

科技部人文社會科學研究中心
學術研究群成果報告

產業與貿易理論學術研究群

學術研究群編號：MOST 104-2420-H-002-016-MY3- SG10510

學術研究群執行期間：2016 年 7 月 1 日至 2017 年 6 月 30 日

學術研究群召集人：黃鴻

執行機構及系所：國立臺灣大學經濟學系

中 華 民 國 106 年 7 月 6 日

補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

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補助學術研究群暨經典研讀班成果彙整表

計畫主持人：黃鴻		計畫編號：MOST 104-2420-H-002-016-MY3-SG10510				
計畫名稱：產業與貿易理論學術研究群						
		成果項目	量化	單位	質化 (說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)	
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文	21	篇	請附期刊資訊。	
		研討會論文				
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。	
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。	
		其他		篇		
國外	學術性論文	期刊論文		篇	請附期刊資訊。	
		研討會論文				
		專書		本	請附專書資訊。	
		專書論文		章	請附專書論文資訊。	
		其他		篇		
參與計畫人力	本國籍	教授		人次		
		副教授				
		助理教授				
		博士後研究員				
		專任助理				
	非本國籍	教授				
		副教授				
		助理教授				
		博士後研究員				
		專任助理				
		其他成果				
		(無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)	Asia-Pacific Trade Seminars、東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會、台灣經濟學會年會			

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中文摘要

國際貿易研究，一直是經濟學中重要的研究領域。它除了是大學經濟相關科系的必修課程外，國內也有很多學者從事此一領域之研究。台大國際貿易研究群成立迄今已將近二十年，目前參與研討會之人數約二十人，分別來自台灣公私立大學之教授與研究生，且其成員半數以上非台大經濟系畢業之系友。本研究群每年所舉辦之場次(包含參加或與其它學術機構合辦研討會)高達五十場，討論的論文超過一百篇。本研究群近五年來之研究成果斐然，成員所發表之科技部(國科會)經濟學門表列 B 級以上期刊超過五十篇。

透過國科會拋光計劃、人社中心補助學術研究群計劃、教育部邁向頂尖大學經費及黃鴻教授國家講座經費，本研討會每年均邀請多位貿易領域之國際知名學者至本研究群演講。藉由與國外此一領域知名學者之學術交流，提升台灣學者在國際學術界的學術影響力，並進一步增進相關學術社群間之關係，促使台灣之學術研究與國際學術界接軌。

本研究群的特色為以全英語進行報告與討論，成效良好，為國內少數常態性的全英語研討會。在本計劃執行期間，本研究群擬於每星期六上午十點二十分至下午一點，假台灣大學社科院聚會，討論國際貿易及其相關領域重要文獻或小組成員論文。希望藉由本計劃經費挹注，幫助本研究群成員在國際貿易領域繼續進行前瞻性研究，提升台灣國際貿易學者在國內外學術研討會與期刊發表上的表現。

關鍵字：國際貿易、研究群

英文摘要

International trade is an important field in economics. It is not only a required course in universities, but also a field in which a lot of scholars are interested. The International Trade Workshop at Department of Economics of National Taiwan University has gone through twenty years. Workshop members are professors and graduate students from various universities in Taiwan, the number is about twenty now, and more than half of them are not alumni or alumnae of National Taiwan University. The number of workshops, including conferences jointly held with other academic institutes, is over fifty and the number of papers discussed is more than a hundred each year.

Through this project and many others, we have invited many well-known scholars to give speeches at the workshop. This interaction not only enhances Taiwan scholars' academic influence in the academic circle worldwide, but also improves relationships among related academic communities, linking up home and foreign academia. Since March 2013, the official language of the workshop has switched to English and it works very well so far.

Keywords: international trade, workshop

聚會時間

日期	因故取消	日期	因故取消
2016/07/02		2016/12/31	
2016/07/09		2017/01/07	
2016/07/16		2017/01/14	
2016/07/23		2017/01/21	
2016/07/30		2017/01/28	春節
2016/08/06		2017/02/04	
2016/08/13		2017/02/11	
2016/08/20		2017/02/18	
2016/08/27		2017/02/25	
2016/09/03	東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會	2017/03/04	
2016/09/10		2017/03/11	
2016/09/17	莫蘭蒂颱風停課	2017/03/18	
2016/09/24		2017/03/25	
2016/10/01		2017/04/01	
2016/10/08		2017/04/08	
2016/10/15		2017/04/15	
2016/10/22		2017/04/22	
2016/10/29		2017/04/29	
2016/11/05		2017/05/06	網路與貿易研討會
2016/11/12		2017/05/13	
2016/11/19		2017/05/20	
2016/11/26		2017/05/27	
2016/12/03		2017/06/03	
2016/12/10		2017/06/10	
2016/12/17	台灣經濟學會年會	2017/06/17	
2016/12/24		2017/06/24	

演講題目與內容摘要

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 2 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Location and Pricing Strategies in Spatially Separate Markets
作者	Chih-Min She and Ya-Po Yang
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	楊雅博
參加人員	楊雅博、陳金盛、施姵全、黃鴻、張瑞雲、蔡明芳、梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、丁虹仁、周冰瑤、呂得成、鍾睦陵、林晏如、佘志民、曹古駒、張博涵、劉乙人
摘要	<p>We examine the location choice of a supplier and the associated welfare in a straight line model where two markets of different size exist on the two endpoints. There is a retailer in each market who purchases goods from the only supplier charging either uniform or discriminatory mill prices on the two retailers. The fixed cost incurred by the retailers turns out to be crucial in determining the location of the supplier and the associated welfare. It is found that under discriminatory pricing, the supplier always locates in the big market. However, under uniform pricing, when the market asymmetry is small, a higher fixed cost causes the supplier to locate in an interior segment, and even at an interior point somewhat biased to the small market if the fixed cost is high enough. In addition, both total output and social welfare are higher under discriminatory pricing. When the market asymmetry is large, a higher fixed cost pushes the supplier towards the small market, even to the small market if the fixed cost is high enough, moreover, total output may be smaller, but social welfare is higher under discriminatory pricing.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 2 日上午 12:00 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Wholesale Price Discrimination and Technology Spillover
作者	Chin-Sheng Chen
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	楊雅博、陳金盛、施姵全、黃鴻、張瑞雲、蔡明芳、梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、丁虹仁、周冰瑤、呂得成、鍾暉陵、林晏如、佘志民、曹古駒、張博涵、劉乙人
摘要	<p>The paper examines the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination in a vertically related market. In the model an upstream monopolist sells an input to the downstream duopolists which engage in strategic technology protections. Downstream firms' technology protections can strategically affect the wholesale prices in the context of price discrimination. The discriminatory monopolist tends to charge higher unit wholesale prices to the downstream firm with a lower effective marginal cost, thereby dampening a downstream firm's incentives to prevent technology from spilling over to the rival. As a result, wholesale price discrimination reduces downstream firms' production costs and benefits all together consumers and firms.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 9 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition
作者	Keisuke Hattori · Takeshi Yoshikawa
文獻出處	J Econ (2016) 118:97–119
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、林燕淑、張瑞雲、高國峯、黃鴻、鍾睦陵、 陳金盛、林晏如、梁文榮、彭正浩、劉乙人
摘要	<p>We investigate the social desirability of free entry under co-opetition where firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect industry-wide demand. Our findings indicate that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient market entry, depending on the commitment of investment in common property resources. In the non-commitment case, where quantities and investment are simultaneously chosen, there is a possibility of insufficient entry. However, in the pre-commitment case, where investment is chosen at a prior stage, free entry leads to excess entry and a reduction in common property resources. Interestingly, in this case, the excess entry results of Mankiw and Whinston (RAND J Econ 17:48–58, 1986) hold even without entry costs or economies of scale. These results have important policy implications for entry regulation.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 9 日上午 12:00 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	A Note on the Efficiency of Indirect Taxes in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly
作者	Judy Hsu
文獻出處	Review of Economics & Finance
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、林燕淑、張瑞雲、高國峯、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、 陳金盛、林晏如、梁文榮、彭正浩、劉乙人
摘要	Based on product homogeneity and Cournot competition, a recurrent finding in the literature is that ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to unit taxation in noncompetitive markets. This paper first observes that with asymmetric costs inefficient firms are more likely to be inactive in equilibrium under ad valorem taxation than under unit taxation. It is then illustrated that if the inefficient firms' unit costs and/or the ad valorem tax rate are high enough then unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation.

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 16 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The role of firm ownership in policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries
作者	Yasuo Sanjo
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 35 (2015) 110–121
主講人	王昇傑
參加人員	王昇傑、彭正浩、梁文榮、黃鴻、高國峯、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、張博涵
摘要	This study develops a two-country policy competition model for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries. It analyzes how firm ownership via foreign capital affects the investment location choice of the foreign firm, and policy competition between the potential host countries. The findings show that the inflow of foreign capital changes the investment location choice of the foreign firm, as does policy competition between the host countries. Further, an increase in the inflow of foreign capital to a domestic firm in the host country heightens the country's attractiveness as an investment location.

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 16 日上午 12:00 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Trade Liberalization and Product Innovation
作者	Yi-Shan Hsueh and Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	彭正浩
參加人員	王昇傑、彭正浩、梁文榮、黃鴻、高國峯、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、張博涵
摘要	<p>This paper discusses the impact of trade liberalization and firms' incentive to carry out product R&D which increases the willingness to pay of consumers in an intra-industry trade duopolistic model. In the model, firms can invest in product R&D to maximize their profits. We show that trade liberalization may encourage or discourage the two firms to invest in product R&D, depending on the consumers' preferences for the product innovation. This finding is of some interest because it is in sharp contrast to the standard result in which trade liberalization always stimulates firms to do more R&D.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 23 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Mixed Duopoly, Location Choice, and Shadow Cost of Public Funds
作者	Toshihiro Matsumura and Yoshihiro Tomaru
文獻出處	<i>Southern Economic Journal</i> 2015, 82(2), 416–429
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	丁虹仁、張博涵、梁文榮、彭正浩、王光正、高國峯、劉乙人
摘要	<p>We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare-maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 23 日上午 12:00 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Location for Foreign Direct Investment in Vertically Related Markets
作者	Chrysovalantou Milliou
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 22(2), 326–341, 2014
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	丁虹仁、張博涵、梁文榮、彭正浩、王光正、高國峯、劉乙人
摘要	<p>This paper studies a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) location decision in a vertically related market with endogenous vertical technology transfer (VTT). We show that, even though VTT is more costly in a less developed country, an MNE can transfer more technology there than in a developed country (DC). When the opposite occurs, the MNE sometimes locates in a DC where, although it faces stronger competition, it obtains the input at better terms. Therefore, by arguing that the MNE's decision can be crucially affected by the upstream market's outcomes, an alternative explanation is provided for the commonly observed foreign direct investment (FDI) in DCs.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 7 月 30 日上午 10:20 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	(1) Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders (2) Long-Run Evaluation for Public Infrastructure Investment
作者	Toshihiro Matsumura、Atsushi Yamagishi
文獻出處	working papers
主講人	Toshihiro Matsumura
參加人員	Toshihiro Matsumura、蔡明芳、高國峯、張博涵、彭正浩、詹銘 葦、周冰瑤、呂得成、梁文榮、林燕淑、張瑞雲、林晏如、王 光正、黃鴻、劉乙人
摘要	(1) The analysis of free entry markets often yields very clear-cut and contrasting results, and the results often depend on whether the demand function is convex or concave. Some results in the free-entry markets can be crucially dependent on the assumption of linear demand and this assumption can be innocuous in this context. (2) In free entry markets, incumbents or industry association may require cost-raising regulations even if they increase the costs uniformly among all firms. (3) Cost-reducing public investments for production infrastructure are insufficient for short-run viewpoint but can be excessive for long-run viewpoint.

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 6 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Note on Self-Restraint as an Online Entry-Deterrence Strategy
作者	Yunchuan Liu, Sunil Gupta, Z. John Zhang
文獻出處	<i>Management Science</i> 52(11):1799-1809.
主講人	劉乙人
參加人員	曹古駒、林燕淑、張博涵、呂得成、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳宏易、鍾曄陵、黃鴻、林晏如、王光正、劉乙人
摘要	<p>We develop a game-theoretical model to show that in the markets where price consistency across channels is critical, an incumbent brick-and-mortar retailer can deter the online entry of a pure-play e-tailer by strategically refraining from entering online. In the markets where price consistency is not a constraint, we find that the incumbent can deter the e-tailer's entry only if it enters online and credibly operates the online channel as an independent profit center. In other words, the incumbent must be willing to cannibalize its own brick-and-mortar business by charging a low online price. We also discuss some social welfare implications of retail online entry and the managerial insights of our analysis.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 6 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	BERTRAND VS. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH UPSTREAM FIRM INVESTMENT
作者	DongJoon Lee and Kangsik Choi
文獻出處	<i>Bulletin of Economic Research</i> 00:0, 2015, 0307-3378
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	曹古駒、林燕淑、張博涵、呂得成、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳宏易、鍾曄陵、黃鴻、林晏如、王光正、劉乙人
摘要	<p>This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms' point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 13 日上午 10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Real and Virtual Competition
作者	OKSANA LOGINOVA
文獻出處	The Journal of Industrial Economics 0022-1821 Volume LVII June 2009 No. 2
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、蔡明芳、鍾曉陵、呂得成、黃鴻、陳金盛、王光正、Byeong Hwa Choi、劉乙人、詹銘葦
摘要	Goods sold by electronic firms are not perfect substitutes for otherwise identical goods sold by their offline counterparts. Online purchases are associated with waiting costs, and they do not allow consumers to inspect the product prior to purchase. Visiting a conventional retailer, on the other hand, involves positive travelling costs. In this paper I extend the circular city model to include two types of firms, conventional and electronic. I show that under some parameter configurations, conventional stores actually raise their prices in response to entry of electronic firms. Moreover, economic welfare goes down.

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 13 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
作者	Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima, and Giorgos Stamatopoulos
文獻出處	J Econ (2010) 99:267–276
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	曹古駒、丁虹仁、林燕淑、高國峯、蔡明芳、鍾擘陵、呂得成、黃鴻、陳金盛、王光正、Byeong Hwa Choi、劉乙人、詹銘葦
摘要	It is known that if exogenous cost heterogeneities between the firms in a spatial duopoly model are large, then the model does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in location choices. It is also known that when these heterogeneities are stochastically determined after firms choose their locations, spatial agglomeration can appear. To tackle these issues, the current paper modifies the spatial framework by allowing firms to exchange the cost-efficient production technology via royalties. It is shown that technology transfer guarantees the existence of a location equilibrium in pure strategies and that maximum differentiation appears in the market.

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Competition for foreign direct investment: The role of technology and market structure
作者	Qian Hao and Sajal Lahiri
文獻出處	International Review of Economics and Finance
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、曹古駒、呂得成、劉乙人、鍾擘陵、郭紫瑩、彭正浩、張博涵、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、陳金盛、林晏如、王光正、林燕淑、詹銘葦
摘要	We analyze the location choice of a multinational corporation (MNC) between two host countries. We consider both passive and active governments and examine the role of production efficiencies, and of market structure, in the MNC's choice. Our findings include: (i) when the domestic firms export, the country with fewer firms always gets the MNC, but the MNC is indifferent between hosts with firms that have different efficiency levels, (ii) when the domestic firms do not export, the country with more firms gets the MNC if they are sufficiently inefficient, and the MNC locates in the country with less efficient firms.

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 20 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Optimal Bi-sourcing Strategy of a Multi-input-multi-product Firm
作者	高國峯
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	王羿傑、高國峯、曹古駒、呂得成、劉乙人、鍾曉陵、郭紫瑩、彭正浩、張博涵、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、陳金盛、林晏如、王光正、林燕淑、詹銘葦
摘要	<p>This paper investigates the sourcing decision of a multi-input-multi-product firm. Different from Kopel et al. (2016), we assume the sourcing decision of the firm is not a make-or-buy decision, the firm can endogenously determine how many inputs to outsource and how many inputs are produced in-house. Under this circumstance, we show that both the specific input and common input do not follow the simple isolated cost comparison. Not only the cost-saving effect shall be considered, but also the output effect is important. This result holds even the final good markets are duopoly.</p>

研討日期	2016年8月27日上午10:20~12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	代理制度下醫院的品質競爭
作者	張博涵
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	林晏如、張博涵、曹古駒、劉乙人、林燕淑、ByeongHwa Choi、呂得成、王光正、丁虹仁、高國峯、詹銘葦
摘要	代理制度對公司決策有重大影響，我們可推論，如果將代理制度引入醫療產業，將可以預期醫院的決策也將有不同的行為表現。僅假設醫院目標為極大化本身效益來決定醫療品質，將可能與實務現象脫節，導致推論結果所做的政策建議有所偏頗。為了跳脫傳統醫院經營者必為專診醫師的框架，本文將加入醫療市場上存在所有權及經營權相異之醫院的假設條件，在存在代理授權機制的情況下，討論醫院的品質決策。

研討日期	2016 年 8 月 27 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control
作者	Dragan Jovanovic and Christian Wey
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 125 (2014) 32–35
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、張博涵、曹古駒、劉乙人、林燕淑、ByeongHwa Choi、呂得成、王光正、丁虹仁、高國峯、詹銘葦
摘要	We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental to consumers.

研討日期	2016 年 9 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Disclosure standards for vertical contracts
作者	Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf
文獻出處	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 42, No. 3, Fall 2011 pp. 595–617
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、曹古駒、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾擘陵、ByeonHwa Choi、周冰瑤、郭紫螢
摘要	In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers' market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.

研討日期	2016 年 9 月 10 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Incentives to Innovate in Oligopolies
作者	PAUL BELLEFLAMME and CECILIA VERGARI
文獻出處	<i>The Manchester School</i> Vol 79 No. 1 6–28 January 2011
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	施姵全、曹古駒、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾擘陵、ByeonHwa Choi、周冰瑤、郭紫螢
摘要	In the spirit of Arrow (The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs. Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotonic, different and potentially opposite ways.

研討日期	2016 年 9 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Country risk, country size, and tax competition for foreign direct investment
作者	Yasuo Sanjo
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 21 (2012) 292–301
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、蔡明芳、丁虹仁、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、陳宏易、陳金盛、黃鴻、呂得成、周冰瑤、張博涵、曹古駒、陳怡姝
摘要	<p>This paper analyzes tax competition for foreign direct investment with country risk using a two-country model with different market sizes. We show that the trade-off between country size as a locational advantage and country risk as a locational disadvantage affects the location choice of a foreign firm. Given the circumstance in which the foreign firm faces the same probabilities of country risk in both potential host countries when deciding investment location, our analysis shows that if the market size of the high-risk country is sufficiently large relative to the low-risk country, the foreign firm benefits from choosing the high-risk larger country even if the host country's government imposes a lump-sum tax. Given the situation in which the foreign firm faces different probabilities of country risk in each host country, our results show that the important matter for the foreign firm is whether the host country is high-cost or low-cost, rather than whether the host country is high-risk.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 9 月 24 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	On the Impact of Input Prices on an Entrant's Profit Under Multi-Product Competition
作者	Duarte Brito Markos Tselekounis
文獻出處	<i>Rev Ind Organ</i> DOI 10.1007/s11151-016-9531-2
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	王羿傑、蔡明芳、丁虹仁、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、陳宏易、陳金盛、黃鴻、呂得成、周冰瑤、張博涵、曹古駒、陳怡姝
摘要	We study the impact of input prices on an entrant's profit when firms are engaged in multi-product competition. We consider a setting with both horizontal and vertical differentiation, in which a vertically integrated firm controls the input that is required for the supply of the high-quality product. We establish the conditions under which the entrant is better off from an increase in the wholesale price of this critical input. This possibility contrasts with the existing literature that, under linear demands, finds a non-positive relationship between the input price and the single-product entrant's profit.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Government-Induced Production Commitment in the Open Economy
作者	Hiroaki Ino and Akira Miyaoka
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Hiroaki Ino (豬野弘明)
參加人員	Hiroaki Ino (豬野弘明)、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曉陵、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡妏、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>In developing countries, governments often have direct or indirect control over domestic production in order to develop or protect their immature domestic industries. We investigate the welfare effects of such a production-control policy when domestic firms are faced with free entry of foreign firms. For the production-control policy, we consider that the government induces domestic firms to commit to targeted output levels before the foreign entry, and explore how effectively such a government-induced production commitment works in terms of domestic social welfare by comparing it to the welfare-maximizing import-tariff policy. We show that when the products of firms are homogeneous, the production-control policy always yields higher domestic welfare than the import-tariff policy, even if the government using production control aims to maximize domestic industry profits rather than overall domestic welfare.</p> <p>In addition, we consider the case of differentiated products and show that the superiority of production control crucially depends on the degree of product differentiation.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Are Public Firms Always Less Innovative than Private Firms?
作者	YANFANG ZHANG and WEIJUN ZHONG
文獻出處	<i>The Japanese Economic Review</i> , Vol. 66, No. 3, September 2015
主講人	陳怡妏
參加人員	陳怡妏、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、涂光億
摘要	The effect of information spillovers is analysed in a mixed duopoly where a profit-maximizing private firm and a market-share-maximizing public firm decide whether to invest in a process innovation. It is shown that, when the spillover effect is rather strong, the public firm innovates in order to acquire a larger market share, while the private firm prefers that its rival invests in the new technology and reaps the benefits of technological leakages if investment costs are moderate. Thus, when information spillovers are taken into account, the public firm sometimes behaves more innovatively than the private firm, which is contrary to the well-known results. Furthermore, in a mixed duopoly where only the public firm invests, its average cost exceeds that of its competitor, but investment remains an efficient strategy compared with non-investment.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 8 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tariffs versus anti-dumping duties
作者	Emin Dinlersoz and Can Dogan
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 19 (2010) 436–451
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	陳怡妉、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、涂光億
摘要	Tariffs and anti-dumping duties are two important tools used to protect industries from foreign competition and to generate revenue. While the two tools have been studied extensively in separate contexts, little is known about their comparative effects. This paper compares their effects on prices, profits, government revenue, industry protection, and welfare in a two-country framework where a dominant firm in one country exports to the other inhabited by an oligopoly. Conditions under which one tool dominates the other for a given criterion are provided.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	How to Commit to a Future Price
作者	Keisuke Hattori and Amihai Glazer
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Keisuke Hattori
參加人員	Keisuke Hattori、Taiju Kitano、林晏如、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	A monopolist selling both a platform and its complementary products or services faces a commitment problem: after selling the platform, it has incentives to charge prices above marginal cost for the complementary good. Consumers who expect future high prices for the complementary good would be willing to pay little for the platform, reducing the firm's profits. We consider three mechanisms which would credibly induce the firm to charge a low price for the complementary good: paying a financial firm to subsidize production of the complementary good, allowing entry into the complementary-good market, and selling the platform to consumers who little value the complementary good.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 15 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Did temporary protection induce technology adoption? A study of the US motorcycle industry
作者	Taiju Kitano
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Taiju Kitano
參加人員	Keisuke Hattori、Taiju Kitano、林晏如、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	During a temporary protection in the 1980s, Harley-Davidson (HD) successfully closed technology gap with foreign rivals by adopting a new engine. According to the diffusion of the new engine across its model range, HD recovered its sales from a bottom in the early 1980s. This paper assesses the causal relationship between temporary protection and technology adoption based on a two-stage structural econometric model of technology adoption in which learning effects on adoption costs are taken into account. Simulation results show that HD would have successfully implemented the adoption and achieved the sales turnaround in the absence of the protection despite strong learning effects.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Competition, Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare
作者	Arijit Mukherjee and Uday Bhanu Sinha
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 139 (2016) 43–45
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、林晏如、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、黃鴻、蔡明芳、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、詹銘葦、陳怡妏
摘要	In contrast to the usual belief, we show that a lower product-market competition may make the consumers better off and increase welfare when foreign firms strategically choose between export and foreign direct investment (FDI). A lower product-market competition may increase consumer surplus and welfare by inducing FDI. The higher welfare stems from the increased production efficiency under FDI compared to export by the foreign firm.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 22 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Behavior-Based Price Discrimination with Experience Goods
作者	Hoe Sang Chung
文獻出處	<i>The Manchester School</i> Volume 84, Issue 5, September 2016, Pages 675–695
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	曹古駒、林晏如、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、黃鴻、蔡明芳、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、詹銘葦、陳怡紋
摘要	This paper examines the profitability of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) by duopolists producing horizontally differentiated experience goods. Considering a three-stage game in which the firms first make price discrimination decisions followed by two-stage pricing decisions, the two main results we obtain are the following: (i) if consumers underestimate the quality of the products at a level that is not very low, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria where both firms do not collect information about consumers' purchase histories so that neither firm price discriminates and where both firms collect consumer information to practice BBPD; (ii) BBPD is more profitable than uniform pricing if consumers overestimate at a more than moderate level.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Foreign Direct Investment in A Two-Tier Oligopoly: Coordination, Vertical Integration, And Welfare
作者	Ping Lin and Kamal Saggi
文獻出處	<i>International Economic Review</i> Vol. 52, No. 4, November 2011
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	張博涵、施姵全、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡奴、郭紫瑩
摘要	We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two-tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to <i>linkage offsetting</i> , FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates <i>no</i> vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.

研討日期	2016 年 10 月 29 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Innovation in Vertically Related Markets
作者	Yongmin Chen and David E. M. Sappington
文獻出處	<i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i> Volume LVIII June 2010
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	張博涵、施姵全、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	We examine the impact of vertical industry structure on upstream process innovation. We find that vertical integration (VI) generally enhances innovation under downstream Cournot competition, but can diminish innovation under downstream Bertrand competition. We also find that under Bertrand competition, VI can increase innovation when the direct incentives for innovation are limited, but can reduce innovation when the direct incentives are pronounced.

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 5 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	North-South Parallel Import, Trade Liberalization and Optimal Taxation
作者	Xuan Nguyen, Chi-Chur Chao, Hong Hwang
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	Xuan Nguyen
參加人員	Xuan Nguyen、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、陳金盛、黃鴻、呂得成、詹銘華、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	Building upon an international model of vertical product differentiation, this paper aims to uncover the impact of parallel import of ‘green and safe’ products from developed countries (North) into developing countries (South) on producing firms’ profitability and social welfare of the related countries. We show that in a broad range of parameterizations and modeling alternatives, the presence of such North-South parallel import increases the profitability of producing firms, promotes trade between North and South and enhances social welfare for these countries. In this context, we study optimal taxation from a Northern perspective and investigate how such optimal taxation and South’s incentive towards trade liberalization with North is affected by North-South parallel import.

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 12 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Market Power of The Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare
作者	JIYUN CAO and ARIJIT MUKHERJEE
文獻出處	<i>The Manchester School</i> Vol 00 No. 00 00–00 Month 2016
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	It is believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers since it creates the double marginalization problem. We show that this view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier. Market power of the input supplier may encourage a final goods producer either to license its technology to a competitor with a cost advantage or to adopt a less distortionary technology licensing contract. Both these effects may create higher consumer welfare under market power of the input supplier compared to a competitive input market.

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 12 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products
作者	Eric W. Bond and Kamal Saggi
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Development Economics</i> 109 (2014) 217–228
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	曹古駒、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>We analyze how a price control and the threat of compulsory licensing (CL) affect consumer access in a developing country (South) to a patented foreign product. In the model, the Southern government sets the level of the price control on a Northern patent-holder who chooses between entry and voluntary licensing (VL). While entry incurs a higher fixed cost, licensed production is of lower quality. If the patent-holder does not work its patent locally, the South is free to use CL. The threat of CL: ensures that consumers have access to (a lower quality version of) the patented good when the patent-holder chooses not to work its patent locally; improves the terms at which VL occurs; can cause the patent-holder to switch from VL to entry; and can delay consumer access when CL replaces VL or entry. We also show that a price control and CL are mutually reinforcing instruments.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 19 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Should Good Patents Come in Small Packages? A Welfare Analysis of Intellectual Property Bundling
作者	Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 24 (2006) 931– 952
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、彭正浩、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱
摘要	Intellectual property owners often hold the rights to several patents, each of which is essential to make or use a product. We compare the welfare properties of package licenses, under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed, with component licenses, under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount. A central finding is that a long-term package license can induce incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than are those induced by a long-term component license. We also identify settings in which a short-term license is a partial substitute for a package license and a prohibition on package licensing induces parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold-up.

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 26 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass-through
作者	Hakan Orbay and Benan Zeki Orbay
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 21(4), 627–635, 2013
主講人	陳怡妏
參加人員	陳怡妏、周冰瑤、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姍全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、ByeonHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、林季萱、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>This paper investigates effects of exchange rate on optimal trade policies and market prices within a standard export subsidy model. Shifts in exchange rate change relative efficiencies of firms in different countries. We show that depreciation of own currency increases subsidy levels when marginal cost is constant. Import dependency weakens this relationship, decreasing sensitivity of subsidy levels to depreciation. In general, subsidies reduce exchange rate pass-through. Additionally, perverse exchange rate pass-through effect arises with sufficiently intensive subsidies.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 11 月 26 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Antidumping Protection and R&D Competition
作者	Xiwang Gao and Kaz Miyagiwa
文獻出處	<i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i> / <i>Revue canadienne d'Economique</i> , Vol. 38, No. 1 February
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	陳怡妉、周冰瑤、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正 浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、ByeonHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古 駒、詹銘葦、林季萱、郭紫瑩
摘要	In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade.

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 03 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Welfare Effects of Compulsory Licensing
作者	Jacob Seifert
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Regulatory Economics</i> (2015) 48:317–350
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	張博涵、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾擘陵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡妏、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for compulsory licensing to increase consumer surplus and total welfare, taking into account both static (technology transfer) and dynamic (innovation) effects. When the risk-free rate is low, compulsory licensing is shown unambiguously to increase consumer surplus. Compulsory licensing has an ambiguous effect on total welfare, but is more likely to increase total welfare in industries that are naturally less competitive. Finally, compulsory licensing is shown to be an effective policy to protect competition per se. The paper also demonstrates the robustness of these results to alternative settings of R&D competition and discusses their significance for the debate on compulsory licensing in the context of standard-setting organisations and pharmaceutical trade.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 03 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Financial Development, Endogenous Dependence on External Financing, and Trade
作者	ByeongHwa Choi
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	ByeongHwa Choi
參加人員	張博涵、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾曉陵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、陳怡妏、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>The influential papers on the effect of credit constraints on growth and international trade (Manova, 2013; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) tend to assume that asset tangibility and the share of external borrowing are exogenous industry characteristics, which are time- and country-invariant. In the finance literature, however, the share of external borrowing is viewed as endogenous and dependent on the amount of collateral the firm can provide (and thus implicitly on its asset tangibility). In order to compare these approaches, I use Compustat Global data, to construct the measures of asset tangibility and external borrowing for 25 industries in 10 countries between 1987 and 2006. I find that (i) the share of external borrowing increases in asset tangibility, and (ii) the rankings of asset tangibility and the share of external borrowing vary significantly across countries. Further, I develop a theoretical model that incorporates financial frictions into an otherwise standard trade model to investigate the impact of financial development and asset tangibility on the demand and supply of external finance and export. The model offers theoretical predictions that are consistent with and provide an intuition for the above results.</p> <p>Furthermore, contrary to the results of Manova (2013), both the model and my empirical results demonstrate that industries with more tangible assets export relatively more from countries with higher levels of financial development.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Upstream Collusion and Downstream CSR Initiatives: Cournot vs. Bertrand Competition
作者	Han Wang and Leonard F.S. Wang
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	王鳳生
參加人員	王鳳生、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>This paper analyzes the impacts of downstream CSR initiatives on upstream tacit collusion. By considering an infinitely repeated game with trigger strategy punishment, we find that how consumer-oriented CSR affects the stability of upstream collusion basically hinges on the downstream competition mode. Specifically, the CSR initiatives facilitate upstream collusion under downstream quantity competition, whereas they hinder upstream collusion when downstream firms choose price contract. For given degree of CSR initiatives and product substitutability, upstream collusion is always less stable in the case of price competition. In addition, we also supplement existing literature to show that in a vertical market structure with the inclusion of downstream CSR initiatives; higher degree of product substitutability obstructs collusion, regardless of downstream competition mode.</p>

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm
作者	Wen-Chung Guo and Fu-Chuan Lai
文獻出處	<i>The Annals of Regional Science</i> January 2014, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 309–324
主講人	王昇傑
參加人員	丁虹仁、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、陳怡姝
摘要	d'Aspremont (Econometrica 47:1145–1150, 1979) showed that a Hotelling (Econ J 39:41–57, 1929) duopoly model with quadratic transport costs yields maximal differentiation. However, the introducing of an online firm ensures that the duopolist will never be located at the end points of the market. In other words, an online firm can raise a market effect that induces two firms to be finitely differentiated. The implication of the socially optimal solution is derived. The results herein can be extended to allow multiple firms. Finally, a free-entry equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium are also discussed.

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 24 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Discriminatory nonlinear pricing, fixed costs, and welfare in intermediate-goods markets
作者	Fabian Herweg and Daniel Müller
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 46 (2016) 107–136
主講人	陳怡妏
參加人員	丁虹仁、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、陳怡妏
摘要	We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in input markets when nonlinear wholesale tariffs are feasible. After accepting their respective wholesale contracts, two downstream firms have to pay a fixed cost in order to become active in the downstream market. If the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has significantly higher fixed cost, uniform pricing leads to lower marginal wholesale prices for all downstream firms and thus higher quantities of the final product being produced. This in turn implies that banning price discrimination improves welfare and consumer surplus. If the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has only weakly higher (or even lower) fixed cost, banning price discrimination deteriorates welfare and consumer surplus.

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 31 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Interfirm Bundled Discounts As A Collusive Device
作者	JONG-HEE HAHN and SANG-HYUN KIM
文獻出處	<i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i> , Volume 64, Issue 2, June 2016 Pages 255–276
主講人	鍾曄陵
參加人員	鍾曄陵、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、 呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand-specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.

研討日期	2016 年 12 月 31 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Market Size, Local Sourcing and Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment
作者	Jie Ma
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 21(5), 984–995, 2013
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	鍾曄陵、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡姝、郭紫瑩
摘要	This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign-owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries.

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 7 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical integration and innovation
作者	Xingyi Liu
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 47 (2016) 88–120
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、陳怡妏、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾擘陵、呂得成、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱
摘要	Innovation is a driving force for most industries, where it moreover affects many stages of the vertical chain. We study the impact of vertical integration on innovation in an industry where firms need to undertake risky R&D investments at both production and distribution stages. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm, which boosts its investment incentive at both upstream and downstream levels. However, it is only mutually beneficial for firms to integrate when both upstream and downstream innovations are important. When innovation is irrelevant at one level, firms favor instead vertical separation. The analysis provides insights for the wave of mergers and R&D outsourcing observed in the pharmaceutical industry and other vertically related industries.

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 7 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Pre-emptive Mergers and Downstream Cost Asymmetry
作者	J. Alejandro Gelves and John S. Heywood
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 147 (2016) 23–26
主講人	陳怡妉
參加人員	施姵全、陳怡妉、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾暉陵、呂得成、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱
摘要	With sufficient downstream cost asymmetry a horizontal merger will be chosen over a vertical merger. This results because the technology transfer is large and the incentive to vertically merge shrinks as the horizontal merger eliminates a cost asymmetry induced “bottleneck.”

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 14 日上午 10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Privatization and the Choice of Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly
作者	Ray-Yun Chang and Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處	Working paper, 2017
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	張瑞雲、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曁陵、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、曹古駒、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宗翰、鍾秉鈞、郭紫瑩、胡家瑜、吳世傑
摘要	<p>This paper investigates the effect of privatization on the choice of a price or a quantity contract in a mixed duopoly. We find that if the degree of privatization is sufficiently low (high), choosing the price (quantity) contract is a dominant strategy for the state-own firm. In this context, the best response for the private firm is to choose the quantity (price) contract as well. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is at middle range, not both firms choose the price or quantity contract. That is to say, the degree of privatization may affect the competition mode in the market. In addition, under partial privatization and given that the product differentiation is sufficiently large, social welfare is higher if both firms choose quantity contract. This result is very different from the convention wisdom in the mixed duopoly literature.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 14 日上午 12:00 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Strategic R&D Location by Multinational Firms: Spillovers, Technology Sourcing, and Competition
作者	REN'E BELDERBOS, ELISSAVET LYKOGIANNI, and REINHILDE VEUGELERS
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy</i> , Volume 17, Number 3, Fall 2008, 759–779
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	張瑞雲、陳金盛、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曠陵、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、曹古駒、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宗翰、鍾秉鈞、郭紫瑩、胡家瑜、吳世傑
摘要	This paper develops a model of strategic interaction in R&D internationalization decisions between two multinational firms, competing both abroad and in their home markets. It examines different incentives for foreign R&D faced by a technology leader and a technology laggard. The model takes into account the impact of local inter firm R&D spillovers, (noncostless) international intra firm transfer of knowledge, and the notion that internal R&D increases.

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 21 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Inter-firm Price Coordination in A Two-sided Market
作者	Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen, and Lars Sørsgard
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 44 (2016) 101–112
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、張博涵、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、劉乙人、陳怡姝、周宗翰、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均
摘要	In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits in the TV industry be. We also show that joint profits may be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.

研討日期	2017 年 1 月 21 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Knowledge Diffusion, Input Supplier's Technological Effort and Technology Transfer via Vertical Relationships
作者	Ai-Ting Goh
文獻出處	<i>Journal of International Economics</i> 66 (2005) 527– 540
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	曹古駒、張博涵、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、劉乙人、陳怡姝、周宗翰、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均
摘要	<p>This paper studies the effect of knowledge diffusion on the incentives for developed countries' (DC) firms to undertake costly technology transfer to their less developed countries' (LDC) suppliers whose cost of production varies inversely with their technological effort. When the incumbent supplier's cost of improving efficiency is high, diffusion of knowledge to other potential input producers encourages technology transfer, as it increases upstream competition. However, and in sharp contrast to existing literature, when technological effort is less costly, knowledge diffusion discourages technology transfer by reducing the incumbent supplier's technological effort.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Vertical or Horizontal: Endogenous Merger Waves in Vertically Related Industries
作者	Zhiyong Yao and Wen Zhou
文獻出處	<i>BE J. Econ. Anal. Policy</i> 2015; 15(3): 1237–1262
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	蔡明芳、林季萱、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、曹古駒、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宇翰、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均
摘要	Endogenous merger waves are studied in vertically related industries where firms may engage in both vertical and horizontal mergers. It is shown that whether and how firms merge depends crucially on the balance between vertical and horizontal externalities, and the balance between upstream and downstream competition. Furthermore, firms may merge with or without any fundamental change in the underlying economic conditions.

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 4 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in A Differentiated Stackelberg Duopolistic Competition Market
作者	Huaige Zhang, Xuejun Wang, Ping Qing, and Xianpei Hong
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 45 (2016) 215–229
主講人	林季萱
參加人員	蔡明芳、林季萱、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、曹古駒、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宇翰、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均
摘要	<p>This study investigates the strategy implications of patent licensing between two firms in a differentiated Stackelberg framework, when the innovator faces an uncertain research and development (R&D) outcome. We establish a three-stage duopoly game (with an R&D stage, a licensing stage and an output stage), in order to analyze the effects of product differentiation and technology spillover on the optimal licensing strategy for a stochastic R&D firm. Our results demonstrate that, in cases where the R&D outcome is uncertain, (i) whether the innovator chooses fixed-fee licensing or royalty licensing depends on the degree of product differentiation and technology spillover; (ii) when the technology spillover is lower than a critical value, regardless of the degree of product differentiation, two-part tariff licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing, and (iii) the optimal royalty rate is dependent upon the technology spillover, with the value possibly being higher than the cost reduction.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Strategic Incentives When Supplying to Rivals with An Application to Vertical Firm Structure
作者	Serge Moresi and Marius Schwartz
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> 51 (2017) 137–161
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曉陵、呂得成、張博涵、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宗翰、林季萱、郭紫瑩、許至乙
摘要	We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand—unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship—for either Cournot or Bertrand competition. With a two-part tariff on the input, the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements, but is reversed for Cournot with strategic substitutes. We analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival/customer.

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 11 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	The Effects of Trade Liberalization in a Vertical Structure
作者	Yao Liu and Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 21(5), 966–973, 2013
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	曹古駒、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、呂得成、張博涵、劉乙人、詹銘葦、周宗翰、林季萱、郭紫瑩、許至乙
摘要	Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of a labor union. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalization on the final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionized wage and imports intermediate goods. We show that trade liberalization on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (decreases) the unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit. Trade liberalization on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or decrease the domestic unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producers and the union's objective function.

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Trade liberalization and aftermarket services for imports
作者	Jota Ishikawa, Hodaka Morita, and Hiroshi Mukunoki
文獻出處	<i>Econ Theory</i> (2016) 62:719–764
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、張博涵、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、周宗翰、鍾秉均、許至乙、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm's products. This weakens the firms' competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 18 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Trade, foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals
作者	Theo Eicher and Jong Woo Kang
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Development Economics</i> 77 (2005) 207– 228
主講人	張博涵
參加人員	呂得成、張博涵、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曉陵、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、周宗翰、鍾秉均、許至乙、郭紫瑩
摘要	<p>We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.</p> <p>FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	FDI in Post-production Services and Product Market Competition
作者	Jota Ishikawa, Hodaka Morita, and Hiroshi Mukunoki
文獻出處	<i>Journal of International Economics</i> 82 (2010) 73–84
主講人	郭紫瑩
參加人員	郭紫瑩、王昇傑、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、李家君、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	<p>Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element of business activity. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign firm has the option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival or providing those services by establishing its own facilities through FDI. We demonstrate that trade liberalization in goods may hurt domestic consumers and lower world welfare, and that the negative welfare impacts are turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. This finding yields important policy implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is still limited.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 2 月 25 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Commitment, First-Mover-, and Second-Mover Advantage
作者	Michael Kopel and Clemens Löffler
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics</i> (2008) 94:143–166
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	郭紫瑩、王羿傑、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、李家君、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	<p>We identify circumstances under which a firm with a first-mover advantage may get leapfrogged by a follower. At the market stage we assume a Stackelberg structure, i.e. the leader commits to a quantity and the follower reacts to it. We allow the owners of both firms to select the internal organization and the production technology before quantities are set. That is, leader and follower can additionally use two commitment strategies alternatively or in combination: investing in R&D and delegating quantity decisions to managers. Despite the symmetry of options for the two firms, we find that there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms invest in process R&D, only the follower delegates, and the follower can overcome the first-mover advantage of the quantity leader and obtain a higher profit than the leader. Our analysis reveals that there are some important differences between the two commitment devices “cost-reducing R&D” and “delegation to managers”.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 4 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements
作者	Paul Missios, Kamal Saggi, and Halis Murat Yildiz
文獻出處	<i>Journal of International Economics</i> 99 (2016) 105–119
主講人	詹銘葦
參加人員	詹銘葦、高國峯、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宇翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	In a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries, we show that while the pursuit of customs unions (CUs) prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) does not. This result reflects the relatively flexible nature of FTAs: whereas each FTA member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non-member, CU members must do so as a group due to their common external tariff. By diverting members' exports away from the non-member, both types of trade agreements induce the non-member to voluntarily lower its import tariffs.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 4 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Competitive Parallel Imports
作者	Hong Hwang, Kuo-Feng Kao, and Pei-Cyuan Shih
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	詹銘葦、高國峯、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宇翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	We use a two-country model to investigate the effect of parallel imports when there are multiple manufacturers and retailers. If the products are differentiated, we find that both manufacturers will subsidize their retailer to acquire a higher market share when parallel imports are prohibited. However, when parallel imports are allowed, both manufacturers will increase their control over the parallel imports and raise their wholesale price, which softens the competition in both host country and foreign country. If the market size of foreign country is large enough, allowing parallel imports increases the profit of the manufacturers, but decreases the global welfare.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 11 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	“Bricks and Clicks”: The Impact of Product Returns on the Strategies of Multichannel Retailers
作者	Elie Ofek, Zsolt Katona, and Miklos Sarvary
文獻出處	<i>Marketing Science</i> 30(1), pp. 42–60
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施嫻全、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宇翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>The Internet has increased the flexibility of retailers, allowing them to operate an online arm in addition to their physical stores. The online channel offers potential benefits in selling to customer segments that value the convenience of online shopping, but it also raises new challenges. These include the higher likelihood of costly product returns when customers’ ability to “touch and feel” products is important in determining fit. We study competing retailers that can operate dual channels (“bricks and clicks”) and examine how pricing strategies and physical store assistance levels change as a result of the additional Internet outlet. A central result we obtain is that when differentiation among competing retailers is not too high, having an online channel can actually increase investment in store assistance levels (e.g., greater shelf display, more-qualified sales staff, floor samples) and decrease profits. Consequently, when the decision to open an Internet channel is endogenized, there can exist an asymmetric equilibrium where only one retailer elects to operate an online arm but earns lower profits than its bricks-only rival. We also characterize equilibria where firms open an online channel, even though consumers only use it for research and learning purposes but buy in stores. A number of extensions are discussed, including retail settings where firms carry multiple product categories, shipping and handling costs, and the role of store assistance in impacting consumer perceived benefits.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 11 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	On Welfare under Cournot and Bertrand Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies
作者	JUDY HSU and X. HENRY WANG
文獻出處	<i>Review of Industrial Organization</i> (2005) 27:185–191
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施媿全、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宇翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	Hackner (2000, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> 93, 233–239) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms, prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of Singh and Vives (1984, <i>Rand Journal of Economics</i> , 15, 546–554) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is sensitive to the duopoly assumption. Hackner (2000, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 93, 233–239), however, leaves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition. This note shows that in Hackner's model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition, regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 18 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: the case of foreign rivalry
作者	Jota Ishikawa and Kaz Miyagiwa
文獻出處	<i>The Canadian Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 41, No.3 (Aug., 2008), pp. 954-970
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、王羿傑、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、呂得成、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宇翰、李家君
摘要	Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favour of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and price undertakings. This paper compares these policy options in the presence of protection-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI), with special emphasis on rivalry between foreign firms. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. As a result, by settling AD cases with VER agreements, the importing country can pursue a more protectionist policy without triggering FDI. In this sense the GATT ban on VERs following the proliferation of AD uses was a sensible decision.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 18 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Cournot and Stackelberg Duopolies Revisited
作者	Koji Okuguchi
文獻出處	<i>The Japanese Economic Review</i> Vol. 50, No. 3, September 1999
主講人	王昇傑
參加人員	許至乙、王昇傑、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曄陵、呂得成、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宇翰、李家君
摘要	First, conditions are derived for a leader (or a follower) to be more advantageous than a follower (or a leader) in Stackelberg duopoly with symmetric firms and without product differentiation. Second, the equilibria in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies are compared under a set of reasonable assumptions. If the reaction function slopes upward, the Cournot duopolists' profits turn out to be lower than those of both the Stackelberg leader and follower, and the equilibrium industry output is smaller in Stackelberg duopoly than in Cournot duopoly.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 25 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Passive Cross Holding As A Strategic Entry Deterrence
作者	Sanxi Li, Hongkun Ma, Chenhang Zeng
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 134 (2015) 37–40
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、鍾擘陵、ByeongHwa Choi、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘華、郭紫瑩、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	This paper builds a duopoly model to study the strategic effects of cross holding on entry deterrence. We show that, in equilibrium, the incumbent optimally chooses strictly positive cross holdings in each other to deter entry for the potential entrant.

研討日期	2017 年 3 月 25 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Product Bundling and Incentives For Mergers and Strategic Alliances
作者	SUE H. MIALON
文獻出處	<i>Economic Inquiry</i> Vol. 52, No. 2, April 2014, 562–575
主講人	鍾曄陵
參加人員	林晏如、鍾曄陵、ByeongHwa Choi、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘華、郭紫瑩、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>This paper analyzes firms' choice of a merger or a strategic alliance in bundling their products with other complementary products. Tying two products of unequal value makes them equally valuable as they become inseparable for purchase. Consequently, firms can charge a higher price for the bundled products than before. If foreclosure is not the main purpose of bundling, firms would prefer strategic alliances to mergers because mergers only intensify competition by internalizing the complementarities of two products. In equilibrium, bundling occurs only through strategic alliances.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 1 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tariffication, FDI and Endogenous Market Structure
作者	Chih-Yi Hsu
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are many literatures focus on “protection-jumping” FDI, but most of this literature assumes firms compete in the short run. • We consider a model in which one foreign firms and domestic potential entrants compete in the home market. • To capture the relation between free entry and FDI.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 1 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-Sided Markets
作者	Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbueger, Guttorm Schjelderup
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Public Economics</i> 92 (2008) 1531–1539
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	許至乙、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 8 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Can Online Markets Attract High-Quality Products?
作者	Pu Chen, Yijuan Chen, Xiangting Hu, Sanxi Li
文獻出處	<i>Economic Modelling</i> 51 (2015) 65–71
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、蔡明芳、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、詹銘華、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>We study a firm's choice between online and physical markets with respect to product quality. We analyze two contrasting driving forces: On the one hand, online consumers cannot physically inspect the products prior to purchase. This provides the firm with the incentive to hide low-quality products online. On the other hand, consumer reviews and the larger market size may attract higher qualities to the online market. Using a simple yet flexible framework, we show that the firm's choice of a marketplace can disclose or hide product quality. If marginal cost is convex in quality, the firm's choice will be characterized by a cut-off quality level, below which the firm will choose the online market. If marginal cost is concave in quality, both high-end and low-end qualities may choose the online market, leaving the physical market to intermediate qualities. Overall, we show that consumer reviews can alleviate, but do not eliminate, the “lemons problem”. The pooling result in the case of concave-in-quality marginal cost provides a caveat for empirically testing the effectiveness of online consumer-review mechanisms.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 8 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous
作者	Dainis Zegners and Tobias Kretschmer
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy</i> , Volume 26, Number 1, Spring 2017, 96–122
主講人	蔡明芳
參加人員	曹古駒、蔡明芳、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、詹銘華、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below-cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition-softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition-softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 15 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
作者	Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover, and Judith Chevalier
文獻出處	<i>American Economic Review</i> 2014, 104(8): 2421–2455
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、郭紫瑩、丁虹仁、王昇傑、林晏如、林燕淑、施媿全、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾擘陵、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	Firms' incentives to manufacture biased user reviews impede review usefulness. We examine the differences in reviews for a given hotel between two sites: Expedia.com (only a customer can post a review) and TripAdvisor.com (anyone can post). We argue that the net gains from promotional reviewing are highest for independent hotels with single-unit owners and lowest for branded chain hotels with multiunit owners. We demonstrate that the hotel neighbors of hotels with a high incentive to fake have more negative reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia; hotels with a high incentive to fake have more positive reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 15 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets
作者	Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross
文獻出處	<i>The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique</i> , Vol. 31, No.5 (Nov., 1998), pp. 1204-1224
主講人	郭紫瑩
參加人員	呂得成、郭紫瑩、丁虹仁、王昇傑、林晏如、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾曉陵、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	A number of recent antitrust cases in Canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service organizations. Earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply. This paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit. It goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages inefficient substitution of inputs in the production of repairs.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 22 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Multimarket Linkages, Trade and the Productivity Puzzle
作者	Noriaki Matsushima and Laixun Zhao
文獻出處	<i>Review of International Economics</i> , 23(1), 1–13, 2015
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	丁虹仁、王佳琪、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君、吳世傑
摘要	This paper examines the relationship between firms' productivity improvement and the volume of exports, and shows that it can be sometimes negative, which seems to be an empirical puzzle. The key lies in that we simultaneously take into account intermediate retailers (i.e. vertically) and multimarket linkages (i.e. horizontally). With convex cost functions, when market conditions worsen, the manufacturer increases supply to the retailer who is larger or more efficient in trade cost.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 22 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Voluntary Disclosure and Investment in Environmental Technology
作者	Yi Li
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i> 133 (2017) 331–341
主講人	王佳琪
參加人員	丁虹仁、王佳琪、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施佩全、高國峯、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君、吳世傑
摘要	<p>I examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology. In an industry subject to environmental regulation (such as emission taxes), such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal R&D, innovation and learning (whose outcomes are uncertain and unlikely to be publicly observable). Specifically, I analyze a duopoly where firms are subject to an emission tax and invest in reducing the emission intensity of their production processes; the outcome of the investment is private information. I show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it; in particular, the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit. Thus, voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change (even when buyers have no preference for greener technology). I show that such programs generally increase social welfare.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 29 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports
作者	Noriaki Matsushima and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	<i>Open Econ Rev</i> (2010) 21:433–447
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、周冰瑤、ByeongHwa Choi、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、詹銘華、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.

研討日期	2017 年 4 月 29 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Merger and Entry-License Tax
作者	Susumu Cato and Toshihiro Matsumura
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 119 (2013) 11–13
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	施姵全、周冰瑤、ByeongHwa Choi、林晏如、林燕淑、高國峯、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.

研討日期	2017 年 5 月 13 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Preferential Trade Agreements, Technology Adoption and the Speed of Attaining Free Trade
作者	Hiroshi Mukunoki
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Hiroshi Mukunoki
參加人員	Hiroshi Mukunoki、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、張瑞雲、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>This paper compares sequential trade liberalization through a preferential trade agreement (PTA) and one-shot multilateral trade liberalization with respect to the speed with which countries attain multilateral free trade. We build a three-country oligopoly model, including one developing country whose domestic firm initially uses old technology. Firm-level adoption of new technology and country-level conclusions of trade agreements are endogenously determined. When a PTA that includes the developing country is feasible, but a multilateral trade agreement is infeasible due to prior to technology adoption in the developing country, a free trade area (FTA) accelerates technology adoption and the realization of multilateral free trade; however a customs union (CU) delays these processes. The opposite case is obtained if PTAs are infeasible prior to technology adoption, or if they are formed between developing countries. Even if increased realization of free trade via an FTA improves world welfare, a developed country may prefer liberalization via a CU.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 5 月 20 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Cournot vs. Bertrand under Centralised Bargaining
作者	Debasmita Basak
文獻出處	<i>Economics Letters</i> 154 (2017) 124–127
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、許至乙、林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under quantity competition than under price competition if the goods are substitutes (complements). Our results are strikingly different to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in other vertical pricing models.

研討日期	2017 年 5 月 20 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Tariffication, FDI and Endogenous Market Structure
作者	Chih-Yi Hsu
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	王昇傑、許至乙、林晏如、林燕淑、施姍全、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	<p>There are many literatures focus on “protection-jumping” FDI, but most of this literature assumes firms compete in the short run.</p> <p>We consider a model in which two foreign firms and domestic potential entrants compete in the home market. To capture the relation between free entry and FDI.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 5 月 27 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare
作者	Jiyun Cao and Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>The Manchester School</i> Month 2016
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、施姵全、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、詹銘葦、林季萱、周宇翰、李家君
摘要	It is believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers since it creates the double marginalization problem. We show that this view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier. Market power of the input supplier may encourage a final goods producer either to license its technology to a competitor with a cost advantage or to adopt a less distortionary technology licensing contract. Both these effects may create higher consumer welfare under market power of the input supplier compared to a competitive input market.

研討日期	2017 年 5 月 27 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Duopolistic Parallel Imports
作者	Hong Hwang, Kuo-Feng Kao, and Pei-Cyuan Shih
文獻出處	working paper
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	曹古駒、施姵全、ByeongHwa Choi、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、周冰瑤、詹銘葦、林季萱、周宇翰、李家君
摘要	We use a two-country model to investigate the effect of parallel imports when there are two manufacturers and retailers. If the products are differentiated, we find that both manufacturers will subsidize their retailer to acquire a higher market share when parallel imports are prohibited. However, when parallel imports are allowed, both manufacturers will increase their control over the parallel imports and raise their wholesale price, which softens the competition in both host country and foreign country. If the market size of foreign country is large enough, allowing parallel imports increases the profit of the manufacturers, but decreases the global welfare.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 3 日上午 10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Patent Protection As A Puppy-Dog Ploy
作者	Kaz Miyagiwa and Yuka Ohno
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	Yuka Ohno
參加人員	Yuka Ohno、ByeongHwa Choi、王光正、王羿傑、林晏如、林燕淑、張瑞雲、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、郭紫瑩、鍾秉均、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要	This paper presents a formal model of patent races in which alternative rent-appropriating measures are available. The model shows that a patent promotes rather than impedes entry, and benefits both patentees and imitators. It also shows that research effort does not respond to subtle changes in patent design when patent protection is insufficient but may even decline when the extent of patent protection is improved. Such a non-monotonic relationship between research effort and the extent of patent protection is consistent with many empirical findings.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 10 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Cooperating Upstream while Competing Downstream: A Theory of Input Joint Ventures
作者	Zhiqi Chen and Thomas W. Ross
文獻出處	<i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 21 (2003) 381–397
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、周冰瑤、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、陳金盛、蔡明芳、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、鍾秉均、許至乙、李家君
摘要	<p>Joint ventures in which firms share ownership of a facility that produces an important input have become common. In our model, two parent firms competing in a downstream market set up such a joint venture. We analyze the pricing strategy of the joint venture and the impact of this strategy on downstream competition. We compare the joint venture equilibrium with alternative arrangements in which (a) the two firms merge; and, (b) each firm produces its own input. Among our results, we find that the joint venture can replicate the effects of a full-scale merger of the parents.</p>

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 10 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes in Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly
作者	Harvey E. Lapan and David A. Hennessy
文獻出處	<i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 13 (1), 2011, pp. 125–138.
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	林晏如、周冰瑤、王光正、王昇傑、林燕淑、施佩全、梁文榮、陳金盛、蔡明芳、呂得成、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、鍾秉均、許至乙、李家君
摘要	The welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes in a single-market Cournot oligopoly is well known. This article extends the analysis to multimarket oligopoly. Provided all ad valorem taxes are equal and positive, unit costs are constant, firms are active in all considered markets, and a representative consumer has convex preferences, ad valorem taxes are shown to dominate in multiproduct equilibrium. Conditions exist, however, under which economic efficiency declines upon replacing specific taxes with ad valorem taxes that preserve output levels. We discuss the roles of unit cost covariances across multiproduct firms, and also of complementarity in demand, in determining the extent of cost efficiencies arising under ad valorem taxation. For goods that are complementary or independent in demand, conditions are found such that industry profits decline upon use of ad valorem taxes.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 17 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Technology Licensing in A Differentiated Oligopoly
作者	Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee
文獻出處	<i>International Review of Economics and Finance</i> 29 (2014) 455–465
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、許至乙、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、Tatiana Khomiakova、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competitions, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in choosing the type of the licensing contract.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 17 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly
作者	Horn-In Kuo, Cheng-Hau Peng and K.L. Glen Ueng
文獻出處	Working paper
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	曹古駒、許至乙、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、陳金盛、Tatiana Khomiakova、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱、鍾秉均、周宗翰、李家君
摘要	This paper investigates the neutrality of a profit tax in a mixed oligopoly. It is found that when the privatization level is exogenously given, the profit tax is no longer neutral. By contrast, if the optimal privatization level can be determined by the government, then the neutrality of the profit tax holds. These results are robust under a free-entry market structure.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 24 日上午 10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Is Price Undertaking a More Friendly Protection Policy than Anti-dumping Duty?
作者	<i>Kuo-Feng Kao and Hong Hwang</i>
文獻出處	Working Paper
主講人	高國峯
參加人員	高國峯、陳金盛、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗瀚、李家君
摘要	Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) assert that price undertaking is a more friendly protection policy toward foreign dumping firm than anti-dumping duty. The main reason is that price undertaking allows the foreign dumping firm to keep the anti-dumping rents. However, this contrasts with the empirical finding in Zanardi (2006) where only 41% of anti-dumping measures in EU ends up with price undertaking in 1981-2001, where firms can commit to a minimum price instead of imposing anti-dumping duty. We will show that the competition mode and the curvature of demands play important roles in determining which anti-dumping measure is more friendly to dumping firms.

研討日期	2017 年 6 月 24 日上午 12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院 710 討論室
主講題目	Passive Vertical Integration and Strategic Delegation
作者	Matthias Hunold and Konrad Stahl
文獻出處	<i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2016 pp. 891–913
主講人	陳金盛
參加人員	高國峯、陳金盛、王光正、林晏如、林燕淑、張瑞雲、梁文榮、黃鴻、Tatiana Khomiakova、曹古駒、鍾秉均、周宗瀚、李家君
摘要	With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing them to charge high downstream prices. The effects of passive backward acquisition are reinforced with the acquisition by several downstream firms in the efficient supplier. The results are sustained when suppliers charge two-part tariffs.

計畫執行心得與收穫

本研究群成立已近 20 年。這 20 年來除了遇颱風假、春節、臺灣經濟學會年會，以及近幾年網路與貿易研討會和東華大學經濟系暨 IEFS Taiwan Chapter 學術研討會外，我們都固定於每星期六上午 10：20 至下午 13：10 間舉行，鮮少中斷，深獲經濟學術界之肯定。在獲得外部經費補助前，我們都透過研究群資深成員之樂捐來運行。限於經費，我們很難邀請研究群以外之學者參加。我們非常感謝科技部人文社會科學研究中心的支持，透過本計畫之經費，讓我們得以邀請國內外產業/貿易的學者蒞臨指導，此一措施能大幅提昇研究群成員的視野，讓我們的運作更能順利，成果也較輝煌。

本研究群已於 2013 年 3 月開始改成全英語。不論論文之發表與討論皆以英語進行，實施迄今已逾四年，成效良好。透過此一全英語之研討，研究群成員幾乎都改以英語撰寫論文，也都以投稿國外期刊為主要目標。由於語言的障礙減少了，本研究群成員對外國教授蒞臨演講反應良好，期間之討論與交流也十分熱烈。在過去一年中，我們邀請了 Toshihiro Matsumura (The University of Tokyo)、Hiroaki Ino (Kwansei University)、Xuan Nugyen (Deakin University)、Leonard FS Wang (Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)、Hiroshi Mukunoki (Gakushuin University)、Yuka Ohno (Hokkaido University) 等經濟學者蒞臨演講。

本研究群已逐漸茁壯，相信它的表現肯定一年比一年好。