D in a Differentiated Duopoly. *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Forthcoming. (Accepted). (SSCI). MOST104-2410-H-030-003-MY2.
- [12] **Hwang, Hong**, Chao-Cheng Mai, Shih-Jye Wu (2017, Aug). Tariff Escalation and Vertical Market Structure. *The World Economy*, 40(8), 1597-1613.
- [13] **M.F.TSAI, J.R. CHIOU** (2017, Jul). Entry and Import Quota. *Bulletin of Economic Research*, 69(3), 229-239. (SSCI).

目錄

中文摘要.....	II
英文摘要.....	III
場次表.....	1
演講題目與內容摘要.....	3
計畫執行心得與收穫.....	87

中文摘要

國際貿易研究，向來是經濟學的重要研究領域。不僅是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程，也是國內許多學者投身研究的重點領域。台大國際貿易研究群成立迄今已滿二十二年，目前參與研討會人數近三十人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且成員半數以上非台大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次（包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會）高達五十場，討論之論文超過一百篇。本研究群近五、六年來之研究成果斐然，成員所發表之科技部（國科會）經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊將近五十篇。

透過國科會拋光計劃、人社中心補助學術研究群計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費及黃鴻教授國家講座經費，本研究群每年均邀請多位貿易領域之國際知名學者至研討會演講。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，進一步加深相關學術社群間之關係，促使台灣學術研究圈與國際學術界接軌。

本研究群的特色在於，不論報告或討論，全程使用英語，為國內少數常態性的全英語研討會，且成效良好。在計畫執行期間，本研究群照例於每星期六上午十點二十分至下午一點，假臺灣大學社會科學院討論室舉行，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或研究群成員論文。希望藉由本計劃經費補助，幫助研究群成員鑽研國際貿易領域，繼續研究熱門前瞻議題，提升臺灣國際貿易學者在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表上的表現。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty-two years. Workshop members are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number is about twenty now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over fifty and the number of papers discussed is more than a hundred each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

Keywords: *international trade, workshop*

場次表

日期	因故取消	日期	因故取消
2017/06/03		2017/12/23	
2017/06/10		2017/12/30	
2017/06/17		2018/01/06	
2017/06/24		2018/01/13	
2017/07/01		2018/01/20	
2017/07/08		2018/01/27	
2017/07/15		2018/02/03	
2017/07/22		2018/02/10	
2017/07/29	妮莎颱風停課一次	2018/02/17	春節
2017/08/05		2018/02/24	社科院清潔不開放
2017/08/12		2018/03/03	
2017/08/19		2018/03/10	
2017/08/26	東華大學研討會	2018/03/17	
2017/09/02		2018/03/24	區域經濟研討會
2017/09/09		2018/03/31	
2017/09/16		2018/04/07	
2017/09/23		2018/04/14	
2017/09/30		2018/04/21	
2017/10/07		2018/04/27	網路與貿易研討會
2017/10/14		2018/05/05	
2017/10/21		2018/05/12	
2017/10/28		2018/05/19	
2017/11/04		2018/05/26	
2017/11/11		2018/06/02	
2017/11/18	高雄大學研究群聯合研討會	2018/06/09	
2017/11/25		2018/06/16	

2017/12/02		2018/06/23	
2017/12/07	中研院人社中心聯合研討會	2018/06/30	
2017/12/16	台灣經濟學會年會		

演講題目與內容摘要

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 1 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly
作者	David R. Collie
文獻出處	Review of International Economics, 11(1), 55-71, 2003
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	劉容銓、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、施珮全、蔡明芳、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、詹銘葦
摘要	For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 1 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Incentive for Adoption of New Technology in Duopoly under Absolute and Relative Profit Maximization
作者	Masahiko Hattori and Yasuhito Tanaka
文獻出處	Economics Bulletin (October 2014)
主講人	劉容銓
參加人員	劉容銓、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、施珮全、蔡明芳、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、詹銘葦、
摘要	We present an analysis about adoption of new technology by firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods under absolute and relative profit maximization. Technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, for example, for education of its staff. Under absolute profit maximization there are three types of sub-game perfect equilibria depending on the value of set-up cost. Both firms, or one firm, or no firm adopt new technology. On the other hand, under relative profit maximization there are two sub-game perfect equilibria. Both firms, or no firm adopt new technology. And we show that if demand is sufficiently high, it is more probable that both firms adopt new technology under relative profit maximization than that both firms, or one firm adopt new technology under absolute profit maximization.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 8 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Patent Strength and Optimal Two-Part Tariff Licensing with A Potential Rival Incorporating Ad Valorem Royalties
作者	Marta San Martín and Ana I. Saracho
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 143 (2016) 28–31
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、鍾秉均、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、周宗翰、劉容銓、李家君、許至乙、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	We show that an internal patentee may prefer to use ad valorem royalties instead of per-unit royalties in the licensing contract of a new product to a potential rival who may develop a substitute good.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 8 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Retailer's Channel Structure Choice: Online Channel, Offline Channel, or Dual Channels?
作者	Peng Zhang, Yong He, and Chunming (Victor) Shi
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Production Economics</i> 191 (2017) 37–50
主講人	鍾秉均
參加人員	曹古駒、鍾秉均、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、周宗翰、劉容銓、李家君、許至乙、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	<p>Extensive research has been done on a manufacturer's channel structure choice. In this paper, we study a retailer's channel structure choice and pricing decisions in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. To this end, we first derive the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and the retailer's optimal retail price(s) under all three possible channel structures: a pure offline channel, a pure online channel, and dual channels. We then investigate how channel structure changes affect pricing decisions and what the optimal channel structure is for the retailer. Our main findings include the following. First, the retailer's optimal channel structure is a pure offline channel, dual channels, and a pure online channel if the customer acceptance rate for the online channel is low, medium, and high, respectively. Second, a pure offline retailer may strategically set up an online channel with little demand just to gain wholesale price reduction from the manufacturer. Third, in case that the manufacturer can disallow the retailer to sell online, we find appropriate fees the retailer can pay to achieve Pareto improvement for both.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 15 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tarification, FDI and Endogenous Market Structure
作者	Chih-Yi Hsu
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	王羿傑、許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、詹銘葦、楊東穎、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	We examine the policy choice of an importing country and investment decision for the foreign firms in a long run model where n foreign firms compete with domestic potential entrants. Regardless of the number n is, it is more socially desirable for the home government under a tariffication regime than NTBs. But for the world welfare, NTBs are better than a tariffication regime.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 15 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Quality Differentiation and Firms' Choices Between Online and Physical Markets
作者	Yijuan Chen, Xiangting Hu, and Sanxi Li
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 52 (2017) 96–132
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、詹銘葦、楊東穎、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	We study firms' choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product's quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent's may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 22 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports
作者	Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei
文獻出處	<i>American Economic Review</i> 2014, 104(2): 459–494
主講人	Tatiana Kholmakhova
參加人員	周宗翰、Tatiana Kholmakhova、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、李家君、許至乙、詹銘葦、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	This paper proposes an accounting framework that breaks up a country's gross exports into various value-added components by source and additional double-counted terms. Our parsimonious framework bridges a gap between official trade statistics (in gross value terms) and national accounts (in value-added terms), and integrates all previous measures of vertical specialization and value-added trade in the literature into a unified framework. To illustrate the potential of such a method, we present a number of applications including re-computing revealed comparative advantages and the magnifying impact of multi-stage production on trade costs.

研討日期	2017 年 7 月 22 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Licensing a technology standard
作者	Chun-Hui Miao
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 47 (2016) 33–61
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、Tatiana Khomiakova、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、李家君、許至乙、詹銘葦、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider inventor or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopting a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner also sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 5 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Corporate Social Responsibility and Marketing Channel Coordination
作者	Gregory E. Goering
文獻出處	<i>Research in Economics</i> 66 (2012) 142–148
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	呂得成、許至乙、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers' welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are explored: the up-stream producer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR) in one case and the down-stream retailer in the other. In the two-stage game, the retailer makes their quantity-setting decision in stage-two, given the two-part tariff (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) set by the stage-one producer. In this setting, among other things, we find that the optimal channel-coordinating tariff is very different from the standard pure profit-maximizing two-part tariff. For example, if either firm in the supply/marketing chain exhibits CSR, we show the optimal wholesale price does not equal the manufacturer's marginal production cost, nor does the fixed fee equal the monopoly profit earned by the retailer. Finally, we find that our two-part tariff CSR model provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding of little to no correlation between CSR and firm profits.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 5 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Robust Technology Policy Against Emission Leakage: The Case of Upstream Subsidies
作者	Carolyn Fischer, Mads Greaker, and Knut Einar Rosendahl
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i> 84 (2017) 44–61
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、許至乙、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and lead to emissions leakage, which hampers countries' welfare. In order to limit leakage, governments consider supporting domestic trade-exposed firms by subsidizing their investments in abatement technology. The suppliers of such technologies tend to be less than perfectly competitive, particularly when both emissions regulations and advanced technologies are new. In this context of twin market failures, we consider the relative effects and desirability of subsidies for abatement technology. We find a more robust recommendation for upstream subsidies than for downstream subsidies. Downstream subsidies tend to increase global abatement prices, reduce pollution abatement abroad and increase emission leakage. On the contrary, upstream subsidies reduce abatement technology prices, and hence also emissions leakage.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 12 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Patent Protection with A Cooperative R&D Option
作者	XiaoGang Che and Yibai Yang
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 116 (2012) 469–471
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、胡義坤、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament effect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 12 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Quality Portfolio, Price Control and Parallel Imports
作者	Chin-Sheng Chen
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	曹古駒、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、胡義坤、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	This paper analyzes a manufacturer's choice of product portfolio between two countries. Parallel imports arise because of the retail price control in a PI sourcing country from which a retailer in a receiving country may import and sell the product then. In responds to parallel imports, the manufacturer may degrade the quality to the sourcing country. The quality choice is related to the degree of the price cap and the size of trade cost. The welfare implications of parallel imports are also discussed.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 19 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Unit Taxes and Ad Valorem Taxes with Vertically Differentiated Products
作者	Francisco Galera, Pedro Mendi, and Juan Carlos Molero
文獻出處	<i>Applied Economics Letters</i> , 21:17, 1221-1225
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	李家君、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	This article analyses a model in which a local monopolist that produces low quality goods competes against a foreign competitive industry that produces a higher quality version of the goods. We use the model to analyse the welfare implications of introducing a unit tax on the local producer, relative to an ad valorem tax. We find parameter values for which the unit tax dominates the ad valorem tax, in the sense of increasing welfare while not reducing government revenues. This result contrasts with the mainstream results on the dominance of ad valorem over unit taxes.

研討日期	2017 年 8 月 19 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	A Strategic Analysis of Incorporating CSR into Managerial Incentive Design
作者	Junsong Bian, Kevin W. Li, and Xiaolei Guo
文獻出處	<i>Transportation Research Part E</i> 86 (2016) 83–93
主講人	李家君
參加人員	李家君、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、胡義坤、劉曉芬
摘要	A strategic analysis is conducted to incorporate corporate social responsibility (CSR) considerations into managerial incentive design in a duopoly where each firm comprises an owner and a manager. Consumer surplus is adopted to represent the firms' CSR concerns and a CSR-related incentive is introduced to accommodate both profit and consumer surplus. Bertrand and Cournot competition modes are discussed with the firms' products being complementary, independent, or substitutable. We first examine the equilibrium of CSR-related incentive design and, then, analyze how CSR-related incentives affect the firms' profitability and CSR performance, measured by consumer surplus and social welfare.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 2 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Comparison Between Specific Taxation And Volume Quotas in A Free Entry Cournot Oligopoly
作者	Toshihiro Matsumura and Yasunori Okumura
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics</i> October 2014, Volume 113, Issue 2, pp 125–132
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、蔡明芳、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	We revisit the classic discussion of the comparison between tax and quota, but in a free-entry Cournot oligopoly. We investigate a quantity ceiling regulation as a quota policy. We find that tariff-quota equivalence holds if the firms are symmetric and the number of firms is given exogenously. However the equivalence does not hold and taxes dominate quotas in the free entry market because quota can increases the number of entering firms and increases the loss caused by excessive entries.

研討日期	2017年9月2日上午12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Patent Protection And R&D with Endogenous Market Structure
作者	ARIJIT MUKHERJEE
文獻出處	<i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i> 0022-1821 Volume LXV March 2017 No. 1
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	許至乙、蔡明芳、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、劉曉芬、楊東穎
摘要	In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 9 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Environmental Tax in a Green Market
作者	Dorothée Brécard
文獻出處	<i>Environ Resource Econ</i> (2011) 49:387–403
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	王羿傑、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、黃鴻、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers' environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 9 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Corporate Social Responsibility Spillover and Competition Effects on the Food Industry
作者	YOU-HUA CHEN, XIAO-WEI WEN and MING-ZHONG LUO
文獻出處	<i>Australian Economic Papers</i> , 55(1), March 2016, 1–13
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、黃鴻、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	This paper examines the spillover and competition effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) with duopoly competition. In employing the assumption that firm CSR increases consumer willingness to pay for the firm's products while consumer willingness to pay decreases for non-CSR firm products, some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, CSR spillover effects increase CSR firm outputs and prices, while CSR spillover has the opposite effect on competitors. Second, CSR spillover decreases total outputs and total social welfare levels. Third, competition effects increase CSR expenditures, and CSR firms' CSR policies are the most robust when non-CSR firms assume a leading position. It is found that total outputs and consumer utilities are highest when CSR firm acts as leader, while the relationships of social welfare among different cases are ambiguous depending on product substitution and spillover effects.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 16 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Downstream Research Joint Venture with Upstream Market Power
作者	Constantine Manasakis, Emmanuel Petrakis, and Vasileios Zikos
文獻出處	<i>Southern Economic Journal</i> 2014, 80(3), 782–802
主講人	施佩全
參加人員	施佩全、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	In a vertically related industry, we examine the downstream firms' incentives to invest in cost-reducing Research and Development (R&D), and to form a Research Joint Venture (RJV), under two alternative structures of input supply: exclusive vertical relations and a single supplier. In contrast to the “hold-up” argument, in which downstream firms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under a single supplier than under competing vertical chains. Downstream firms' incentives to form a RJV are also stronger in the former case than they are in the latter. We identify conditions under which an RJV is beneficial for society. Integrated innovation and competition policies are also discussed.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 16 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Price versus Quantity in A Mixed Duopoly with Foreign Penetration
作者	Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	<i>Research in Economics</i> 68 (2014) 338–353
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	施佩全、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a differentiated duopoly between a public firm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private firm that can be owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or integrated: in the first case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost confirming the robustness of the results.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 23 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Revenue Royalties
作者	Stefano Colombo and Luigi Filippini
文獻出處	<i>J Econ</i> (2016) 118:47–76
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、張瑞雲、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、周宗翰
摘要	Under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale, we compare several licensing mechanisms—per-unit royalty, an ad valorem royalty, and a revenue-royalty, and combinations with fixed fees—for an insider patentee. In the case of a non-drastic innovation, the patentee maximizes its profits by offering, respectively, an ad valorem royalty, a revenue-royalty and a two-part per-unit royalty, if the cost function is scarcely or highly convex, moderately-low convex, and moderately-high convex. In the case of a drastic innovation, the patentee always offers an ad valorem royalty contract.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 23 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Privatization in the Presence of Patent Licensing
作者	Shuai Niu
文獻出處	<i>J Econ</i> (2015) 116:151–163
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	曹古駒、張瑞雲、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、呂得成、周冰瑤、周宗翰
摘要	This paper analyzes the licensing policy for a cost-reduction technology of a foreign R&D institution when it is faced with a domestic monopoly manufacturer. It is found that, due to objective differences, a public domestic manufacturer will be charged higher than a private domestic manufacturer for a certain licensed technology. Accordingly, to save on the licensing payment made to the foreign R&D institution, the domestic government is recommended to (partly) privatize the public manufacturer.

研討日期	2017 年 9 月 30 日上午 10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Capitalism, Communism and Patience in Catching up
作者	Kazumichi Iwasa and Laixun Zhao
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Laixun Zhao
參加人員	Laixun Zhao、丁虹仁、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君、楊東穎
摘要	This paper examines how impatience interacts with inequalities in economic development. We consider two distinct groups of households with intrinsic inequality (e.g., capitalists and workers), and show that (i) under decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), an unequal capitalist society may be preferable for poor households than communism when every household owns an equal share of asset; (ii) poor households tend to benefit more from positive shocks under DMI than CMI (constant marginal impatience); (iii) inequality exhibits a sharp inverted-U shape as more people become rich, which should be good news for developing countries in catching up; (iv) a tax on capital income reduces poor households' income when the fraction of the rich is sufficiently small; and (v) immigration into rich countries raises their average income but widens the income gap.

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 7 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Orders to Supply As Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets
作者	Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross
文獻出處	<i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i> 31(5) pp. 1204-1224
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、林晏如、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰
摘要	A number of recent antitrust cases in Canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service organizations. Earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply. This paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit. It goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages inefficient substitution of inputs in the production of repair

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 7 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Complementary Patents and Market Structure
作者	Klaus M. Schmidt
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy</i> , 23(1) 68–88
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	許至乙、林晏如、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗翰
摘要	Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to nonintegration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (patent pool, pass through) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, whereas a horizontally integrated firm always benefits from entry and innovation.

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 14 日上午 10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Endogenous Market Structures, Tariffication and FDI
作者	Chih-Yi Hsu, Hong Hwang & Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、楊東穎
摘要	This paper examines the effects of tariffication on foreign firms' FDI with free entry. We consider a model with a number of foreign firms with domestic new entrants, competing in Cournot fashion in the home market. In contrast to an import quota policy, it is found that the foreign firms have more incentive to undertake FDI than a quota or a price undertaking policy. Furthermore, under free entry, tariffication from a quota or a price undertaking policy is welfare-enhancing for the domestic country but it decreases world welfare.

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 21 日上午 10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 736 討論室
主講題目	1. Firms' Costs, Profits, Entries, and Innovation under Optimal Privatization Policy 2. Competitive Pressure from Neighboring Markets and Optimal Privatization Policy 3. Optimal Privatization Policy with Asymmetry among Private Firms
作者	1. Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura 2. Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura and Shohei Yoshida 3. Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	1. MPRA Paper No. 80927, posted 26 August 2017 08:23 UTC 2. MPRA Paper No. 81978, posted 17 October 2017 17:20 UTC 3. MPRA Paper No. 77523, posted 15 March 2017 06:17 UTC
主講人	Toshihiro Matsumura
參加人員	Toshihiro Matsumura、ByeonHwa Choi、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、曹古駒、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	<p>1. We investigate how cost conditions of private firms affect optimal privatization policy and private firms' profits. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the costs of private firms unless the public firm is fully privatized in equilibrium. A cost reduction in a private firm increases the degree of privatization and benefits for all private firms. Therefore, each private firm's profit is increasing with its rival private firms' costs, which is in contrast to the result when the degree of privatization is given exogenously. This interesting property yields two important results. The profit of each private firm can increase with the number of private firms, and the positive externality of innovation accelerates private firms' R&D.</p> <p>2. We formulate a mixed oligopoly model in which one state-owned public enterprise competes with n private firms in the same market and m private firms in the neighboring market. We investigate how n and m affect the optimal degree of privatization. We find a nonmonotone (monotone) relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the number of private competitors in the neighboring (same) market. The optimal degree of privatization is increasing in the number of private firms in the same market, and the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the</p>

number of private competitors in the neighboring market is an inverted U-shape. An increase in m more likely increases the optimal degree of privatization when the degree of product differentiation is low. Our results suggest that more competitive pressure from competitors supplying differentiated products can reduce the optimal degree of privatization.

3. We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman-Herndahl index, which is affected by the number of firms and asymmetry of size among these firms: the larger the number of firms (the less asymmetry among firms), the lower the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggests that the optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number of private firms (and, thus, decreasing with the market competition index), assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how the asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation for discussing asymmetry among private rms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monopolistically increasing (and, thus, never monopolistically decreasing) in the asymmetry among private rms.

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 28 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 736 討論室
主講題目	Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Relationships
作者	Yoshifumi Hino, Yusuke Zennyo
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics</i> , September 2017, Volume 64, Issue 3, pp 231–244
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	高國峯、王羿傑、ByeongHwa Choi、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、陳金盛、周冰瑤、曹古駒、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙
摘要	We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm's owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game.

研討日期	2017 年 10 月 28 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 736 討論室
主講題目	The Effect of a Licensing Option Agreement in Vertically-related Markets
作者	Kuo-Feng Kao
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、王羿傑、ByeongHwa Choi、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、張瑞雲、陳金盛、周冰瑤、曹古駒、周宗翰、李家君、許至乙
摘要	We employ a simple successive monopoly model to investigate the effect of a licensing option agreement in vertically-related markets. By providing licensing options to the licensee, the innovator can resolve the hold-up problem in vertically-related markets by making the input monopolist aware that its pricing will affect the downstream firm's incentive on exercising the licensing option. The input monopolist can thus encourage technology licensing to happen by determining a low input price. At equilibrium, both the innovator's profit and the social welfare with the licensing option are higher than that without.

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 4 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence
作者	Jeremy Bulow
文獻出處	<i>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , Vol. 101, No. 4. (Nov., 1986), pp. 729-750.
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	呂得成、許至乙、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周冰瑤、周宗翰、李家君、楊東穎
摘要	<p>Suppliers of durables in imperfectly competitive markets have been suspected of producing goods with uneconomically short useful lives, so that consumers will have to repurchase more often. However, the theory behind “planned obsolescence” has been notably weak. Will customers not pay less for products that have a shorter useful life? If the firm decides to sell customers any given flow of services as cheaply as possible? These are the questions with which an economic theory of planned obsolescence must deal.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 4 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Patent Breadth in An International Setting
作者	Eric W. Bond and Ben Zissimos
文獻出處	<i>Economic Inquiry</i> Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2017, 1538–1555
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、許至乙、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周冰瑤、周宗翰、李家君、楊東穎
摘要	We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North–South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 11 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation
作者	Giulio Federico, Gregor Langus, and Tommaso Valletti
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 157 (2017) 136–140
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	We analyze the impact of a merger on firms' incentives to innovate. We show that the merging parties always decrease their innovation efforts post-merger while the outsiders to the merger respond by increasing their effort. A merger tends to reduce overall innovation. Consumers are always worse off after a merger. Our model calls into question the applicability of the “inverted-U” relationship between innovation and competition to a merger setting.

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 11 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Specific versus ad valorem Taxation and Externalities
作者	Jukka Pirttila
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 76 (2002), No. 2, pp. 177–187
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	This study examines the choice between specific and ad valorem taxes when the production of a good, produced under imperfect competition, creates harmful externalities. The optimal tax system is shown to rely on wholly ad valorem (specific) taxation if the valuation of the distortion arising from the harmful externality is smaller (larger) than that of the imperfect competition.

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 25 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical Mixed Oligopoly with Environmental Damage
作者	Chia-Chi Wang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	王佳琪、李家君、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、呂得成、曹古駒、周宗翰、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	<p>This paper analyzes how a privatization policy is affected by different market structures (a vertical or a horizontal market structure) and environmental damage and finds the following noteworthy results. First, the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and environmental damage crucially depends on the market structure. The optimal privatization policy will remain unchanged regardless of the level of the marginal environmental damage in a horizontal market structure, whereas in a vertical market structure the optimal degree of privatization increases with the level of the marginal environmental damage. Second, privatizing an upstream public firm does not always harm and may even benefit downstream private firms if the marginal environmental damage is sufficiently high. Third, environmental quality can improve after privatization if the public firm belongs to a relatively less polluting industry, but it can deteriorate after privatization if the public firm belongs to a highly polluting industry. Finally, the optimal degree of privatization of an upstream public firm under a vertical market structure being higher or lower than that under a horizontal market structure crucially depends on the pollution level of the industry and the increasing speed of firms' marginal cost.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 11 月 25 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	垂直相關市場中企業社會責任的策略性誘因
作者	李家君
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	李家君
參加人員	王佳琪、李家君、丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、呂得成、曹古駒、周宗翰、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	隨著商業發展，企業越來越看重社會責任，本文建立一個上下游供應鏈的雙佔模型，給定製造商將產品以兩部定價方式授權於予經銷商進行銷售，並且製造商與經銷商是否須承擔企業社會責任，皆是由該供應鏈之業主決定的情況下，分析業主如何選定自身供應鏈中的製造商或經銷商參與CSR活動的程度，並進一步探討對消費者剩餘和社會福利的影響。結果顯示，兩條供應鏈之業主同時讓其製造商參與CSR活動程度的時候，將存在一組最適的內在解；而若讓其經銷商參與CSR活動程度的時候，兩條供應鏈之業主則會要求其經銷商完全參與CSR活動。此外，在前一種情況下，雖然消費者剩餘與社會福利可因此增加，但兩家業主的利潤反較完全不顧企業社會責任時來的低；反之，在後面一種情況，兩條供應鏈之經銷商完全參與CSR活動反而會降低消費者剩餘與社會福利，但兩家業主的利潤卻可因此而提高。

研討日期	2017 年 12 月 2 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Optimal Design of Multi-dimensional Rank-order Contests
作者	Jingfeng Lu, Bo Shen, Zhewei Wang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	王哲偉
參加人員	李長英、王哲偉、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、黃鴻、呂得成、曹古駒、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	<p>Summary (more intuition)</p> <p>with fixed budget V</p> $V_{12} = V, V_0 = 0 \text{ and } V_2 \square V_1 = -V$ <p>with costly flexible budget</p> $V_{12} = W_- \text{ and } V_1 = V_2 = V_0 = 0$ <p>in the latter: prize allocated is costly and budgets between the two situations are allowed to be transferred</p> <p>budget for $(V_{12}; V_0)$ is W_- and for $(V_1; V_2)$ is zero</p>

研討日期	2017 年 12 月 2 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Competitive Pursuit of Targetability with Privacy Intrusions
作者	Changying Li, Yue Li, and Jianhu Zhang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	李長英
參加人員	李長英、王哲偉、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、黃鴻、呂得成、曹吉駒、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	<p>This paper proposes a framework in which two platforms compete to improve their targetability, which sensitizes consumers to privacy concern and leads them to resist ads. We analyze the impact of consumer privacy on competitive pursuit of targetability by the platforms. We find that, under pay-TV, equilibrium targetability is lower than the social optimum. The improvement in targetability hurts platforms but benefits consumers. Under free-to-air, equilibrium targetability is too high (low) if consumers are more (less) privacy-sensitive, increased targetability might benefit both platforms and consumers. In addition, privacy regulation reduces targeting accuracy through the increase in the cost of improving targetability and therefore might make consumers worse off. Our findings contribute to the business strategy of platforms and offer insights to the assessment of the regulatory debate on consumer privacy.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 12 月 23 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Optimal Technology Import in a Two-Tier Monopoly
作者	曹古駒
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周宗翰、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial upgrading <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The government takes measures aimed at improving the competitiveness and capabilities of domestic firms and promoting structural transformation. - Encourage the development and growth of part or all of the manufacturing sector as well as other sectors of the economy. • However <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - due to lack of technology, - the government can through international technology licensing to achieve the purpose of industrial upgrading. • Technology licensing is an important element of conduct in many industries and has attracted a fair amount of attention in the industrial organization literature.

研討日期	2017年12月23日上午12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	International Outsourcing, Tax, and Patent Protection
作者	Soumyananda Dinda and Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 13 (1), 2011, pp. 139–154.
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周宗翰、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	<p>We show the implications of strengthening patent protection in a developing country in the presence of a vertical technology transfer, which, despite its empirical relevance, did not get due attention in the literature. We show that if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, a strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. However, if there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or discriminatory tax policy in the developing country, the profits of the developed-country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing countries.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 12 月 30 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Procurement of Advanced Technology and Welfare-Reducing Vertical Integration
作者	Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura and Chul-Hi Park
文獻出處	Munich Personal RePEc Archive (5 May 2017)
主講人	Toshihiro Matsumura
參加人員	Toshihiro Matsumura (松村敏弘)、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、曹古駒、周宗翰、許至乙、楊東穎
摘要	<p>This article presents a model in which two downstream firms compete in a differentiated product market and choose whether to adopt new advanced inputs supplied by the monopolist, while standard inputs are competitively supplied. When the monopoly supplier is independent, from the welfare viewpoint, the incentive to adopt the new inputs is insufficient (can be excessive) given that the rival does not adopt (adopts). When the monopoly supplier and one downstream firm merge, such integration increases the unintegrated downstream firm's incentive to adopt the new input supplied by the rival and thus helps the spread of new inputs in the industry.</p> <p>However, because of the collusive effect of increasing the prices of the final products, vertical integration can be harmful for welfare despite the reduction in the welfare loss due to double marginalization and the increase in product quality.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 6 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Indirect Taxes in Oligopoly in Presence of Licensing Opportunities
作者	Neelanjan Sen and Rajit Biswas
文獻出處	<i>J Ind Compet Trade</i> (2017) 17:61–82
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、鍾暉陵、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem tax in a Cournot duopoly market in the presence of licensing opportunities after the announcement of the tax rates by the government. In case of fixed-fee licensing, if the unit cost difference of the firms is low and tax revenue of the government is high, then unit tax is more efficient than the ad valorem tax. If tax revenue of the government is low, then ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax. Ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax in the case of royalty licensing.

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 6 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Refusals to Deal and Orders to Supply in Competitive Markets
作者	Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 17 (1999) 399–417
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、鍾疇陵、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	A number of recent antitrust cases in North America and Europe have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper analyzes such refusals in a competitive market and connected aftermarket. In this model, the refusals help to support higher prices for high intensity-high value users; however, these higher charges permit the recovery of higher costs incurred during an initial warranty period. Since full prices equal full marginal costs in equilibrium, the refusals permit the attainment of a first-best outcome and an attempt by antitrust authorities to force supply will be welfare-reducing.

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 13 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Trading Away Wide Brands for Cheap Brands
作者	Swati Dhingra
文獻出處	<i>American Economic Review</i> 2013, 103(6): 2554-2584
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙
摘要	Firms face competing needs to expand product variety and reduce production costs. Access to larger markets enables innovation to reduce costs. Although firm scale increases, foreign competition reduces markups. Firms' ability to recapture lost markups depends on the interplay between within-firm competition and across-firm competition. Narrowing product variety eases within-firm competition but lowers market share. I provide a theory detailing the impact of trade policy on product and process innovation. Unbundling innovation provides new insights into welfare gains and innovation policy. Product innovation increases welfare beyond standard gains from trade. The relative returns to innovation policy change with trade liberalization.

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 13 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	International Asymmetric R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy
作者	Yasunori Ishii
文獻出處	<i>J Econ</i> (2017) 122:267–278
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	周宗翰、呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙
摘要	<p>This study models an international duopoly under “asymmetrical” R&D investment rivalry, in which a firm from a cost-reducing country (CRC) conducts process R&D investment, a firm from a quality-improving country (QIC) makes product R&D investment, and the governments in the respective countries implement R&D policies for their own firms. We analyze the relationship between firms’ R&D investment-price decisions and governments’ R&D policies. We find that an increase in the process (product) R&D investment subsidy of the CRC (QIC) raises the process (product) R&D investment of its firm, but reduces the product (process) R&D investment of its rival firm, and vice versa. We also show that, while an increase in the process (product) R&D investment of the CRC’s (QIC’s) firm increases its output, it decreases its rival’s output, and vice versa. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, while an increase in the process R&D investment of the CRC’s firm reduces the prices of both firms, an increase in the product R&D investment of the QIC’s firm raises its own price, but reduces its rival’s, and vice versa. Finally, we find that the optimal R&D investment policies of both countries are subsidy policies, when their firms act under asymmetrical R&D investment rivalry.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 20 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Cooperation in Product Development and Process R&D between Competitors
作者	Marc Bourreau, Pinar Doğan
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 28 (2010) 176–190
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	蔡明芳、施姍全、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、周冰瑤、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	In this paper, we first provide a simple framework for cooperation in product development between competitors. We put forward the trade-off between the benefits obtained through development cost-sharing and the cost of intensified competition due to reduced product differentiation, which implies that no cooperation can be an equilibrium outcome. We allow for firms to cooperate partially, i.e., to develop some product components jointly, but not necessarily all components. This enables us to study the factors that may have an effect on the degree of cooperation in product development, both in the presence and in the absence of process R&D. We also analyze the interaction between cooperation decisions on product development and process R&D. By considering a direct link between the two, we show that the degree of cooperation in product development may adversely affect the intensity of cooperation in process R&D.

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 20 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization
作者	Thomas D. Jeitschko and Nanyun Zhang
文獻出處	<i>The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics</i> 2014; 14(1): 27–57
主講人	施佩全
參加人員	蔡明芳、施佩全、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、周冰瑤、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	<p>The conventional wisdom is that the formation of patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complementary, since the pool avoids a double-marginalization problem associated with independent licensing. This conventional wisdom relies on the effects that pooling has on downstream prices. However, it does not account for the potentially significant role of the effect of pooling on downstream product development and commercialization. We consider development technologies that entail spillovers between rivals and assume that final-demand products are imperfect substitutes. When pool formation facilitates information sharing and spillovers in development, then decreases in the degree of product differentiation can adversely affect welfare by reducing the incentives towards product development and product market competition – even with perfectly complementary patents. The analysis modifies and even negates the conventional wisdom for some settings and suggests why patent pools are uncommon in science-based industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals that are characterized by tacit knowledge and incomplete patents.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 27 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets
作者	Marc Escrivuela-Villar, Ramon Faulí-Oller
文獻出處	<i>Span Econ Rev</i> (2008) 10:279–288
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	丁虹仁、王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、鍾暉陵、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	<p>It is well known that the profitability of horizontal mergers with quantity competition is scarce. However, in an asymmetric Stackelberg market we obtain that some mergers are profitable. Our main result is that mergers among followers become profitable when the followers are inefficient enough. In this case, leaders reduce their output when followers merge and this reduction renders the merger profitable. This merger increases price and welfare is reduced.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 1 月 27 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Mixed Duopoly with a Partial-Delegated-Public Firm
作者	Jie Shuai
文獻出處	<i>The Manchester School</i> Vol 85 No. 3 339–356 June 2016
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	丁虹仁、王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、鍾疇陵、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	We compare the welfare results of mixed duopoly model where a firm can be private, public or partial-delegated-public. We consider two types of partial-delegated-public firms. In partial-delegated-public with location delegation, the firm chooses location to maximize its profit while the social planner chooses price to maximize social surplus. Partial-delegated-public firm with price delegation is the opposite where the firm chooses price to maximize its profit. We find significant differences in equilibrium outcomes both between the two types of partial-delegated-public firms, and between the partial-delegated-public firms and the purely private/public firms. While equilibrium prices in the partial-delegated-public firm cases lie in between those in the pure cases (purely private or purely public), the private firm's profit may be higher when its rival is a partial-delegated-public firm rather than a purely private/public firm. We also find a 'trade-off' within the two partial-delegated-public firm cases: social surplus is higher under location delegation, but consumer surplus and profit of the partial-delegated-public firm are higher under price delegation.

研討日期	2018 年 2 月 3 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 814 討論室
主講題目	Strategic Environmental Policy; Eco-dumping or a Green Strategy?
作者	Mads Greaker
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i> 45 (2003) 692–707
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	The Porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation's export industry. While this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality, this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational. If the available abatement technology turns the environment into an “inferior input”, competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy. The government should take advantage of this, and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax. The findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy. If a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness, the environment is better protected without cooperation.

研討日期	2018 年 2 月 3 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 814 討論室
主講題目	Aftermarket Power and Foremarket Competition
作者	Luís Cabral
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 35 (2014) 60–69
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周宗翰、楊東穎
摘要	I revisit the issue of aftermarkets by developing an infinite period model with overlapping consumers. If the aftermarket is characterized by constant returns to scale, then social surplus and consumer surplus are invariant with respect to aftermarket power. Under increasing returns to scale, however, greater aftermarket power leads to: greater concentration in the foremarket; higher barriers to entry; higher social surplus; and possibly higher consumer surplus.

研討日期	2018 年 2 月 10 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Sequentialism vs. Simultaneity to Free Trade
作者	Te-Cheng Lu, Jin-Li Hu, Yan-Shu Lin
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、鍾疇陵、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、周冰瑤、張志偉、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、鄭依涵、胡均立
摘要	This paper constructs a three-country intra-industry trade model with asymmetric cost firms, in order to analyze the welfare effects under sequential or simultaneous customs unions (CUs) forming on the basis of the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. On a non-discriminatory basis, sequential or simultaneous trade liberalization and their impact on pursuing global free trade are analyzed herein. A cost-efficient (cost-inefficient) CU imposes a low (high) common external tariff on a non-member country, where the degrees of trade liberalization are also endogenously decided. Sequentialism may yield global free trade if the difference in cost efficiency is sufficiently low. By contrast, global free trade is a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) under simultaneity.

研討日期	2018 年 2 月 10 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Incentives, Performance and Desirability of Socially Responsible Firms in a Cournot Oligopoly
作者	Luca Lambertini and Alessandro Tampieri
文獻出處	<i>Economic Modelling</i> 50 (2015) 40–48
主講人	鍾疇陵
參加人員	呂得成、鍾疇陵、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、周冰瑤、張志偉、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、鄭依涵、胡均立
摘要	This paper investigates how socially responsible behavior influences firms' profits and social welfare when production entails an environmental externality. We study a Cournot oligopoly with pollution, with one CSR operating in the market. A CSR firm not only takes into account its profits but also internalizes its own share of pollution and is sensitive to consumer surplus. With a large enough market, the CSR firm obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors, and induces a higher level of social welfare. The results are confirmed when a socially optimal tax on pollution is adopted. Indeed, even if the environmental concern restrains the production of a CSR firm, the social concern expands it. The second effect more than offsets the first one in a large market, making the CSR production strategy be more aggressive compared to its competitors.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 3 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Comparing Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes under Price-inelastic Demand with Quality Differentiation
作者	Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang, Ping-Yao Chou, and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾曉陵、周宗翰、李家君、鄭依涵、吳家敏、陳聖沛
摘要	We examine the superiority of a specific tax and an ad valorem tax in a fully covered model with vertical differentiation. While the traditional literature mainly focuses on the effects of the two tax schemes on the price elasticity of demand, we concentrate our analysis on the effects of the two tax schemes on the production distributions and the quality levels of the high- and low-quality products, because the demand for each of them is inelastic in this paper. We show that a specific tax is superior to an ad valorem tax in the short run, when the marginal cost of the high-quality product is relatively low or is relatively high but the ad valorem tax rate is high. We also show that a specific tax is superior to an ad valorem tax in the long run, when the ad valorem tax rate is high enough. These two results imply that the government should impose a specific tax on products with price-inelastic demand if the tax revenue requirement is high.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 3 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Why are extended warranties so expensive?
作者	Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 45 (1994) 2.53-257
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾曉陵、周宗翰、李家君、鄭依涵、吳家緻、陳聖沛
摘要	Intense users place greater demands than other users on repair services during the period covered by the manufacturer's basic warranty. An extended warranty with a price exceeding expected cost permits the recovery of the extra costs of servicing more intense users.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 10 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The Profit-Maximizing Case for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly
作者	Gregory E. Goering
文獻出處	Managerial and Decision Economics 35: 493–499 (2014)
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、張瑞雲、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	We analyze a stylized distribution channel (bilateral monopoly) model where an upstream manufacturer sells output to a downstream retailer. In a two-stage linear demand game setting, we show that a two-part contract, consisting of a wholesale price and corporate social responsibility (CSR) component, can be utilized by the manufacturer to fully coordinate and control its retailer. Thus, a CSR contract can be used in place of the traditional two-part tariff scheme (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) to optimally coordinate the marketing channel. Our model provides a novel theoretical profit-maximizing rationale for the strategic use of CSR.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 10 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Optimal Licensing Policy under Vertical Product Differentiation
作者	Xuan Nguyen, Pasquale Sgro, and Munirul Nabin
文獻出處	<i>Review of Development Economics</i> , 21(3), 497–510, 2017
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	王羿傑、張瑞雲、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	This paper explores a vertical product differentiation model with a licensing arrangement between a multinational firm with superior technology and a domestic firm with obsolete technology. We find that a subsidy provided by the domestic country's government to the domestic firm to assist with the licensing arrangement is welfare enhancing for the domestic country. Furthermore, both the multinational firm and the domestic country are better off under royalty than under fixed fee licensing. These findings stand in contrast to earlier results in the literature.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 17 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Cooperating with competitors: Patent pooling and choice of a new standard
作者	Nancy Gallini
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> Volume 36, September 2014, Pages 4-21
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、高國峯、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	I examine the efficiency of patent pooling in a setting that allows for the interplay between the standards process, in which owners of essential intellectual property (IP) develop a new product, and the subsequent pooling decision, in which IP prices are coordinated. If one of the IP owners is also the incumbent of a product that employs the current competing standard – referred to as overlapping ownership – then the relationship among the IP owners will be both vertical through their IP, and horizontal through their competing interests in the final products. Consumers are better off when IP owners cooperate, even when these owners are effectively competitors, because of lower prices and greater product variety. Consumers prefer, however, that the agreements not admit firms with overlapping ownership. These results inform antitrust policy on cooperative agreements among competitors.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 17 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The Strategic Effect of a Licensing Option Agreement in Vertically Related Markets
作者	Kuo-Feng Kao
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	林晏如、高國峯、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	We employ a simple successive monopoly model to investigate the effect of a licensing option agreement in vertically-related markets. By providing licensing options to the licensee, the innovator can resolve the hold-up problem in vertically-related markets by making the input monopolist aware that its pricing will affect the downstream firm's incentive on exercising the licensing option. The input monopolist can thus encourage technology licensing to happen by determining a low input price. At equilibrium, both the innovator's profit and the social welfare with the licensing option are higher than that without.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 31 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Can collusion promote sustainable consumption and production?
作者	Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Yossi Spiegel
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 53 (2017) 371–398
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	周宗翰、王佳琪、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、楊東穎、李家君、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	Several competition authorities consider the exemption of horizontal agreements among firms from antitrust liability if the agreements sufficiently promote public interest objectives such as sustainable consumption and production. We show that when consumers value sustainable products and firms choose investments in sustainability before choosing output or prices, coordination of output choices or prices boosts investments in sustainability and may even enhance consumer surplus when products are sufficiently close substitutes and the marginal cost of investment in sustainability is relatively low. By contrast, coordination of investments in sustainability leads to lower investments and harms consumers.

研討日期	2018 年 3 月 31 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Policy Spillovers in the Regulation of Multiple Pollutants
作者	Stefan Ambec and Jessica Coria
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i> 87 (2018) 114–134
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、王佳琪、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、楊東穎、李家君、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or dis- economies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that trans- boundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump-sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs.

研討日期	2018 年 4 月 7 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Time preference and the welfare effects of tie-in sales
作者	Florian Heubrandner, Bernd Skiera
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 108 (2010) 314–317
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	呂銘耀、許至乙、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、黃鴻、周宗翰、鍾秉均、吳家緻、林筠珊、鄭依涵
摘要	This paper shows for B2C tie-in sales with a monopoly or competition in the durable market that tying increases welfare for the likely case that consumers exhibit higher discount rates than firms.

研討日期	2018 年 4 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Quality in Open Markets: The Sumo Conjecture
作者	M.F. Calmette, M. Kilkenny, C. Loustalan, I. Pechoux, C. Bernard
文獻出處	<i>Revue économique</i> 2018/2 (Vol. 69) 197-224
主講人	呂銘耀
參加人員	呂銘耀、許至乙、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、黃鴻、周宗翰、鍾秉均、吳家緻、林筠珊、鄭依涵
摘要	<p>How can trade expansion lead to lower quality and less diversity? Autarky quality is hypothetically positively related to domestic market size and willingness to pay for quality, and inversely related to the cost of quality. To investigate open market outcomes we formalize strategically interacting firms. We identify when low-quality producers can lead and drive high-quality producers out of the market, despite the existence of customers willing to pay for quality. The strategy is more likely when the emerging exporter is very large but the difference in willingness to pay for higher quality between it and the trade partner is small.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 4 月 14 日上午 10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Forward and backward stocking policies for a two-level supply chain with consignment stock agreement and stock-dependent demand
作者	W. Lee, S.-P. Wang and W.-C. Chen
文獻出處	<i>European Journal of Operational Research</i> 256 (2017) 830–840
主講人	李文義
參加人員	李文義、王光正、王羿傑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周冰瑤、楊東穎、許至乙、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛
摘要	<p>We consider a vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock agreement applied to the integrated vendor-buyer system, in which the vendor manufactures a single product in batches and delivers it in equal-sized transfer lots to the buyer. Some of the delivered items are presented to the end customers in the buyer's display area, while the rest of the items are kept in the buyer's backroom warehouse.</p> <p>Demand is assumed to be positively dependent on the amount of stock displayed. We propose a new joint economic lot sizing (JELS) model, taking into account the vendor's stocking policy, to maximize the total profit for the coordinated system. This paper first proves that, for any stock-dependent demand, a minimum restocking level at the buyer's sales floor is a more profitable strategy than the traditional run-out replenishment policy. It then shows that when the unit inventory holding cost decreases as stock moves downstream the supply chain, the vendor ought to adopt the forward stocking policy, in which product is pushed forward to the buyer's warehouse as soon as possible. Finally, it derives the analytical formulations for the maximum inventory levels at different stocking points, while the vendor adopts either forward or backward stocking policy.</p> <p>Numerical examples are also provided for illustration.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 4 月 21 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Environmental Policy in a Linear City Model of Product Differentiation
作者	ANA ESP'NOLA-ARREDONDO and HUAN ZHAO
文獻出處	<i>Environment and Development Economics</i> 17: 461–477
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	張瑞雲、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	This paper analyzes how a tax/subsidy policy affects consumers' behavior when choosing between green (pollution-free goods) and conventional products, and its effects on welfare when a proportion of consumers have strong preferences for green goods. We analyze a Hotelling's linear city model where final products by two firms are symmetric in all dimensions except for the externality their production process generates. Our efficiency comparisons suggest that, under a setting of horizontal product differentiation, an environmental regulation (either on polluting firms or consumers buying their products) yields higher social welfare than the absence of policy. Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer green products affects the welfare gains from a subsidy or tax policy.

研討日期	2018 年 4 月 21 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Domestic Patenting Systems and Foreign Licensing Choices
作者	Yingyi Tsai and Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>J Econ</i> (2017) 121:173–191
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	This paper examines a foreign technology holder's licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor's technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor's selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.

研討日期	2018年5月5日上午12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Efficient Durable Good Pricing and Aftermarket Tie-In Sales
作者	DAVID L. KASERMAN
文獻出處	<i>Economic Inquiry</i> 2007 45(3), p533-537
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	施佩全、許至乙、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、周冰瑤、楊東穎、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	The conditions under which a durable good supplier employs a tying arrangement that binds aftermarket purchases to the original sale was a central issue in the Kodak case. Two competing theories were presented in that case. Importantly, neither of these provides an efficiency-based explanation for the observed behavior. Subsequent theories provide several efficiency-driven motivations for aftermarket tying. None of these, however, rely upon efficient contracting between the buyer and the seller of the durable good. This article demonstrates the conditions under which such a contract will contain an aftermarket tie-in provision.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 5 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical licensing, input pricing, and entry
作者	Elpiniki Bakaouka and Chrysovalantou Milliou
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 59 (2018) 66–96
主講人	施珮全
參加人員	施珮全、許至乙、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、周冰瑤、楊東穎、鍾秉均、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing even when licensing also transforms the licensee into one of its direct competitors in the final products market. In fact, the licensee's entry into the final products market, although it increases the competition and the cost that the licensor faces, reinforces the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive welfare implications of vertical licensing.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 12 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	When ad valorem tax prevails in international tax competition
作者	Hikaru Ogawa
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 46 (2016) 1–9
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	鄭依涵、周冰瑤、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、黃鴻、周宗翰、李家君、鍾秉均、呂銘耀、陳盛沛
摘要	The studies on capital tax competition have assumed that the governments compete for mobile capital in unit tax, and this assumption is partially justified by Lockwood (2004), which proves that unit tax competition is always welfare superior to ad valorem tax competition within a framework of symmetric tax competition. This paper presents the reexamination of governments' choice on tax method in the framework of asymmetric tax competition. The results show that asymmetric countries do not compete in the same tax instrument, as assumed in the literature. The capital importing countries compete in ad valorem tax, while the capital exporting countries compete in unit tax.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 12 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Complementary monopolies and multi-product firms
作者	Michael Kopel, Clemens Löffler and Thomas Pfeiffer
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 157 (2017) 28–30
主講人	鄭依涵
參加人員	鄭依涵、周冰瑤、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、黃鴻、周宗翰、李家君、鍾秉均、呂銘耀、陳盛沛
摘要	<p>According to the classical result on complementary monopolies, a single-product firm unambiguously prefers purchasing complementary inputs from an integrated monopolistic supplier rather than from different non-integrated monopolistic suppliers. In this note, we account for the fact that firms often manufacture multiple products and show that the classical result on complementary monopolies can be reversed in such a case. Purchasing complementary inputs from non-integrated suppliers can be optimal for multi-product firms.</p>

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 19 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets
作者	Youping Li
文獻出處	<i>THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS</i> 0022-1821 Volume LXV September 2017 No. 3
主講人	周宗翰
參加人員	周宗翰、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周冰瑤、吳世傑、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、陳聖沛、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from demand-based price discrimination, cost-based differential pricing shifts production efficiently. If total output (and consumer welfare) is weakly increased under differential pricing as opposed to uniform pricing, as is true for weakly convex final market demand functions, social welfare is strictly improved. The analysis is extended to the case in which both the upstream monopolist's cost to serve the downstream firms and the downstream firms' cost to produce the final good differ.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 19 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency
作者	Markus Reisinger and Emanuele Tarantino
文獻出處	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 46, No. 3, Fall 2015 pp. 461–479
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	周宗翰、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、周冰瑤、吳世傑、楊東穎、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、陳聖沛、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two-part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output-shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below-cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 26 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Location, Price, and Welfare in the Presence of An On-line Firm
作者	Wen-Jung Liang and Yi-Jie Wang
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	呂銘耀、王羿傑、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、施佩全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要	We utilize a barbell model, in which both the brick-and-mortar firms' costs and markets are asymmetric, to examine the effects of increasing the number of firms by adding an online firm on brick-and-mortar firms' location choices, outputs, price, and welfare under Cournot competition. We obtain the following results. First, it may induce the two brick-and-mortar firms to switch their optimal locations either from agglomeration at the urban market to separate or from separation to agglomerate at the urban market. Second, the total sales may decline and the price level may rise in the urban market. Lastly, the welfare level may worsen.

研討日期	2018 年 5 月 26 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical Integration and Product Differentiation
作者	Piercarlo Zanchettin and Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 55 (2017) 25–57
主講人	呂銘耀
參加人員	呂銘耀、王羿傑、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、吳家緻
摘要	We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an up-stream monopolist's incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms' differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 2 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The effect of dual channels of on-line and off-line stores
作者	Yi-Ren Liou
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	劉乙人
參加人員	劉乙人、楊東穎、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、許至乙、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	This paper studies the effect of dual channels in two types of product differentiation models. First, a vertical product differentiation model is utilized to examine the differences between physical (off-line) store only and dual channels with both on-line and off-line stores. It is found that both input and physical prices are lower in dual channels than those in the physical store only, and the retailer will choose dual channels when the on-line store is available and the manufacturer's profit is ambiguous. Furthermore, the consumer surplus is higher in dual channels lead higher input price and physical price. When the on-line store exists in the market, the retailer chooses dual channels which also benefit the manufacturer. Comparing to physical store only, dual channels lead lower consumer surplus and higher social welfare.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 2 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Green consumption and relative preferences in an international oligopoly
作者	Ornella Tarola, Giulia Ceccantoni, and Skerdilajda Zanaj
文獻出處	CREA Discussion Paper (https://wwwfr.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/crea/publications2/discussion_papers)
主講人	楊東穎
參加人員	劉乙人、楊東穎、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、許至乙、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵、林筠珊
摘要	We consider an open to trade North-South two-country model with two vertically differentiated goods and relative preferences in consumption. Differentiation is along an environmental quality dimension. Analyzing the equilibrium configuration, we find that the green firm obtains higher profits under relative preferences than in their absence, whereas a brown firm is penalized by them if trade is sufficiently liberalized. Moreover, under relative preferences in both countries, trade liberalization is beneficial for the green producer but detrimental for the brown rival. Importantly, this finding does not hold when these preferences are only present in the developing country where the brown good is produced. In this case, the process of trade liberalization can be environmentally detrimental since it can favor the brown firm in terms of profits, while penalizing the green rival.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 9 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tariff induced licensing contracts, consumers' surplus and welfare
作者	Abhishek Kabiraj, Tarun Kabiraj
文獻出處	<i>Economic Modelling</i> 60 (2017) 439–447
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵
摘要	We construct a duopolistic trade model with technology transfer and consider two-part tariff licensing contracts. We show that a tariff on foreign products can influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. There is a trade-off between a tariff and a royalty license in affecting the product price. We show in particular that a tariff can be chosen so as to induce fee licensing and maximize both consumers' surplus and domestic welfare. This resolves the so-called conflict between these two objectives in respect of the choice of a tariff. The paper provides a number of testable hypothesis.

研討日期	2018年6月9日上午10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Parallel Imports and Repair Services
作者	Jota Ishikawa, Hodaka Morita, Hiroshi Mukunoki
文獻出處	CESifo Working Papers
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、吳家緻、呂銘耀、鄭依涵
摘要	This study explores the effect of parallel imports (PIs) when the producer may discriminate repair and maintenance services against PI units. This service discrimination weakens intra-brand competition and reduces the degree of price convergence between countries. If the producer makes costly activities to improve the quality of the good, permitting PIs in the presence of the service discrimination could lower the quality, because lower quality leads to a larger price gap. Consequently, it is possible that prices increase, consumers lose, and welfare deteriorates in both countries. This negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as trade liberalization proceeds.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 16 日上午 10:20~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Downs Meets d'Aspremont and Company: Convergence versus Differentiation in Politics and the Media
作者	Wen-Chung Guo, Fu-Chuan Lai, and Wing Suen
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	賴孚權
參加人員	賴孚權、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛
摘要	Media firms have incentives to differentiate their news products to soften price competition. When consumers value cognitive consistency between the news they read and the policies they support, politicians are induced to propose more polarized policies to conform to a polarized media landscape. A stronger commercial motive or a weaker preference for editorial neutrality in the media exacerbates this effect and causes party policies to become more extreme. We find that prices for news products are higher when consumers have a demand for cognitive consistency, despite the fact that maximal product differentiation does not hold for media rms.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 16 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Downs Meets d'Aspremont and Company: Convergence versus Differentiation in Politics and the Media
作者	Wen-Chung Guo, Fu-Chuan Lai, and Wing Suen
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	賴孚權
參加人員	賴孚權、王光正、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、許至乙、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛
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研討日期	2018 年 6 月 23 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Input Price Discrimination when Buyers Operate in Multiple Markets
作者	Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf
文獻出處	<i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i> 0022-1821 Volume LVIII December 2010 No. 4
主講人	鍾秉均
參加人員	鍾秉均、林晏如、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、黃鴻、周冰瑤、周宗翰、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀
摘要	This paper revisits third-degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets. Such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs, and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations. The typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency (and welfare) by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms. When buyers serve multiple markets, price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand. When lower demand markets also have less competition, price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 23 日上午 12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Sourcing Strategies of A Multi-Input-Multi-Product Firm
作者	Michael Kopel, Clemens Löffler, Thomas Pfeiffer
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i> 127 (2016) 30–45
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	鍾秉均、林晏如、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施珮全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、黃鴻、周冰瑤、周宗翰、李家君、吳家緻、呂銘耀
摘要	Firms commonly manufacture multiple products using multiple complementary inputs. The multi-input-multi-product environment generates interactions among products yielding the following results for the firm's sourcing strategies: (i) A multi-input-multi-product firm might optimally deviate from an isolated least-cost comparison, i.e. might produce in-house even if marginal in-house production cost exceeds the per-unit input price (and vice versa). Such a deviation can be optimal even if the input supplier can engage in price discrimination and can condition its input prices on the individual products that the firm manufactures. (ii) An outsourcing wave can arise in that concurrently outsourcing all inputs can be profitable for the firm even though outsourcing each input individually is unprofitable. (iii) More competition on the supplier market can decrease the multi-input-multi-product firm's profit.

研討日期	2018 年 6 月 30 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Corporate Social Responsibility and Privatization Policy in a Mixed Oligopoly
作者	Seung-Leul Kim and Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	MPRA Paper No. 79780
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、林燕淑、施姍全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	This article formulates a mixed oligopoly in which a public firm competes with two private firms that may adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR). We investigate the optimal privatization policy and find that, depending on the magnitude of CSR, the optimality of either nationalization or full privatization can hold. In particular, we show that the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in the magnitude of CSR and thus nationalization can be optimal if they have homogeneous objectives. Under significant heterogeneity of the objectives among firms, however, the optimal degree of privatization is non-monotone with the magnitude of CSR, but full privatization can be optimal. This result suggests that the optimal privatization policy depends on both the magnitude of CSR and the heterogeneity of the objectives among private firms.

研討日期	2018年6月30日上午12:00~13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Is Price Undertaking a More Friendly Protection Policy than Anti-dumping Duty?
作者	<i>Kuo-Feng Kao and Hong Hwang</i>
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、林燕淑、施珮全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、周宗翰、楊東穎、許至乙、吳家緻、呂銘耀、陳聖沛、鄭依涵
摘要	Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) assert that price undertaking is a more friendly protection policy toward foreign dumping firm than anti-dumping duty. The main reason is that price undertaking allows the foreign dumping firm to keep the anti-dumping rents. However, this contrasts with the empirical finding in Zanardi (2006) where only 41% of anti-dumping measures in EEC ends up with price undertaking in 1981-2001, where firms can commit to a minimum price instead of being imposed an anti-dumping duty. We will show that the competition mode plays an important role in determining which anti-dumping measure is friendlier to dumping firms.

計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立已近 20 年。這 20 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近几年網路與貿易研討會和東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行，鮮少中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾四年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨演講反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。在過去一年中，我們邀請了 Toshihiro Matsumura (The University of Tokyo)、Hiroaki Ino (Kwansei University)、Xuan Nugyen (Deakin University)、Leonard FS Wang (Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)、Hiroshi Mukunoki (Gakushuin University)、Yuka Ohno (Hokkaido University) 等經濟學者蒞臨演講。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。